Audit Report

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

SUPPORT TO DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS IN THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND

Report Number 91-109

July 9, 1991

SANITIZED COPY

Classified information has been expunged based on a review preformed by the Joint Staff.

Department of Defense

INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-2884

July 3, 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR DOD COORDINATOR FOR DRUG ENFORCEMENT POLICY AND SUPPORT
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
CHIEF, NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

SUBJECT: Audit Report on Support to Drug Interdiction Efforts in the U.S. Pacific Command (U) (Report No. 91-109)

(U) This is our final report on the Audit of DoD's Support to Drug Interdiction Efforts in the U.S. Pacific Command. This audit, a segment of the overall Audit of DoD's Support to U.S. Drug Interdiction Efforts, was made from January through August 1990. The objectives of this segment of the audit were to evaluate the support that the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) provided the law enforcement community in the areas of detection and monitoring, loans of equipment, training, and operational support. We also evaluated the role of the Hawaii National Guard to determine if the support it provided to the law enforcement agencies was adequate and met the intent of Congress. Separate reports have been issued on other segments of the audit and the overall results of our review of the support provided by DoD to the U.S. Drug Interdiction Program.

(U) In FY 1989, Congress mandated the initial funding of $300 million for DoD's counternarcotics efforts. In FY 1990, funding for counternarcotics had increased to $877.6 million, which includes $450 million mandated by Congress and $427.6 million appropriated for normal DoD operations that also benefited the counternarcotics effort.

(U) The audit showed that overall, USPACOM has aggressively implemented its counternarcotics mission in the Pacific region. The emphasis placed on this new mission was demonstrated by the Commander in Chief, USPACOM, when he identified counternarcotics as the USPACOM's "number one peacetime mission." USPACOM has displayed a strong commitment to eliminate drug smuggling in the Pacific region. However, our audit identified problems in USPACOM's counternarcotics program. The results of the audit are summarized in the following paragraphs, and the details, audit recommendations, and management comments are in Part II of this report.

The Joint Task Force 5 (JTF-5) mission in Alameda, California, duplicates counternarcotics capabilities at other

USPACOM activities and creates unnecessary operational overhead. Furthermore, the location of JTF-5 in California does not allow it to provide optimum support to the law enforcement community. As a result, initial start-up costs of more than $3.2 million for JTF-5 in FY 1989 and $5.1 million in FY 1990 were unnecessarily incurred, and more than $15.8 million was programmed for JTF-5 in FY 1991 through FY 1995 that could be used more productively for counternarcotics efforts in other areas. In addition, the proliferation of access to data bases unnecessarily increased the risk for potential compromise of sensitive counternarcotics information. We recommended that JTF-5 be disestablished and that USPACOM, in coordination with the law enforcement agencies, establish liaison offices as a means of providing responsive and more efficient support to the law enforcement community. Additionally, we recommended that the intelligence functions for counternarcotics be incorporated into the existing Drug Enforcement Agency's El Paso Intelligence Center and provisions be made for future support of the National Drug Intelligence Center (page 5).

(U) The use of ships and aircraft for dedicated counternarcotics operations in the USPACOM area of responsibility was ineffective. More than $23 million was programmed for the operations of the dedicated assets in FY 1989. We recommended that dedicated counternarcotics operations that are not directed or justified by intelligence information be discontinued. We also recommended that USPACOM reprogram counternarcotics operations that are not commensurate with the counternarcotics strategy issued by the Director, Central Intelligence (page 15).

(U) The counternarcotics activities of the U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC), a USPACOM Component command in Hawaii, overlap the congressionally mandated mission of the Hawaii National Guard. Approximately $600,000 of USARPAC's $2.3 million counternarcotics program for FY 1990 is for counternarcotics operations in Hawaii. We recommended that USPACOM revise its Counternarcotics Operations Plan to acknowledge the lead role of the Hawaii National Guard for counternarcotics support in Hawaii, coordinate the USARPAC Counternarcotics Operations Plan with the Hawaii National Guard to minimize duplication efforts and to provide the most effective and responsive support to the law enforcement agencies, and review and adjust counternarcotics funding accordingly. (page 21).

(U) Based on a referral from the DoD Hotline, the Inspector General Regional Office - Hawaii, DoD, reviewed more than $69 million in USPACOM FY 1990 through FY 1994 initial requirements for counternarcotics-related programs. The audit and an

internal USPACOM review concluded that DoD guidelines were not being followed, and many of the proposed projects submitted by USPACOM Component commands were not supported by proper documentation. The internal USPACOM review identified and deleted $152 million in noncounternarcotics-related programs. After completion of the USPACOM review, we recommended the cancellation of a $4 million Secure Video Teleconferencing System. This system, proposed for both JTF-5 and the Fleet Intelligence Training Center, San Diego, California, was unjustified based on its modest potential contribution to the counternarcotics mission (page 27).

(U) On January 31, 1991, a draft of this report was provided to the Commander in Chief, USPACOM, for comments. On March 30, 1991, USPACOM provided detailed comments regarding numerous statements in the draft report. These comments are summarized and our audit responses are provided in Part II of the report. On April 1, 1991, the Deputy Director for Operations, the Joint Staff, provided unsolicited comments on the draft report. Complete texts of managements' comments are included as Appendixes F and Appendix G.

(U) USPACOM nonconcurred with Recommendation A.1. stating that if JTF-5 is disestablished, USPACOM could not effectively meet its obligation to support the LEA's during the next 2 to 5 years. USPACOM nonconcurred with Recommendation A.2. and stated that it considers current coordination with the LEA's to be effective. USAPACOM also nonconcurred with Recommendation A.3. and indicated that the relocation of its intelligence mission "would be executable only after further expenditure of sunk costs to retool the EPIC and to create the National Center."

(U) The Joint Staff nonconcurred with Recommendation A.1. stating that JTF-5 fulfills a critical counternarcotics role in USPACOM's area of responsibility. The Joint Staff did not comment on Recommendations A.2. and A.3.

(U) We continue to support the disestablishment of JTF-5, the designation of liaison personnel for coordinating with the LEA's, and the relocation of the counternarcotics intelligence operations of USPACOM to EPIC. For reasons explained in Part II of this report, we maintain that benefits derived from the consolidation of DoD intelligence centers at EPIC far outweigh the disadvantages. Therefore, we request that USPACOM reconsider its position on these recommendations in response to the final report.

******UNCLASSIFIED******

(U) USPACOM concurred with Finding B and Recommendation B.1. stating that action has been taken to use intelligence as the basis for conducting counternarcotics operations. USAPACOM nonconcurred with Recommendation B.2. and indicated that the application of broad national counternarcotics strategy to ongoing day-to-day counternarcotics efforts, conducted by any unit or by JTF-5, does not recognize the tactical nature of these operations. The Joint Staff concurred with Recommendation B.1., but nonconcurred with Recommendation B.2. stating "it is not appropriate to suggest that the operations of any Unified command should be reprogrammed to correspond in size and extent with the strategy of an outside agency."

(U) We contend that Recommendation B.2. is valid. However, we have revised the recommendation to reflect that the guidance was issued by the Director, Central Intelligence, not the Director, Central Intelligence Agency.

(U) USPACOM nonconcurred with Recommendation C.1. stating "USARPAC has not and may not be appointed a lead role over the Guard, which is not in the USCINCPAC chain of command." USPACOM agreed in principle with Recommendations C.2. and C.3 and stated that coordination with the Hawaii National Guard has been implemented since the inception of USPACOM's counternarcotics mission. The Joint Staff concurred with Recommendation C.2., but did not comment on Recommendations C.1. and C.3.

(U) Based on USPACOM's comments on Recommendation C.1., we believe that the intent of our recommendation was misinterpreted. The purpose of the recommendation was to establish a lead role for DoD support within Hawaii and to recognize the Hawaii National Guard as having that responsibility. We did not recommend that USARPAC appoint the Hawaii National Guard the lead role for counternarcotics in Hawaii.

(U) USPACOM agreed with the recommendation in Finding D. The Joint Staff did not comment.

(U) On April 8, 1991, USPACOM provided updated funding information in response to monetary benefits associated with Finding A. The updated information was submitted on a marked-up copy of our appendix from the draft report. USPACOM's response inferred that substantial errors were included in our monetary benefits estimate. To compile a 5-year estimate of USPACOM's counternarcotics operations, we extensively coordinated with the counternarcotics section of the intelligence organization (J26) within USPACOM. We recognize that because of the newness of the mission, significant changes to the original funding estimates

could occur; however, we strongly defend the estimate in the draft report as the best and most accurate information available at the time of our audit.

(U) Based on updated information in USPACOM's reply, we have adjusted our funding estimates and corresponding projections of monetary benefits. Regarding monetary benefits resulting from Finding B, USPACOM's comments indicate that costs of cued operations have the potential to exceed those of random patrol. As a result, USPACOM's actions to perform operations based on intelligence demonstrates a more constructive approach to monitoring counternarcotics trafficking in the Pacific. Therefore, we consider this action to qualify funds expended for operations to be placed in the category of "funds put to better use."

(U) USPACOM's comments on Finding C imply that the $4.0 million in monetary benefits associated with the cancellation of the Secure Video Teleconferencing (SVTC) was not a direct result of the audit. We contend that the SVTC was a funded FY 1990 requirement at the time of our exit conference with the Deputy, USCINCPAC. In summary, USPACOM disagreed with all of the monetary benefits in the draft report. We request that USPACOM reconsider its position on the monetary benefits in Appendix H in responding to this final report. We also request that USPACOM provide official funding information regarding the start-up and planned costs for JTF-5.

(U) The audit identified internal control weaknesses as defined by Public Law 97-255, Office of Management and Budget Circular A-123, and DoD Directive 5010.38. Controls to identify responsibilities relating to law enforcement support for counternarcotics operations within Hawaii were not clearly differentiated between USPACOM and the Hawaii National Guard. This internal control deficiency could result in duplication of effort or inefficient accomplishment of law enforcement requested support. Recommendations C.1., C.2., and C.3., if implemented, will correct these weaknesses. A copy of this report will be provided to the senior official responsible for internal controls within USPACOM.

(U) DoD Directive 7650.3 requires that all recommendations be resolved promptly. Accordingly, USPACOM is requested to provide final comments on the unresolved issues in this report within 60 days of the date of this memorandum. Recommendations and potential monetary benefits are subject to resolution in the event of nonconcurrence or failure to comment.

******UNCLASSIFIED******

(U) The courtesies extended to the audit staff are appreciated. If you have any questions on this audit, please contact Mr. Charles M. Santoni or Mr. Wayne B. Winkler on (703) 693-0117 (DSN 223-0117). Copies of this report are being provided to the activities listed in Appendix J.

Robert J. Lieberman
Assistant Inspector General
for Auditing

cc:
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
Director, Joint Staff

******UNCLASSIFIED******

SUPPORT TO DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS
IN THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (U)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
TRANSMITTAL MEMORANDUM/EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	i
PART I - INTRODUCTION	1
Background	1
Objective and Scope	2
Internal Controls	2
Prior Audits and Other Reviews	3
PART II - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	
A. Joint Task Force 5	5
B. Counternarcotics Operations	15
C. Hawaii National Guard	21
D. Counternarcotics Requirements	27
APPENDIX A - Summary of Joint Task Force 5 Start-Up Costs and Planned Costs	31
APPENDIX B - System Descriptions	33
APPENDIX C - System Allocation Within USPACOM	35
APPENDIX D - System Procurement and Operating Costs	37
APPENDIX E - Areas of Duplication Between the Hawaii National Guard and the U.S. Army Command, Pacific	39
APPENDIX F - Deputy Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command Comments	41
APPENDIX G - Deputy Director for Operations, Joint Staff, Comments	55
APPENDIX H - Summary of Potential Monetary and Other Benefits Resulting from Audit	57
APPENDIX I - Activities Visited or Contacted	59
APPENDIX J - Final Report Distribution	61

Prepared by:
Readiness and Operational
Support Directorate
Project No. 9RC-0052.02

SUPPORT TO DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS IN THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (U)

PART I - INTRODUCTION

Background

(U) The Defense Authorization Act, September 1988, requires the DoD to take an active role in the nation's counternarcotics efforts. The Act tasked the DoD: to serve as the lead Federal agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States; to integrate the dedicated command, control, communications, and intelligence assets into an effective communications network; and to provide for an enhanced role for the National Guard.

(U) In response to the Act, the Secretary of Defense directed that the Unified Commanders submit plans to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for carrying out the counternarcotics mission in their respective area of responsibility (AOR). Five U.S. commands were tasked a counternarcotics mission by the JCS: the Atlantic Command, the Pacific Command, the Southern Command, the North American Aerospace Defense Command, and the Forces Command. As lead Federal agency for detecting and monitoring aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States, DoD provides intelligence and other support to its customers, the law enforcement community.

(U) The U.S. Pacific Command's (USPACOM) mandated role in the DoD counternarcotics mission began in December 1988 with the issuance of the warning order from the JCS to the Commander in Chief, USPACOM. In response, USPACOM developed a concept of operations for the implementation of the new counternarcotics mission. The concept of operations called for the placement of an "Anti-Drug Task Force" (ADTF) on the west coast of the United States. This ADTF would provide coordination with and support of the law enforcement agencies (LEA's) involved in the counter-narcotics mission. The concept of operations identified the counternarcotics threat in the AOR as primarily maritime. The identified narcotics threat was high-dollar value drugs, specifically heroin.

(U) The magnitude of the USPACOM AOR, which is essentially the Pacific and Indian Oceans, necessitated that a sophisticated, all-source intelligence network be developed to identify traffickers involved in smuggling heroin into the AOR. The all-source intelligence network would fuse all the various types of intelligence (e.g., imagery, signals, electronic, human) into a usable product that would assist in the follow-on phases of the interdiction and apprehension of traffickers. The fusion of the various types of counternarcotics intelligence at the ADTF would

require a substantial communications and data base capability to receive and analyze data from the DoD and the LEA's participating in the counternarcotics mission.

(U) The Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPACFLT), the Naval component commander for USPACOM, proposed that the ADTF be located in Alameda, California. Alameda is also the location of the Maritime Defense Zone Pacific, a U.S. Coast Guard contingency command for the CINCPACFLT. The Commander in Chief, USPACOM, approved Alameda as the location for the ADTF, now referred to as Joint Task Force 5 (JTF-5).

(U) As a result of the congressional mandate for DoD's expanded role in counternarcotics, the Commander in Chief, USPACOM, identified counternarcotics as the primary peacetime mission.

Objective and Scope

(U) The objective of the audit was to evaluate the support that USPACOM provided the LEA's in the detection and monitoring of maritime drug traffickers, loans of equipment, training, and operational support. We also evaluated the role of the Hawaii National Guard to determine if the support it provided to the LEA's was adequate and met the intent of the Congress. In addition, we reviewed the execution of USPACOM's counternarcotics budget to determine if counternarcotics funds were used efficiently and effectively. This program results audit was made from January through August 1990 in accordance with auditing standards issued by the Comptroller General of the United States as implemented by the Inspector General, DoD, and accordingly included such tests of the internal controls as were considered necessary. A list of activities visited or contacted is shown in Appendix I.

Internal Controls

(U) We reviewed internal controls related to counternarcotics requirements and justifications, financial management, resource management, support functions, and compliance with DoD directives and instructions, OSD guidance, and public law. The review focused on documents for FY 1989 and FY 1990 and the period of October 1989 through February 1990. Our objective was to determine if appropriate internal controls were in place to ensure that USPACOM's counternarcotics resources were utilized efficiently and effectively. In addition, a DoD Hotline review, Hotline Control No. 89-L46022, identified a weakness in USPACOM's internal controls that allowed program requirements not directly related to the counternarcotics mission to receive command's approval as valid requirements. Details on the weaknesses are discussed in Part II of the report.

Prior Audits and Other Reviews

(U) In August 1989, the Inspector General Regional Office-Hawaii, DoD, received a DoD Hotline complaint and subsequently initiated a limited review of USPACOM's counternarcotics requirements. The limited review of six projects with requirements totaling more than $69 million concluded that DoD guidelines were not being followed and that many of the proposed projects submitted by USCINCPAC component commands could not be supported by proper documentation. To preclude duplication of effort during our audit, the Hotline review was closed without recommendations for corrective action. During the same time frame, USPACOM initiated a comprehensive review of its counternarcotics requirements. The review resulted in USPACOM deleting approximately $152 million of the $195 million of requirements that were initially submitted and approved for the period FY 1990 through FY 1994. Finding D of this report addresses a deficiency in USPACOM's requirements review process. With the incorporation of the Counternarcotics Program into the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System beginning in FY 1992, procedures will exist to validate projects for counternarcotics efforts. Accordingly, we did not make any recommendations concerning the establishment of additional controls over the Counternarcotics Program.

******UNCLASSIFIED******

PART II - FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Joint Task Force 5 (U)

FINDING

(U) Joint Task Force 5 (JTF-5), a center for fusing counternarcotics intelligence, established at Alameda, California, duplicates analyses of counternarcotics information and communication, manpower, and command and control capabilities that exist at other U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) activities; creates an unnecessary layer of operational overhead; and does not provide the degree or type of counternarcotics support required by the law enforcement agencies (LEA's). In establishing JTF-5, alternative sites were not adequately evaluated, OSD guidance on counternarcotics activities was not complied with, and plans were not adequately coordinated with the LEA's. As a result, $3.2 million was expended in FY 1989, $5.1 million was budgeted in FY 1990, and $15.8 million was programmed for FY 1991 through 1995 in USPACOM's Counternarcotics Program without adequately documented justification and support for the cost-effectiveness of JTF-5 operations. In addition, the proliferation of access to data bases unnecessarily increased the risk for potential compromise of sensitive counternarcotics information.

DISCUSSION OF DETAILS

Background. On February 10, 1989, JTF-5 was created to serve as USPACOM's joint command element dedicated to counternarcotics. Before the establishment of JTF-5, counternarcotics functions were performed by USPACOM elements that continue to perform those functions. At the time of our audit, the Intelligence Center, Pacific, was performing selected aspects of the counternarcotics intelligence analysis function.

Duplication of Capabilities. According to its mission statement, JTF-5 is to act as a counternarcotics intelligence fusion center responsible for the assimilation and analysis of all-source intelligence. In addition, JTF-5 contains other elements normally found in a command structure (i.e., Operations, Plans, Communications, Logistics, and Administration). An intelligence architecture was developed by the Naval Ocean Systems Center, San Diego, California, to support JTF-5 in the assimilation and analysis of all-source intelligence. The purpose of this architecture was to identify the capabilities and configuration of data bases and communication systems required to

perform intelligence analyses and to communicate the results to the users. Approximately $3.2 million was expended in FY 1989 and $5.1 million in FY 1990 for the intelligence architecture and its supporting command structure. Further, $15.8 million has been programmed for FY 1991 through FY 1995 (see Appendix A).

(U) Once the intelligence architecture is in place, JTF-5 will replicate many capabilities already in USPACOM. The counternarcotics systems planned for use in USPACOM are described in Appendix B. Six data base terminals and communication systems already in USPACOM were included in the intelligence architecture for placement at JTF-5. Four of the six systems that will replicate existing capabilities are to be procured for JTF-5 and other USPACOM elements. The two other systems are programmed to be procured for placement in Hawaii and Guam (see Appendix C). More than $1.4 million in Other Procurement Navy funds and Operation and Maintenance funds were budgeted for these 6 systems in FY 1990, and approximately $1.1 million in Operation and Maintenance funds has been programmed for FY's 1991 through 1995 (see Appendix D).

(U) Duplicate analysis of counternarcotics information not only makes inefficient use of resources, but also affects security. Responsible LEA personnel have expressed concerns with the proliferation of the counternarcotics information they furnished to DoD. We were advised by LEA officials that sensitive counternarcotics information historically had been disseminated only to selected individuals on a strict "need-to-know" basis. The expansion of DoD's counternarcotics mission has resulted in additional replication of LEA information. The replication increases the potential for loss of control over the information and decreases the ability to readily track and identify the source of compromised information.

(U) JTF-5 has been authorized billets for 69 personnel (43 military and 26 civilian) to fully staff its operation. The staff at JTF-5 is augmented by personnel in other USPACOM elements also performing counternarcotics duties.

(U) To provide staffing as quickly as possible, JTF-5 was initially staffed with personnel on temporary duty assignment. Travel costs budgeted by USPACOM for temporary duty assignment personnel totaled approximately $830,000 for FY 1989 and FY 1990. Had the counternarcotics mission been performed within the existing USPACOM structure, this cost could have been avoided.

(U) Guidance on Counternarcotics Resources. On January 6, 1989, the OSD issued policy guidance to the DoD Components for implementing the DoD's congressionally mandated counternarcotics mission. The guidance stated that DoD should "build on existing

capabilities and facilities and avoid unnecessary duplication and expenditure of resources." Additionally, the guidance recommended that "to the maximum extent practical, limit participation, infrastructure modifications, and system/asset procurement that will be dedicated to unique anti-drug activities." In December 1988, when the new counternarcotics mission was being assigned to the Unified Commanders and the approach had not yet been finalized, an internal USPACOM memorandum stated:

> . . . we should manage our role with respect to intelligence support to counter-drug operations as though it were any other adversary target with existing mechanisms. We have a structure in place which is capable of detecting and monitoring illegal drug activity. We need only to expand its tasking and focus. We have also in existence at IPAC [Intelligence Center, Pacific] an element that can act as the fusion center for drug related information and intelligence. I am firmly opposed to the creation of a new command within USPACOM for anti-drug operations as it would serve only to create unnecessary layering when we have a perfectly functional C^3 Command, Control, and Communications structure in place.

(U) Contrary to the guidance from the OSD and the internal counternarcotics intelligence capability assessment, JTF-5 was established in Alameda, California. Rationale for the decision to establish JTF-5 external to the USPACOM headquarters physical structure was not provided to the auditors by personnel at JTF-5 or at Headquarters, USPACOM. In addition, during subsequent audit work at the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), we were unable to obtain documentary evidence that available alternatives were considered by management when the decision was made to establish JTF-5 at Alameda, California.

(U) Other Intelligence Centers. In the September 1989 "National Drug Control Strategy," the Office of the National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) proposed the establishment of a National Drug Intelligence Center. The primary purpose of the Center would be to "improve drug intelligence capabilities by uniting U.S. drug related data and analysis" and to develop a state-of-the-art computer data base to assist in the analysis of drug trafficking and organization structure. Further, the charter of the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC), operated by the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) states that EPIC will "provide a complete and accurate intelligence picture of drug movement by

land, sea and air," with a focus on narcotics trafficking destined for the United States. The EPIC accumulates data, conducts analyses, and provides tactical and operational intelligence to agencies with statutory law enforcement responsibilities.

(U) Coordination with LEA's. DoD's mission in the overall national anti-drug campaign is to support an external group of users, the LEA community. To maximize DoD support to this community, coordination with the LEA's is essential. A February 1989, USPACOM memorandum states "We are not here to take over the AD [anti-drug] war or tell the LEA's how to do it. The LEA's are the actual interdictors of the drug trade, and we are here to provide them with assistance in detection and tracking, but ultimately the LEA's are the customer." This USPACOM memorandum recognizes that DoD's support should assist the LEA's in the enforcement roles of apprehension and seizure.

(U) Based on our audit work with the LEA's, we determined that a strong perception existed within the LEA community that DoD did not coordinate sufficiently with them before deciding to establish JTF-5. The decision to locate JTF-5 at Alameda, California, was repeatedly questioned by the LEA personnel we met with on the west coast. Most of the western regional headquarters for the LEA's are located in the Los Angeles and Long Beach areas, 400 miles south of Alameda. The U.S. Attorney for central California expressed his concern in a letter to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff over the dissolution of the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) and the creation of JTF-5 in Alameda. The NNBIS served primarily as a coordinating body within the counternarcotics community. The U.S. Attorney stated, "it seems to me nothing is gained, and much is lost, by positioning the successor coordination activity far away from the heart of the threat."

(U) LEA officials indicated that the greatest contributions that DoD could make were in the areas of equipment loans and the use of DoD bases and facilities rather than as an operational intelligence fusion center. The LEA officials did not view JTF-5 as an element created to facilitate coordination with the LEA community. In their opinion, the unilateral decision to place JTF-5 in Alameda disregarded the degree or type of counter-narcotics support needed by the LEA community.

(U) Conclusion. When the peacetime counternarcotics mission was assigned, USPACOM decided to accomplish the new mission by establishing an entity outside the existing physical command structure. The decision to locate JTF-5 in Alameda was not supported, is contrary to OSD guidance, and does not provide optimum support to the LEA's. Based on the capabilities of JTF-5

******UNCLASSIFIED******

and the lack of a unique contribution to the counternarcotics effort, the establishment of JTF-5 at Alameda, California, is not justified. We believe the $15.8 million of Operation and Maintenance and Other Procurement Navy funds programmed to support JTF-5 operations from FY 1991 to FY 1995 (Appendix A) can be put to better use. The Operation and Maintenance portion of the $15.8 million includes funding for the 26 civilian billets authorized for the JTF-5. Had the counternarcotics mission been performed within the existing USPACOM structure, these civilian billets may not have been needed. Our projection of cost avoidance for FY 1991 through FY 1995 does not include military pay programmed for the 43 military positions authorized for JTF-5. The military personnel can be used as liaisons for coordinating counternarcotics matters with the law enforcement community and for directly supporting the EPIC and the proposed National Drug Intelligence Center with all-source drug intelligence related to the Pacific area of responsibility. This integration would provide intelligence support in the Pacific that compliments rather than duplicates LEA and existing DoD intelligence centers.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION

(U) We recommend that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command:

(U) 1. Disestablish the Joint Task Force 5 counternarcotics command at Alameda, California.

(U) 2. Designate U.S. Pacific Command personnel to act as liaisons in the coordination of counternarcotics matters with the law enforcement community for the purpose of identifying the requirements of and maximizing the support to the law enforcement community.

(U) 3. Develop a plan, in conjunction with the Director, Office of National Drug Control Policy; the Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration; and the DoD Coordinator for Drug Policy and Support, to provide for the inclusion of intelligence support for counternarcotics by using resources available upon the disestablishment of Joint Task Force 5. This plan should identify procedures/processes for directly supporting the El Paso Intelligence Center and the proposed National Drug Intelligence Center with all-source drug intelligence information relating to the Pacific area of responsibility

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS AND AUDIT RESPONSE

(U) The Deputy, USCINCPAC, generally nonconcurred with the finding and nonconcurred with all the recommendations. Each recommendation is discussed below.

(U) Recommendation A.1. USPACOM stated that if JTF-5 was disestablished, USPACOM could not effectively meet its obligation to support LEA's during the next 2 to 5 years.

(U) Audit Response. USPACOM's response did not address the concept of consolidation at the EPIC and the resulting benefits. Instead, USPACOM identified concern for the adequacy of operations over the next 2 to 5 years if JTF-5 functions were moved to EPIC. It was not the intent of our recommendation to immediately terminate JTF-5 functions. Although this report addresses only JTF-5, our comprehensive draft report entitled, "DoD's Support to Drug Interdiction Efforts," issued April 22, 1991, recommends consolidating all JTF activities at the EPIC. The comprehensive report expands on the benefits of DoD intelligence consolidation and takes into consideration offsetting costs. We maintain that consolidating DoD counternarcotics intelligence efforts at the EPIC can result in significant improvements in mission performance and efficiency. Therefore, in response to the final report, we ask that USPACOM reconsider its position on disestablishment of JTF-5 at Alameda, California.

(U) Joint Staff Comments on Recommendation A.1. The Joint Staff nonconcurred with Recommendation A.1. because of the unique geographical area of responsibility for USPACOM and stated that JTF-5 provides critical and dedicated intelligence support to the counternarcotics operation. The Joint Staff did not comment on Recommendations A.2. and A.3.

(U) Audit Response. The intent of Recommendation A.1. was to realign JTF-5 's functions within USPACOM and the EPIC, not to eliminate those functions entirely. During the audit, we requested that the Joint Staff provide the options and rationale considered for placing the JTF-5 at Alameda. We were provided documentation supporting the placement decision, but not the other options considered.

(U) Recommendation A.2. USPACOM stated that it has been coordinating effectively with the LEA's for the last 2 years and will continue to do so. USPACOM indicated that nine billets at JTF-5 have been filled by the Drug Enforcement Agency, the U.S. Customs Service, and the U.S. Coast Guard.

(U) Audit Response. Based on the number of billets the LEA's have provided to JTF-5, we believe that JTF-5 has lost sight of the fact that the DoD is the supporting organization for counternarcotics operations in the Pacific. LEA's repeatedly told us of their shortages in resources and personnel to accomplish their mission. Our recommendation would eliminate the billets supplied by the LEA's and would further assist the LEA's by providing USPACOM staff to act as liaisons at key LEA locations.

(U) Recommendation A.3. USPACOM stated that the relo[illegible] of its intelligence mission would be executable only after incurring further sunk costs to "retool" the EPIC and to create the National Drug Intelligence Center. Also, if USPACOM were to relocate its counternarcotics intelligence operations at EPIC, it would be farther removed from the LEA regional offices.

(U) Audit Response. Concern over sunk cost is valid; however, it should not preclude improvements in operations or benefits that will be derived over future years. The actual recoupment of sunk costs will occur as a result of significant reductions in the operation and maintenance costs of a separate facility. The identification of inherent shortfalls at EPIC, mentioned in USPACOM's response, are recognized by the audit staff. The shortfalls were a key factor in our suggesting that DoD consolidate intelligence operations at the EPIC. The consolidation would enhance operations and assist the EPIC in performing its chartered responsibility. The USPACOM liaisons proposed by Recommendation A.2. will provide collocated support to the LEA's.

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS ON OTHER SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

(U) USPACOM's reply addressed specific comments within the discussion of Finding A of the report. USPACOM's detailed response stated that: JTF-5 is not solely an intelligence fusion center; JTF-5 data bases are not duplicative of any other in USPACOM; the funding figures for FY 1991 through FY 1995 are in error by as much as 70 percent; the only counternarcotics dedicated staff in USPACOM includes personnel at JTF-5 and the 10 personnel on the USCINCPAC counternarcotics staff, along with a "modest number" dedicated to the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific; and that the creation and location of JTF-5 at Alameda was fully supported by JCS and OSD. USPACOM also stated that the U.S. Attorney for central California, who was quoted in the report, was the "sole critic" of the JTF-5 location. In addition, USPACOM nonconcurred with the estimated potential monetary benefits resulting from the disestablishment of JTF-5. USPACOM's comments are provided in Appendix F.

AUDIT RESPONSE TO MANAGEMENT COMMENTS ON OTHER SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

(U) Based on USPACOM's response, several minor adjustments have been made to the Discussion of Details section of Finding A. Audit comments addressing substantive issues in USPACOM's reply follow.

(U) It was not our intent to identify JTF-5 as exclusively an intelligence fusion center, but as a counternarcotics center to include intelligence. The importance of intelligence is

recognized in both the JTF-5 architecture and its statement of work. It is in the architecture that the JTF-5 function is referred to as the intelligence fusion center for the Pacific.

(U) In the discussion portion of the finding, we changed "duplicative data bases" to "duplicative analysis of counternarcotics information." However, based on an October 1989 U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet, message describing the JTF-5 architecture, we maintain that there are multiple counternarcotics data base access terminals at various elements within USPACOM.

(U) In an attempt to develop a comprehensive 5-year funding program for JTF-5, our research and analysis included a review of extracts from multiple documents. One of the primary documents we used in support of our 5-year funding projection for JTF-5 was the staffing adjustments provided by USPACOM personnel on October 31, 1990. We have updated the JTF-5 funding figures in the final report based on the new funding information USPACOM provided on April 8, 1991. The source of the staffing level information for JTF-5 in the draft report was a Director of Manpower, Personnel, and Support memorandum dated February 27, 1990. Regarding USPACOM's other comments related to staffing, personnel in the Counternarcotics Section, within the Director of Operations, identified seven billets dedicated to full-time counternarcotics operations in USPACOM's J-2 and J-3 organizations and nine billets dedicated to the U.S. Army Pacific counternarcotics program. The 63 billets identified in the draft report were to be distributed throughout the Pacific Fleet according to a message dated June 27, 1989, from the Commander in Chief, Pacific Fleet. However, based on the updated information in USPACOM's response to the draft report, we have revised the personnel figures in the final report.

(U) USPACOM references the "planning and attendant resource actions" that were reviewed by authorities for the creation and location of JTF-5. However, when we discussed this issue at the March 1, 1990, debrief, the Deputy, USCINCPAC, requested that we discuss the JTF-5 coordination matter with USPACOM's J-3 organization. The subsequent discussion with J-3 officials provided no documented support for USPACOM's position that LEA coordination on placement of JTF-5 had taken place.

(U) USPACOM's comment that the draft report identified the U.S. Attorney for central California as the sole critic of the Alameda location is incorrect. The strongest opponent to the creation of a separate counternarcotics intelligence organization at a remote location and the source of the quote on page 7 was the USPACOM Director of Intelligence.

(U) The audit staff extensively coordinated with USPACOM personnel in developing a comprehensive funding estimate of USPACOM's 5-year Counternarcotics Program. The projected monetary benefits in the draft report were based on the funding figures for the 5-year Counternarcotics Program provided by USPACOM personnel as of October 31, 1990. However, we have adjusted the monetary benefits to reflect the updated funding figures provided by USPACOM on April 8, 1991.

******UNCLASSIFIED******

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

B. Counternarcotics Operations (U)

FINDING

(U) The use of ships and aircraft to perform dedicated counternarcotics missions in the Pacific area of responsibility (AOR) was ineffective and could not be supported based on current constraints on planning operational missions. This condition was caused by limited intelligence information on potential targets. As a result, there were no indications that the use of dedicated assets was contributing to the law enforcement agencies' (LEA's) primary mission of interdicting and apprehending drug smugglers. USPACOM's plan to use those assets in counternarcotics operations will cost in excess of $23 million annually for FY 1990 through FY 1995.

DISCUSSION OF DETAILS

(U) Background. Historically, the DoD has assisted LEA's in surveilling vessels suspected of illegally transporting narcotics. The involvement of DoD's operational elements in the Pacific was expanded when the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), tasked the Commander in Chief, USPACOM, with the mission of implementing counternarcotics detection and monitoring in the Pacific AOR. The Unified Commands' objective was to "demonstrate visible DoD support for this national effort." With this tasking came the perception that DoD's state-of-the-art systems should be able to target the vessels used by the drug smugglers.

USPACOM, in coordination with JCS, established a program of flying hours and shipping days to detect and monitor the illegal shipment of narcotics within USPACOM's AOR. Specific aircraft have been identified by the operations component in USPACOM for use against counternarcotics targets within the AOR. These aircraft include the Navy P-3 Orion, the E-2 Hawkeye, the S-3 Viking, and the Air Force E-3 Sentry. In addition, the Commander, JTF-5, has the authority to request that the Pacific Fleet (PACFLT) provide ships for counternarcotics operations. In contrast to the aircraft identified for counternarcotics, these ships are not specifically identified by type or class of vessel. When the Commander, JTF-5, requests a ship, any vessel within the discretionary control of PACFLT may be assigned, which allows the Commander, PACFLT, latitude in scheduling ships for counternarcotics operations.

(U) Concept of Operations. The concept of operations developed by JTF-5 identifies the use of dedicated assets (i.e., ships and aircraft) primarily for their deterrence value. This concept is comparable to the "cop on the beat" approach. That is, the mere presence of a ship or aircraft might act as a deterrent to a drug trafficker. Additional assets, from both the

DoD and the LEA community also perform this deterrence function in conjunction with their normal operations. Proactive or self-initiated operations, such as the "cop on the beat" scenario, may eventually be worthwhile in the USPACOM AOR. However, the intelligence capability of the USPACOM will have to increase substantially for these types of proactive missions to be justified.

(U) Preliminary results of these proactive or self-initiated operations have demonstrated that arbitrarily using aircraft and ships in the USPACOM AOR has been ineffective and costly. USPACOM has identified funding requirements of $23 million annually for the continuation of dedicated ship and aircraft operations beginning in FY 1991. Counternarcotics operations will be incorporated into the Navy's total ship and aircraft operations program (OPTEMPO). In FY 1989 and FY 1990, these OPTEMPO funds were part of the counternarcotics program. Personnel at JTF-5 stated that, as of the time of our audit, no seizures had been directly attributable to the USPACOM aircraft or ship operations. Part of the explanation offered by the command is the difficulty in attempting to interdict narcotics traffic in an AOR of about 100 million square miles and more than 5,000 vessels on any given day.

Intelligence. The importance of the intelligence contribution to the counternarcotics mission was substantiated in our discussions with JTF-5 personnel. Intelligence is a necessary ingredient if proactive interdiction is to be effective. Without vital intelligence "tip-offs" or "leads" for USPACOM operations, the return on the operational investment will remain minimal. A USPACOM message to its subordinate elements states:

> . . . the key to anti-drug operations in the Pacific is the development of a superior intelligence gathering and analysis capability, and an ability to respond effectively to short-fused intelligence cueing. Preplanned operations are not as likely to produce results in the Pacific as they are in the Atlantic.

The scenario of dedicated aircraft and ships for use against counternarcotics targets, as envisioned by JTF-5, may eventually prove worthwhile in the USPACOM AOR. Based on the lack of results and the inadequate intelligence cueing available at the time of our audit, these operations are premature and unwarranted.

The Narcotics Target. Narcotics smugglers in the Pacific may employ any number of methods to get illegal narcotics

into the United States. The drugs may be concealed in luggage, carried aboard commercial vessels or aircraft, included as part of a load on a "mother ship," or concealed in a cargo container. The Commander, JTF-5, has acknowledged that, "in the Pacific, a smuggler's mode of transport is literally only constrained by his imagination." JTF-5 is capable of exploiting only a fraction of the various smuggling methods used by traffickers. Through a memorandum of understanding (MOU), JTF-5 has delegated the aerial detection and monitoring of narcotics to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD).

Personnel at JTF-5 determined that narcotics coming into the United States by air would be on commercial aircraft. JTF-5 has no intelligence capability for detecting the use of commercial aircraft to smuggle drugs within the Pacific.

JTF-5 has directed its efforts against the maritime smuggler, or the "mother ship" scenario. A mother ship, usually under 100 tons displacement, carries narcotics as its sole cargo. Once it is in position offshore, its cargo is transferred to several smaller vessels that then smuggle narcotics into port for further distribution. By directing its operations against the maritime smuggler, JTF-5 has, as a result, limited itself to detecting and monitoring marijuana smuggling. Because of its bulk, marijuana is usually shipped by sea.

The focus on marijuana is contrary to the guidance issued by the Director, Central Intelligence (DCI). In February 1990, the DCI ranked marijuana as a lower priority threat and directed that programs against marijuana "do not warrant substantial new intelligence investments." This guidance identified the two primary narcotics threats as cocaine and heroin. The Commander, JTF-5, stated in his testimony to Congress that small quantities of these narcotics are highly profitable and are being "concealed in cargo transported in legitimate commercial shipping and aircraft, or in aerial and seaborne commercial containers." JTF-5 personnel conceded that they were unable to perform detection and monitoring against those methods of smuggling. Instead, by using dedicated ship and aircraft missions in attempting to identify vessels fitting a marijuana intelligence profile, JTF-5 has adapted the smuggling threat to fit its current capabilities.

(U) Conclusion. The ships and aircraft performing dedicated counternarcotics missions in the Pacific AOR are not being used effectively. In addition, USPACOM's emphasis on the marijuana threat is contrary to DCI guidance. The intelligence information available in USPACOM is inadequate to develop and schedule ship and aircraft counternarcotics operations. As a

result, over $23 million was programmed for FY 1990 through FY 1995 with no indication that the funded missions will contribute effectively to the detection and monitoring of narcotics trafficking.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION

(U) We recommend that the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command:

(U) 1. Discontinue the use of dedicated ships and aircraft to perform counternarcotics operations that are not directed or justified by intelligence information.

(U) 2. Reprogram counternarcotics operations for the U.S. Pacific Command that are not commensurate with the counternarcotics strategy issued by the President and reiterated by the Director, Central Intelligence.

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

(U) The USPACOM concurred with Recommendation B.1. and stated corrective actions have already been taken to use intelligence as the basis for counternarcotics operations. USPACOM nonconcurred with Recommendation B.2., and stated that the ranking of narcotics commodities by the Director of Central Intelligence applies to broad national counternarcotics strategy and funding decisions. To apply these criteria to ongoing day-to-day counternarcotics intelligence and interdiction efforts conducted by any unit or by JTF-5 does not recognize the tactical nature of these operations. JTF-5's tactical task is to detect, monitor, and track for LEA interdiction, all illicit narcotics destined for the United States.

(U) The Joint Staff concurred with Recommendation B.1., but nonconcurred with Recommendation B.2. stating that a Unified Command should not be subject to reprogramming that is required to correspond with the strategy of an outside agency.

AUDIT RESPONSE

(U) USPACOM's actions to cue operations based on intelligence are responsive to Recommendation B.1. Costs associated with these operations are considered funds put to better use.

(U) We maintain that Recommendation B.2. is still valid. USPACOM needs to recognize that the counternarcotics strategy issued by the Director, Central Intelligence, is based on the President's September 1989 National Drug Control Strategy. USPACOM's reply demonstrates its unilateral approach to targeting drug traffic in the Pacific. We continue to believe that DoD

would be more effective in its overall counternarcotics mission if it developed a comprehensive program that funds efforts that are commensurate with national priorities and operational successes. USPACOM needs to reassess its counternarcotics performance and adjust its operations to target priorities commensurate with the National Drug Control Strategy.

C. Hawaii National Guard (U)

FINDING

(U) USPACOM's counternarcotics activities in the State of Hawaii overlap the congressionally mandated mission of the Hawaii National Guard. U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) (formerly the U.S. Army Western Command) was designated by USPACOM as the executive agent for counternarcotics in Hawaii. This designation infringes on the legal responsibilities of the Hawaii National Guard as established in Public Law 100-456, sec. 1105. As a result, USARPAC and the Hawaii National Guard received a combined total of $1.31 million in FY 1990 for duplicate counternarcotics operations in Hawaii. This designation of USARPAC as executive agent has confused the law enforcement community regarding the source for obtaining DoD support for counternarcotics operations.

DISCUSSION OF DETAILS

(U) Background. The Hawaii National Guard (the Guard) has supported the law enforcement community in counternarcotics operations within Hawaii since 1977. For example, in 1977, the State of Hawaii initiated and funded "Operation Green Harvest." During this operation, the Guard supported Federal, state, and local LEA's in eradicating the growth, manufacture, and trafficking of illegal drugs within Hawaii. From 1977 through March 1989, the State of Hawaii funded marijuana eradication programs totaling more than $1.1 million. This effort resulted in the eradication of more than two million marijuana plants valued in excess of $1.0 billion. In FY 1989, the Guard received and spent more than $250,000 to accomplish its counternarcotics plan. For FY 1990, the Guard received $710,000 to support the LEA's. As of January 31, 1990, $111,000 had been expended. USARPAC received approximately $2.3 million in FY 1990 for its involvement in USPACOM's counternarcotics mission. Of that amount, approximately 25 percent ($600,000) was designated for "State of Hawaii initiatives" that support the LEA community in Hawaii.

(U) Congressional Direction. On September 29, 1988, Congress passed the Defense Authorization Act, which mandates an enhanced role for the Guard in drug interdiction and law enforcement. The Act states that the Secretary of Defense may provide funding assistance to the Governors of states that submit plans for using their National Guard for counternarcotics interdiction and enforcement operations. In addition, the Act states:

> Nothing shall be construed as a limitation on the authority of any unit of the National Guard of a state, when such unit is not in

******UNCLASSIFIED******

C. Hawaii National Guard (U)

FINDING

(U) USPACOM's counternarcotics activities in the State of Hawaii overlap the congressionally mandated mission of the Hawaii National Guard. U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) (formerly the U.S. Army Western Command) was designated by USPACOM as the executive agent for counternarcotics in Hawaii. This designation infringes on the legal responsibilities of the Hawaii National Guard as established in Public Law 100-456, sec. 1105. As a result, USARPAC and the Hawaii National Guard received a combined total of $1.31 million in FY 1990 for duplicate counternarcotics operations in Hawaii. This designation of USARPAC as executive agent has confused the law enforcement community regarding the source for obtaining DoD support for counternarcotics operations.

DISCUSSION OF DETAILS

(U) Background. The Hawaii National Guard (the Guard) has supported the law enforcement community in counternarcotics operations within Hawaii since 1977. For example, in 1977, the State of Hawaii initiated and funded "Operation Green Harvest." During this operation, the Guard supported Federal, state, and local LEA's in eradicating the growth, manufacture, and trafficking of illegal drugs within Hawaii. From 1977 through March 1989, the State of Hawaii funded marijuana eradication programs totaling more than $1.1 million. This effort resulted in the eradication of more than two million marijuana plants valued in excess of $1.0 billion. In FY 1989, the Guard received and spent more than $250,000 to accomplish its counternarcotics plan. For FY 1990, the Guard received $710,000 to support the LEA's. As of January 31, 1990, $111,000 had been expended. USARPAC received approximately $2.3 million in FY 1990 for its involvement in USPACOM's counternarcotics mission. Of that amount, approximately 25 percent ($600,000) was designated for "State of Hawaii initiatives" that support the LEA community in Hawaii.

(U) Congressional Direction. On September 29, 1988, Congress passed the Defense Authorization Act, which mandates an enhanced role for the Guard in drug interdiction and law enforcement. The Act states that the Secretary of Defense may provide funding assistance to the Governors of states that submit plans for using their National Guard for counternarcotics interdiction and enforcement operations. In addition, the Act states:

> Nothing shall be construed as a limitation on the authority of any unit of the National Guard of a state, when such unit is not in

> federal service, to perform law enforcement functions authorized to be performed by the National Guard by the laws of the state concerned.

(U) During congressional testimony, the DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support stated, "...the Defense Authorization Act provided for an enhanced role for the National Guard, under the direction of State Governors, to support state drug interdiction and law enforcement operations." The Defense Authorization Act of 1988 did not, however, authorize DoD to become an active participant in counternarcotics activities in any one state or territory.

(U) CINCPAC Assignment of USARPAC. An Operations Order entitled, "Enhanced Level of Effort for Counternarcotics," October 15, 1989, assigned USARPAC the role of providing DoD's support to the LEA's in Hawaii. In this role, USARPAC has the ability to task resources of other USPACOM subordinate commanders to perform counternarcotics missions in Hawaii. However, there was no indication that USPACOM coordinated with the Hawaii National Guard before designating USARPAC as the supporting commander in Hawaii. The lack of coordination has lead to an overlap in the counternarcotics missions of the Hawaii National Guard and USARPAC.

(U) The USARPAC Counternarcotics Operations Plan (OPLAN) identifies the support to be provided to the LEA's as the "...detection and monitoring of illegal narcotics entering the USPACOM AOR, and ...assistance in the eradication of illegal drug crops grown within the U.S. and U.S. Territories...." In addition, the OPLAN makes provisions for USARPAC to support the LEA's in training, equipment loans, education programs, and operations, which duplicates the support provided under the Hawaii National Guard's operations plan. For example, USARPAC became involved in the marijuana eradication program in 1989. Marijuana eradication has historically been one of the Hawaii National Guard's missions. Another example is that both USARPAC and the Hawaii National Guard operations plans include provisions for surveillance and reconnaissance support. Although the involvement of USARPAC in selected operations may be necessary, the support identified in the USARPAC counternarcotics OPLAN should be provided only when the Hawaii National Guard determines that it is unable to provide the support requested. USARPAC's support to the LEA's should complement, not duplicate, the support provided by the Hawaii National Guard.

(U) The support USARPAC provides to the LEA's in Hawaii has certain inherent limitations. For example, legal restrictions imposed by the Posse Comitatus Act U.S.C., title 18, sec. 1385, on active duty military personnel prevent USARPAC from

exercising police powers within the United States. These restrictions are not binding on the Guard when it is under the jurisdiction of the Governor of Hawaii and is not federalized under the provisions of U.S.C., title 32, sec. 502. Guard personnel under the jurisdiction of the Governor of the State of Hawaii can exercise police powers to enforce laws. It is not prudent to assign active duty military personnel missions that have a high potential of requiring the exercise of police powers, when appropriate Guard personnel are available and already assigned such missions.

(U) USARPAC also overlaps the mission of the Guard in providing training support to the LEA's. For example, the Drug Enforcement Administration initiated a request for instruction in helicopter rappelling. The request for training went to USARPAC in its role as the executive agent. However, based on the type of support specified in the Guard's plan, the request should have been submitted to the Guard. The Guard's plan was the result of a coordinated effort between the Guard and the LEA's in Hawaii and was subsequently submitted to and approved by the National Guard Bureau. USARPAC should become involved only when the Guard determines it is unable to provide the support requested. The involvement of USARPAC in the counternarcotics efforts in Hawaii has caused the LEA's to be confused in where to request support for counternarcotics efforts. A comparison of excerpts from the Hawaii National Guard Drug Enforcement Support Plan and the USARPAC Counternarcotics OPLAN is presented in Appendix E. The Appendix shows the duplication of planned objectives between the Hawaii National Guard and USARPAC.

(U) Conclusion. Based on the congressional mandate for the enhanced involvement of the Guard in the DoD counternarcotics mission, it is neither effective nor efficient to have the Guard and USARPAC performing essentially the same mission. The Guard should be designated as the "lead agent" for counternarcotics support to the LEA's in Hawaii. The Guard is in a better position to determine if and when LEA requests should be forwarded to USARPAC or when accomplishment by USARPAC would be more cost-effective.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION

(U) We recommend that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, direct the Commander, U.S. Army, Pacific, to:

(U) 1. Revise the U.S. Army, Pacific, Counternarcotics Operations Plan to acknowledge the lead role of the Hawaii National Guard for counternarcotics support to the LEA's within Hawaii.

(U) 2. Coordinate the U.S. Army, Pacific, Counter [illegible] Operations Plan with the Hawaii National Guard to minimize duplication of effort and to provide maximum support to the law enforcement agencies in Hawaii.

(U) 3. Review and adjust the funding for counternarcotics support to accurately reflect the level of support to be provided based on actions resulting from the implementation of Recommendation C.2.

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

(U) USPACOM nonconcurred with Recommendation C.1. and stated that it cannot appoint the Hawaii National Guard for marijuana eradication operations within the state, because the Hawaii National Guard is not in the USPACOM chain of command. USPACOM agreed in principle with Recommendations C.2. and C.3., but maintained that procedures for coordination between USARPAC and the Hawaii National Guard have been implemented since the inception of USPACOM's counternarcotics mission in 1989. USPACOM also stated that there were factual errors in the finding and the discussion section which lead to erroneous conclusions. USPACOM provided comments on various points in those sections.

(U) The Joint Staff concurred with Recommendation C.2., but did not comment on Recommendations C.1. and C.3.

AUDIT RESPONSE

(U) USPACOM misinterpreted the intent of Recommendation C.1. We stated that the USPACOM Counternarcotics OPLAN should acknowledge the lead role of the Hawaii National Guard. We did not recommend that USCINCPAC appoint the Hawaii National Guard to lead marijuana eradication operations as indicated in USPACOM's response. The Hawaii National Guard should be recognized as the primary contact for LEA coordination within Hawaii for both legal and practical purposes. The Hawaii National Guard and USARPAC perform certain missions that are similiar. Implementation of the recommendation will result in less confusion for the LEA's regarding which organization to initially contact for support and a more focused coordinated effort targeting counternarcotics. Therefore, we believe that Recommendation C.1. remains valid.

(U) Regarding Recommendation C.2., our discussion with senior level National Guard personnel indicated that comprehensive coordination of counternarcotics plans between the Hawaii National Guard and USARPAC had not taken place. If formal coordination of the plans was accomplished, either before or after our audit, we ask that USARPAC identify the procedures and provide the appropriate documentation and dates on which the coordination was accomplished.

(U) Regarding Recommendation C.3., we request that any funding adjustments resulting from coordination of the plans be identified in response to this final report.

(U) We reviewed USPACOM's extensive comments on Finding C and did not find any pertinent information to substantiate its assertion that our facts were erroneous or our conclusions, invalid.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

******UNCLASSIFIED******

D. Counternarcotics Requirements (U)

FINDING

(U) The USPACOM submitted requirements in its FY 1989 budget and FY 1990-1994 Counternarcotics Program that either were unrelated to the detection and monitoring of drug trafficking or did not support the LEA's counternarcotics efforts. Internal controls over the counternarcotics requirements validation process were nonexistent, and supporting documentation was inadequate for the submitted requirements. As a result, more than $152 million of the $195 million in counternarcotics requirements submitted by the USPACOM Component commands were identified as being invalid and unrelated to the counternarcotics mission. In addition, the FY 1991-1995 Counternarcotics Program, developed by the USPACOM, includes a $4 million project that does not contribute to the Counternarcotics Program.

DISCUSSION OF DETAILS

(U) Background. On December 20, 1988, the JCS advised the Unified Commanders that $300 million in the FY 1989 DoD budget had been identified for the counternarcotics effort. Approximately $260 million of the $300 million would be available for DoD use, and the remainder would be used to support the Guard. The JCS requested each Unified Commander tasked with a counternarcotics mission to submit a "Commander's Estimate" forecasting the funds required to support the counternarcotics detection and monitoring mission. These estimates were to be carefully considered by the JCS in formulating recommendations for distribution of the $260 million. In response to the JCS tasking, USPACOM developed three possible courses of action: status quo, increased operations at current funding levels, or increased operations in anticipation of increased funding. The estimates were to be provided to the JCS by December 23, 1988.

(U) Requirements. The Component commands of USPACOM were advised on December 20, 1988, that $260 million would be available in FY 1989 for counternarcotics operations and were requested to provide estimates of funding required to support the detection and monitoring mission. Component command estimates would be utilized to develop the USPACOM counternarcotics program. We were advised by a senior USPACOM official that many of the Components perceived this as an opportunity to subsidize some noncounternarcotics efforts struggling for funding approval. USPACOM submitted requirements for counternarcotics totaling $22.3 million in FY 1989 and $108 million in the FY 1990-1994 Counternarcotics Program.

(U) On August 23, 1989, the Inspector General Regional Office-Hawaii, DoD, received a DoD Hotline complaint and subsequently

initiated a limited review of USPACOM's counternarcotics requirements. The DoD Hotline complaint alleged that USPACOM's FY 1990-1994 Counternarcotics Program contained several invalid projects. A DoD Hotline Report (Hotline Control No. 89-L46022), January 25, 1990, concluded that there was merit to the allegation. A review of six proposed counternarcotics projects, totaling more than $34 million, disclosed that DoD guidelines were not being followed. In addition, many of the proposed projects submitted by the USPACOM Component commands were not supported by proper documentation and were unrelated to the counternarcotics mission. Further, no documentation identified either the Component command officials responsible for sponsoring the projects or the officials that reviewed and approved funding for the projects.

(U) During the same time frame, actions were taken by USPACOM to improve management control over its Counternarcotics Progam. USPACOM reviewed the proposed counternarcotics projects submitted by the Component commands and concluded that projects totaling $152 million included in USPACOM's FY 1990-1994 Counternarcotics Program were invalid. As a result, these projects were not included in USPACOM's FY 1990 budget and FY 1991-1995 Counternarcotics Program.

(U) On November 3, 1989, USPACOM Component commands were required to submit new counternarcotics projects for the FY 1990 budget and the FY 1991-1995 Counternarcotics Program. Each project submitted was evaluated to ensure there was a direct contribution to USPACOM's counternarcotics mission. At the time of our audit, counternarcotics projects were reflected in USPACOM's proposed FY 1990 budget and FY 1991-1995 Counternarcotics Program and totaled $28 million and $47 million, respectively. In December 1990, USPACOM revised its FY 1990 budget request to $13.8 million. USPACOM was not required to submit an FY 1991-1995 Counternarcotics Program.

(U) Although USPACOM evaluated each project's applicability to the counternarcotics mission, formal procedures and internal controls for reviewing and approving the counternarcotics projects were not utilized. As a result, there was no assurance the inclusion of invalid projects in the USPACOM Counternarcotics Program would not reoccur. For example, a project deleted during the USPACOM development of the FY 1991-1995 Counternarcotics Program was later included without adequate justification, review, or approval. The project was initiated by the Pacific Fleet, (PACFLT) for Secure Video Teleconferencing (SVTC) connectivity. SVTC provides the capability for participants in a telephone call to view each other and to transfer briefings, photographs, imagery, and drawings. The project was initially included in the FY 1990-1994 Counternarcotics Program, but was unfunded. Although the project was not originally included by

USPACOM in the FY 1991-1995 Counternarcotics Program, PACFLT subsequently identified a requirement to have SVTC connectivity with JTF-5 in Alameda, California, and the Fleet Intelligence Training Center, Pacific, in San Diego, California. The requirement was forwarded to JCS by USPACOM and funded for FY 1990. The secure facsimile and communications capabilities that the SVTC provides can also be obtained by using a Secure Telephone Unit III and a secure facsimile. Both JTF-5 and the Fleet Intelligence Training Center, Pacific, have programmed funds to procure the Secure Telephone Unit III and secure facsimiles. The 6-year projected operation and maintenance costs of the SVTC is $4 million for FY 1990 through FY 1995.

(U) Although the PACFLT staff briefed the USPACOM staff on the new SVTC requirement, there was no documentation available to identify the PACFLT official responsible for development of the project or the USPACOM official who reviewed and approved the project for the FY 1991-1995 Counternarcotics Program. Further, there was no documentation justifying that the SVTC supported the DoD counternarcotics mission. PACFLT officials stated that JTF-5 would be receiving the SVTC, "if not this year, next; if not next year, the following." It is the auditors' opinion that PACFLT used the USPACOM Counternarcotics Program as a source of funding for a project that should be funded through normal, noncounternarcotics program channels.

(U) Conclusion. The requirements review process for the counternarcotics program within the USPACOM did not provide an adequate degree of oversight. Although USPACOM took corrective actions to review the counternarcotics project requirements and the validity of USPACOM project submissions, we subsequently identified a project that should not have been funded in the Counternarcotics Program. With the incorporation of the Counternarcotics Program into the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System beginning in FY 1992, procedures will exist to validate projects for counternarcotics efforts. Accordingly, we are not making any recommendations concerning the establishment of controls over the Counternarcotics Program.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION

(U) We recommend that the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, cancel the counternarcotics funding of the project to provide Secure Video Teleconferencing connectivity to Joint Task Force 5 and the Fleet Intelligence Training Center, Pacific.

MANAGEMENT COMMENTS

(U) USPACOM concurred with the recommendation, but took exception to the assertion that the audit team's efforts and

those of the Inspector General Regional Office - Hawaii, DoD, had a direct causal relation to an ongoing USPACOM review of the counternarcotics resource program. USPACOM provided extensive comments addressing this issue and the accuracy of the financial information included in the report.

AUDIT RESPONSE

(U) Although USPACOM concurred with the recommendation in its transmittal memorandum, the supplemental information provided in an enclosure of the response implies that the cancellation of the SVTC and the corresponding $4 million claimed as funds put to better use were not a direct result of the audit. At the time of our exit conference with the Deputy, USCINCPAC, the SVTC remained a funded FY 1990 requirement, and we contend that the report accurately reflects that status. Therefore, we are still claiming $4.0 million for the SVTC as a monetary benefit (see Appendix H).

(U) Further, in November 1990, we were advised by the Comptroller's Office, USPACOM, that the SVTC was reintroduced as a requirement in the FY 1991 Counternarcotics Program, and we were requested to provide a preliminary draft of our position on the SVTC. We were advised by USPACOM Comptroller personnel that the audit position was used to justify the cancellation of the SVTC resubmission.

(U) Regarding the accuracy of the financial information included in the finding, the financial data presented in the draft report reflected the most current information available at the time of our audit. The information was provided by USPACOM personnel. For financial data that USPACOM has revised subsequent to our audit, we have adjusted the final report accordingly.

SUMMARY OF JOINT TASK FORCE 5 START-UP COSTS AND PLANNED COSTS (U)

($ In Millions)

Project Code		FY 1989	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993	FY 1994	FY 1995	FY 1991-1995
Total	O&M	$ 2,096	$ 2,929	$ 3,256	$ 2,905	$ 2,799	$ 2,913	$ 3,000	$14,873
Total	OPN	1,095	1,449	300	500	100			900
Total	MILCON		880						
Totals [8/]		$ 3,191	$ 5,057	$ 3,556	$ 3,405	$ 2,899	$ 2,913	$ 3,000	$15,773

8/ Excludes Military Pay

Note: The source of the funding information was the Deputy, U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific, April 8, 1991, response to the draft report.

SYSTEM DESCRIPTIONS

CMST-N	(U)	The Collection Management Support Tools - Navy is a collection management tool that supports comparison capability and availability of resources; maintenance of a collection management register; generation of multidiscipline collection requests; access to national on-line data bases; an external gateway to the Automatic Digital Network (AUTODIN); and a way to monitor external collection actions, local data bases, word processing, and station-to-station mail. This system is in use in the U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM).
CSP	(U)	The Communications Support Processor provides the General Service/Special Intelligence AUTODIN service to the counternarcotics processors. This system is in use in USPACOM.
FIST/ FIST-III	(U)	Fleet Imagery Support Terminal Dedicated Circuitry provides the communications lines to communicate drug-related imagery within the USPACOM. The Fleet Imagery Support Terminal III is a low-cost, compact version of a digital imagery manipulation and duplex (send and receive) transfer system that has been used in USPACOM since 1983.
JMIE	(U)	The Joint Maritime Intelligence Element provides the primary system interface with the law enforcement community, access to non-military data bases, and analyst-to-analyst exchange capabilities. Because this system contains law enforcement data that DoD cannot have access to, non-DoD personnel are required to operate the system.
Classified System		USPACOM has a test system on loan from the Defense Intelligence Agency that is being used as part of USPACOM's domestic marijuana detection program.

OPUS (U) The OSIS (Ocean Surveillance Intelligence System) Prototype Upgrade System is an automated, secure, all-source intelligence processing, analysis, and reporting system. This system supports a broad range of ocean surveillance analyses and reports (summary, advisory, and event-by-event). This system is in use in USPACOM.

SYSTEM ALLOCATION WITHIN USPACOM (U) 1/

(U)

Location	System					
	OPUS 2/	JMIE 3/	CMST-N 4/	FIST/FIST-III 5/	CSP 6/	MSI 7/
Joint Task Force 5 Alameda, California	X	X	X	X		
Pacific Fleet Pearl Harbor, Hawaii					X	
Fleet Intelligence Center, Pacific Pearl Harbor, Hawaii		X		X		X
Fleet Intelligence Training Center, Pacific San Diego, California	X		X	X		
Naval Communications Area Master Station, Western Pacific U.S. Guam						X
Third Fleet Pearl Harbor, Hawaii				X		
Seventh Fleet Yokuska, Japan				X		

1/ USPACOM - U.S. Pacific Command
2/ OPUS - Ocean Surveillance Intelligence System Prototype Upgrade System
3/ JMIE - Joint Maritime Intelligence Element
4/ CMST-N - Collection Management Support Tools - Navy
5/ FIST/FIST-III - Fleet Imagery Support Terminal Dedicated Circuitry, Fleet Imagery Support Terminal III
6/ CSP - Communications Support Processors
7/ MSI - Multi-Spectral Imager

SYSTEM PROCUREMENT AND OPERATING COSTS (U)
($ In Thousands)

	OPN	O&M					
	FY 1990	FY 1990	FY 1991	FY 1992	FY 1993	FY 1994	FY 1995
Totals	$959	$474	$223	$223	$204	$204	$204

FY 1990:	OPN	$ 959
	O&M	$ 474
	Total	$1,433
FY 1991-1995:	O&M	$1,058

AREAS OF DUPLICATION BETWEEN THE HAWAII NATIONAL GUARD AND THE UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND, PACIFIC (U)

(U)

Area of Duplication	Excerpts from the Hawaii National Guard Drug Enforcement Support Plan	Excerpts from the CDRWESTCOM * Counternarcotics OPLAN
Ground Reconnaisance	Annex E: (Ground Reconnaissance Operations) Based on intelligence and request for support from a law enforcement agency, Soldiers will search a given area for cultivated marijuana or other drug operations.	Plan Summary: ... at the request of local law enforcement agencies WESTCOM [Western Command] as the USCINCPAC [United States Commander in Chief, Pacific] Supported Commander, ... Assistance will also be given to operations to eradicate illegal drug crops.
Aerial Reconnaissance	Annex F: (Aerial Search Operations) ...Soldiers will search a given area for cultivated marijuana or other drug operations.	Appendix 9 to Annex C: The use of Army tactical air reconnaissance ... will not be tasked to provide intelligence gathering for counternarcotics operations unless authorized by higher headquarters.
Training	Annex G: (Aerial Transportation) ... guidance for planning, training and implementation for aerial transportation of law enforcement officials into amount of marijuana cultivated areas.	Basic Plan: Supervise and assist in training of LEA [Law Enforcement Agency], in military skills applicable to counternarcotics OPS [Operations]. Examples of this would include practical training in rappelling, partrolling....
Equipment Support	Annex E: (Aerial Search Operations) provides for equipment support in conjunction with operations that have been coordinated with the law enforcement agencies.	Basic Plan: Military equipment may be used by local LEAs in Counternarcotics Operations.

* Commander U.S. Army Western Command, currently, the Commander, U.S. Army, Pacific

******UNCLASSIFIED******

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
(USCINCPAC)
CAMP H.M. SMITH, HAWAII 96861-5025

J01
3800
Ser 0190-91
30 Mar 91

To: Director, Readiness and Operation Support Directorate, Office of the Inspector General, Department of Defense

Subj: DRAFT AUDIT REPORT ON SUPPORT TO DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS IN THE U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND (PROJECT NO 9RC-0052.02)

Ref: (a) DoDIG Memo for Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, dtd 30 Jan 91

Encl: (1) Specific Comments, DoDIG Project 9RC-0052.02

1. I am pleased to comment on the subject draft report, forwarded by reference (a). Following paragraphs address the four specific findings of the subject report. Enclosure (1) responds paragraph by paragraph to the full text of the draft report and its annexes.

2. Finding A alleges that Joint Task Force (JTF) FIVE is deficient in supporting Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs) in this theater and recommends its disestablishment. Do not concur. The real management issue is that the counternarcotics (CN) effort constitutes a distinct problem set, requiring the attention of personnel with some amount of supporting equipment. The draft report implies that by fragmenting our support and distributing functions to two or more intelligence activities (one several years in the future), we will increase efficiency and achieve economies in personnel, and perhaps, facilities and equipment. This clearly is not the case. To date, each of the major CINC's with a CN mission has found that focusing CN activities in a single task force is the desirable way to provide DoD support to LEAs. Your report recommends dissolution of JTF FIVE and substitution of the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) as the locus for our essentially maritime and air Pacific CN role. This is clearly inconsistent with acceptance of JTF SIX's establishment within several miles of EPIC to provide DoD support to land border and air operations because EPIC cannot and does not conduct such operations.

3. Finding B concludes that use of DoD ships and aircraft in interdiction support is ineffective without best possible intelligence to focus their efforts. I agree. This has long been our conclusion, and we have devoted a major portion of our CN program development to exactly that effort. It is not a simple task and much remains to be done. Elimination of JTF FIVE per finding A would certainly exacerbate this already formidable challenge. I am unclear as to how we are to reprogram operational forces in consonance with a strategy outlined by the Director of Central Intelligence.

4. I agree in principle with recommendations 2 and 3 of finding C regarding USARPAC and Hawaii National Guard eradication programs. In fact, we implemented such procedures at the inception of our CN program in 1989. We

cannot, however, appoint the Guard to lead Hawaii marijuana (MJ) eradication operations per recommendation 1. As they are not in our chain of command and can not be tasked by USCINCPAC. Factual errors which lead to erroneous conclusions in the "Finding" and "Discussion of Details" of finding C are identified in enclosure (1).

5. I fully agree with the recommendation in finding D relating to fiscal program discipline. We took that action during our review of the USCINCPAC FY90 CN program completed nearly a year ago. However, the assertion in sentence two of this conclusion that the audit team's efforts, and those of the DoDIG Regional Office, had direct causal relation to an ongoing USCINCPAC review of the CN resource program is untrue. Detailed comments regarding this are at enclosure (1).

6. Comments on substantial errors in resource and system displays in annexes A, B, and D which materially affect the cost avoidance sums set forth in recommendation A1 are at enclosure (1). Inaccurate fiscal information presented in Annex B resulted in an $11M error, or 70%, of the monetary savings associated with finding A. A second error was made in the logic offered in support of recommendation A2. Crediting the full (if inaccurate) savings of scrapping JTF FIVE is unsound. Much of the savings must be attributed to substitution efforts directed to the same goal at several other activities. Establishing some unknown number of liaison offices, per recommendation A2, without reference to their costs, is equally unsound.

7. It is difficult to dispute recommendation B1 that USPACOM forces should reduce CN operations without cuing based on timely focused intelligence support. However, this required intelligence support would be difficult to sustain if the balance of audit report recommendations were accepted and implemented.

8. We devote great attention to CN internal control mechanisms at this headquarters, and note that no additional controls were recommended by the auditors. So I remain concerned by the auditors' unfounded attempt to take credit for internal control and fiscal discipline actions already taken by my staff. I trust this will be corrected in the final report.

9. I hope our comments give you a clearer perspective of our CN efforts to date. We look forward to a closer working relationship and an increasingly effective CN program in the Pacific.

JACK B. FARRIS
Lieutenant General, USA
Deputy USCINCPAC/Chief of Staff

cc:
Secretary of the Army
Secretary of the Navy
DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support
Director, Joint Staff
Chief, National Guard Bureau
Adjutant General, Hawaii National Guard

******UNCLASSIFIED******

15 March 1991

PART I - INTRODUCTION

Re: Page 2, line 13: The correct spelling is HEROIN. The word is misspelled throughout the report. 1

Page 4, last line: The review was not initiated in August 89. That was the date of the complaint. The review started 15 September 1989. 3

Re: Page 5, line 1: The six projects reviewed were those submitted to Regional Office (RO) auditors by USCINCPAC Staff members who had already found them unsound. 3

Line 8: Disagree. The review of projects was underway when the RO auditor first arrived.

Line 10: Disagree. The review did not result in the deletion. The projects were already under review and, in some cases, already deleted.

Re: Page 6: There is no page six in the report furnished us. (nor pages 24, 32, 40, 44, 46, 48).

PART II - FINDING A: JOINT TASK FORCE FIVE

Re: Page 7, line 1: JTF-5 is an OPS INTEL and single point Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) liaison and service unit, not solely an intel fusion center. 5

Line 3: There are no JTF FIVE "databases" which duplicate data bases found in any other activity in USPACOM. JTF FIVE accesses, where appropriate, data bases located elsewhere. There is no mention anywhere in the report, which: A) indicates what these data bases are; B) further discusses them or; C) indicates which other data bases they are duplicating. This assertion is incorrect and unsupported.

Line 3: "communication": JTF FIVE is a subscriber to communication systems common throughout the theater. System commonalty is essential to effective communications. JTF FIVE is the only theater entity, CN or otherwise, which is specifically configured to communicate with DoD and LEA assets engaged in CN interdiction activity. Nowhere in the report, or annexes, are the "duplicative" communications identified.

Line 3: "manpower": JTF FIVE has the only CN dedicated manpower in the USPACOM. There are 10 persons on the USCINCPAC CN Staff and a modest (less than 10) number to be dedicated to CN activity at the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) (composed of former FICPAC, IPAC) which is a supporting command to JTF FIVE. JICPAC's principle supporting role is maritime track correlation. JICPAC transmits to JTF FIVE this correlation of the Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS), a major USN surveillance system not possessed by JTF FIVE, with other correlatable tracking data. OSIS and associated data are an ingredient to, not a duplication of, the JTF FIVE intelligence fusion mechanism. Although JTF FIVE personnel are tabulated on page 10 of the report, the report, does not present data to support the allegation of duplication of function in manpower employment.

******UNCLASSIFIED******

15 March 1991

PART I - INTRODUCTION

Re: Page 2, line 11: The correct spelling is HEROIN. The word is misspelled throughout the report. 1

Page 4, last line: The review was not initiated in August 89. That was the date of the complaint. The review started 15 September 1989. 3

Re: Page 5, line 1: The six projects reviewed were those submitted to Regional Office (RO) auditors by USCINCPAC Staff members who had already found them unsound. 3

Line 8: Disagree. The review of projects was underway when the RO auditor first arrived.

Line 10: Disagree. The review did not result in the deletion. The projects were already under review and, in some cases, already deleted.

Re: Page 6: There is no page six in the report furnished us. (nor pages 24, 32, 40, 44, 46, 48).

PART II - FINDING A: JOINT TASK FORCE FIVE

Re: Page 7, line 1: JTF-5 is an OPS INTEL and single point Law Enforcement Agency (LEA) liaison and service unit, not solely an intel fusion center. 5

Line 1: There are no JTF FIVE "databases" which duplicate data bases found in any other activity in USPACOM. JTF FIVE accesses, where appropriate, data bases located elsewhere. There is no mention anywhere in the report, which: A) indicates what these data bases are; B) further discusses them or; C) indicates which other data bases they are duplicating. This assertion is incorrect and unsupported.

Line 1: "communication": JTF FIVE is a subscriber to communication systems common throughout the theater. System commonalty is essential to effective communications. JTF FIVE is the only theater entity, CN or otherwise, which is specifically configured to communicate with DoD and LEA assets engaged in CN interdiction activity. Nowhere in the report, or annexes, are the "duplicative" communications identified.

Line 1: "manpower": JTF FIVE has the only CN dedicated manpower in the USPACOM. There are 10 persons on the USCINCPAC CN Staff and a modest (less than 10) number to be dedicated to CN activity at the Joint Intelligence Center Pacific (JICPAC) (composed of former PICPAC, IPAC) which is a supporting command to JTF FIVE. JICPAC's principle supporting role is maritime track correlation. JICPAC transmits to JTF FIVE this correlation of the Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS), a major USN surveillance system not possessed by JTF FIVE, with other correlatable tracking data. OSIS and associated data are an ingredient to, not a duplication of, the JTF FIVE intelligence fusion mechanism. Although JTF FIVE personnel are tabulated on page 10 of the report, the report, does not present data to support the allegation of duplication of function in manpower employment.

******UNCLASSIFIED******

Lines 3, 4: "Command and control capabilities": Nowhere does the report present any reference or data to substantiate this duplication. See remarks above regarding communications.

Lines 6-8: The report never cites specific data to support deficiencies in degree or type of CN support. The report does not present any complaint from a supported LEA regarding any lack of support.

Lines 11-12: The figures for FY 91 through 95 are in error by up to 70%. See remarks re Appendix A.

Lines 15-17: (See remarks re line 3 "manpower" above). Our focusing of CN activity at a single unit, rather than distributing CN activity at several USPACOM general intelligence activities, was a conscious decision in part based on the desire to prevent wide distribution of CN information which would breed opportunity for compromise by unnecessarily exposed individuals. This is a far more serious possibility than data base compromise. Again, the statement regarding proliferation of data bases, reiterated in line 16, is unfounded and is not supported in the balance of the report.

Re: Page 8, first para: At the time of JTF FIVE's foundation, other USPACOM units were commencing work on functions addressing the CN problem. JTF FIVE was not designed for and is not performing any of these functions. 5

Re: Second para: Figures, restated in this para, are decidedly incorrect. Correct figures are annotated in Appendix A.

Re: Page 9, first full para: Second sentence indicates 8 systems already in USPACOM planned for JTF FIVE. Third sentence says 6 duplicate systems for JTF FIVE. The JTF has only 3 of the systems referred to, as captioned in Appendix C. None is really a system. They are nodes of larger systems, theater and national. Reference to system terminals as systems and alternately as data bases and sometimes as communication systems throughout the report and appendices is incorrect. Dollar values cited, including funds in projects previously cancelled or never submitted for funding, are incorrect. Erroneous data in appendices, which form the basis of erroneous system and funding totals and conclusions in this paragraph, are corrected in appendices portion of this response. 6

Page 9, second full para: Sentence one is repetitive of previously unsupported inaccuracies. We share concern, discussed in balance of para, regarding security. This is precisely the reason why we focused CN activities at a single dedicated facility rather than to circulate the information at a number of general production intelligence and line operation headquarters where information control is much more difficult. 6

Re: Page 10, first full para: The personnel complement of JTF FIVE is composed of 43 mil, 26 civ; not 40 and 29. The balance of support provided to JTF-5 is as stated in response to Line 3, above. Other ops and CN support is necessarily flexible and drawn from USPACOM Staff and subordinate commands as dictated by need. The request for 63 additional billets was not honored by this headquarters in the scrub of our CN program preceding the audit. 6

Re: Third para: We can find no figures to substantiate the $830K TDY cited.

******UNCLASSIFIED******

Final Report
Page No.

Re: Page 11: We maintain that the judgment to focus and control CN information, operations and LEA service is sound. The decision then to build JTF FIVE at and on existing facilities, collocated with a principal LEA involved in CN interdiction operations which we are mandated to support, certainly seems appropriate. 7

Re: Page 12, first full para, Re lines 1-9: Disagree. The decision to create JTF FIVE and locate it at Alameda was submitted to full sponsoring service, JCS and OSD review. Moreover, the planning and attendant resource actions have been successfully reviewed and re-reviewed by authorities, including the Congress of the United States, through full fiscal cycles for FY's 89, 90, 91 and outyear programs. 7

Lines 1-6: JTF FIVE is not external to the USPACOM HQ structure. It is a sub-unified command of USCINCPAC. Statement that rationale for establishment of JTF FIVE was not provided to the auditors is not correct. Rationale was provided in the form of a three page J3 point paper dated 17 April 1989.

Re second para: The ONDCP National Drug Control Strategy of September 1989 was not available to us six months earlier, in February 1989, when JTF FIVE was commissioned. We acted on the best information available at the time our decision was required. This paragraph criticizes a decision made, of necessity, in 1988 and ascribes to JTF FIVE a role duplicate of a National Drug Intelligence Center which will be fortunate to be in operation by the mid-1990's. While correctly stating the EPIC mission, the audit report fails to discuss the acknowledged inability of EPIC to cope with the volume and variety of data that would be necessary to undertake a principally maritime detection and tracking role in the sizable USPACOM AOR. EPIC does not now receive the information now handled in the USPACOM CN detection and monitoring apparatus. Neither is it programmed to receive same in the future.

Re: Page 13, last two paras: The LEAs having the largest interest in the detection and monitoring role which USPACOM is mandated to support are: DEA, USCS and the USCG. There is no single place where all have major theater headquarters. The DEA structure is one with numerous domestic and overseas units all directly reporting to their Washington headquarters. The USCS has a regional office in Los Angeles and subordinate offices throughout the USPACOM AOR. The USCG Pacific Area headquarters is at Coast Guard Island, Alameda where JTF FIVE is located. The USCG provided the building and unit support to quickly establish a DoD central CN facility which allowed us to comply with the mandate to "build on existing facilities and avoid unnecessary...expenditure... of resources." The sole critic of the Alameda location cited in the report is a U.S. Attorney who was accredited to the NNBIS, which JTF FIVE in theory replaced. 8

Re: Page 13, last para, Third sentence: Recommend delete sentence beginning: "Most of the regional...". Replace with "Western regional headquarters for one of the LEA's is located in the Los Angeles..." 8

Re: Page 14, first full para: The first two sentences are unsupported by direct data. In Finding B, the report takes issue that we conducted mandated CN operations not adequately supported by intelligence. In this paragraph, it takes issue that we established the activity focused on developing and delivering that intelligence. 8

Re: Conclusion, Sentence 1: JTF FIVE is not outside of the existing USCINCPAC command structure. It is a USCINCPAC subordinate joint task force reporting directly to USCINCPAC.

Final Report
Page No.

Sentence 2: The decision to commission JTF FIVE was supported at every level of CN review up to and including the Congress of the United States. This approval has included provision of resources for JTF FIVE for FY's 89, 90, 91, and acceptance of POM projects for future support throughout the current FYDP. We are unaware of any specific guidance to the contrary from OSD or any other DoD entity. The finding of failure to provide optimum LEA support does not delineate what shortcomings from that optimum exist and is unsupported by any data in the report attributed to any LEA authority. 8,9

Sentence 3: The JTF FIVE contribution to LEAs is unique. It is the sole USPACOM unit providing sustained CN support within the DoD character to LEAs. It continues to be our persuasion that LEA support focused at a single dedicated point is the least confusing and most efficient way of meeting our obligations. Contrary to the implication that CN is simply another facet of DoD operation or intelligence activity, the CN target is one with which we in DoD have not previously dealt. While we employ pre-existing intelligence and operations assets, their exercise is materially different than in usual military operations and intelligence production.

Sentence 4: The report finds that the entirety of the FYDP resources for JTF FIVE could be "put to better use." CN work must be performed by people using equipment. It is unfounded to assert that support of the CN mission can continue, without acknowledging the need of funds to do so at some location. The stated figure of $26.8M of monetary benefits derived from JTF FIVE closure is incorrect by approx $11.3M. (The entire balance of the USPACOM CN program for the equivalent five year period is circa $6M.)

Sentence 5: The above rationale also applies to personnel. Personnel figure is incorrect. Read 26 vice 29.

Sentences 6 - 7: This proposal is equivalent to closing the factory and assigning all the employees to the sales force to market a commodity no longer produced. Perhaps EPIC, or the proposed National Center, could be beefed up to provide a timely, tactical product, tailored to operations and targets in this theater, but surely not for a period of from 2 to 5 years from now. Read 37 mil positions, vice 40.

Sentence 8: Disagree for reasons as stated in the foregoing.

Re: Page 16 "Recommendation": 9

Recommendation 1: Disagree. Were this done, we could not effectively meet our obligation to support LEAs with detection and monitoring and CSI support during the next 2 to 5 years.

Recommendation 2: Disagree. We have been coordinating effectively with LEAs for the last 2 years and will continue to do so. DEA, USCS, and USCG are represented by nine billets permanently filled by them on the JTF FIVE staff.

Recommendation 3: Disagree. This substitutes present ongoing tactical operational and intelligence support to LEAs with a plan which would be executable only after further expenditure of sunk costs to retool EPIC and to create the National Center. The proposal directs development of a Plan with only one of the LEA's we now serve. Earlier in the report, one criticism was that JTF FIVE is

Final Report
Page No.

removed from an LEA regional office by some 400 miles. The report now concludes that the solution to this is to focus theater support through one, possibly two, centers that are some one to three thousand miles further removed from the scene of action.

PART II - FINDING B: COUNTERNARCOTICS OPERATIONS.

Re: Page 17, para 1, last sentence: There are no plans to use USPACOM Detection and Monitoring assets for uncued patrol operations in FY's 91-95. 15

Re: Page 18, 1st full para, last sentence: This is incorrect. An oiler can be an effective CN platform against maritime targets. In most cases as effective as a frigate, since both can catch a sailboat (most common suspect vessel) and neither can catch a cigarette boat (least common). In cases where a specific capability is required, CJTF FIVE specifies some and PACFLT must provide to the limit of its capability. In the one case where a nuclear submarine was used in a CN operation, it was not "ill-equipped" but in fact the only ship which could do the mission which called for sustained close-in, covert surveillance. This required a submersible. 16

Re: Page 18, 2nd full para under Concept of Ops continuing to page 20: USCINCPAC abandoned random patrols in June 1990 in favor of the more productive intelligence cued or specified narcotrafficker profile, operations. We did random patrol for just less than 1 year, July 1989 - June 1990. We boarded over 200 vessels with negative results. It is easy now to say that because these operations where quantitatively unsuccessful, they should not have been done. Yet in 1989 even within the USCG with a decade of experience in CN operations, there was no unified position on the effectiveness of patrol operations. One position held they were a waste of time and money in the Pacific. The alternate position was that there was some deterrent value associated with the "cop on the beat." Much of this deterrence was unquantifiable since you never know who doesn't come because you are there. Another factor weighing on the side of trying patrols was that it had never been done before in the Pacific with plentiful assets over a sustained time period. Additionally, in 1986, there had been an absolutely random seizure of 8800 pounds of marijuana as the result of a random patrol boarding of the sailing vessel Myth of Bourie by the USCG. Thus, there were enough elements of doubt to foster an earnest attempt. Plus, the patrol assets were there anyway. The inferred position that the monies spent doing patrols were wasted and could be recouped somehow is in error. These ships and aircraft would have operated to their steaming limits in any case; if not on CN patrol then on other duties. The fact that they were on CN patrols did not result in any documented decline in their unit readiness. In fact, CN missions provide effective training in areas directly transportable to more conventional DoD missions such as over-the-horizon targeting and search and rescue. Having unsuccessfully tried patrols, we have embraced intelligence with much greater clarity and zeal. Cued operations are effective, but to say we would be as sure of that today if we had not tried patrols wholeheartedly is engaging in hindsight. 16,17

Re: Page 20, first full para: "Intelligence": The entire content of this paragraph is a repudiation of audit finding A. 16

Re: Page 21, full para, last sentence: True, and an area of our greatest current CN intelligence development effort. 17

Re: Page 22 first and second paras: JTF FIVE is directing its efforts against all narcotics smuggling in its jurisdiction. For example, as cocaine trafficking becomes more prevalent in this AOR, JTF FIVE rapidly moves to that problem. In fact, the largest maritime interdiction on record, MV NORCOLPP (15 TONS of cocaine) was controlled by JTF FIVE. The ranking of narcotics commodities by the Director of Central Intelligence applies to broad national CN strategy and funding decisions. To apply these criteria to ongoing day to day CN intelligence and interdiction efforts by any unit or at JTF FIVE, does not recognize tactical nature of these operations. Our tactical task is to detect, monitor, and track to LEA interdiction, all illicit narcotics destined for the United States. 17

Re: Page 23, "Conclusion": If what is meant by the first sentence is unused patrol operations, they have been discontinued. See above remarks re pg 18. Used operations, though, require specific intelligence. The solution to the dirth of collected, assembled, analyzed and reported intelligence is, however, not to disassemble the unit dedicated to doing so. 17

Re: Page 23, "Recommendation": 18

Recommendation 1: Agree. This has already been accomplished.

Recommendation 2: Disagree. See remarks concerning immediately preceding three paragraphs. Specific strategy to which this recommendation refers is not cited in the report.

PART II - FINDING C, HAWAII NATIONAL GUARD

Re: Page 25, para 2: This para states that the Hawaii National Guard and USPACOM received a total of $1.3M in FY 90 for duplicate CN operations. In the following paragraphs, the figures for the same year, same activity, total $3.010M. It is possible, however, to aggregate the figures, as stated, to $1.310M if a Guard budgeted figure and the USARPAC designated figure are totaled. In fact, USARPAC received no funds designated for Hawaii CN eradication from the USPACOM FY 90 CN program. Those activities were conducted using USARPAC optempo funds. 21

Re: Page 25, para 2: The 12 years of Hawaii eradication operations supported by the Guard yielded an average eradication of 167,000 plants per year. The DEA requested, USCINCPAC/USARPAC supported, "Operation Wipeout" yielded about 388,000 plants eradicated in 6 months. Possible reasons for variation are discussed in subsequent paragraphs. 21

Re: Page 27, para 1, last sentence: The DoD Authorization Act of 1988 neither encourages nor prohibits DoD activity of the type under discussion. 21

Re: Page 27, para 2: Disagree that a lack of coordination exists with the Guard. From the outset, we conducted regularly scheduled bi-monthly meetings between USARPAC and the Guard. Additional coordination of specific activities supplemented these meetings. 22

Re: Page 28, para 2: The USCINCPAC CN OPLAN indeed makes provision for USARPAC and other theater DoD elements to provide equipment loans, training etc., precisely as the Authorization Act mandates. This does not, per se, constitute duplication of effort. The human and equipment assets of USARPAC and the Hawaii 22

******UNCLASSIFIED******

Guard are different. The satisfaction of requests for assistance, with USARPAC and Guard coordination, have taken advantage of both to meet expressed needs. We agree completely with last sentence. Present activities do complement not duplicate.

Re: Page 29, first para, last sentence: Crop eradication operations on public land (as these are) have a very low potential for requiring exercise of police powers. In fact, over the entire history of Hawaiian eradication operations, there is no recorded instance of armed confrontation of active military, Guard, or Federal law enforcement personnel by marijuana growers. Only LEAs conducted manual eradication on the ground during Wipeout. 23

Re: Page 29, second para: The crux of the issue is alluded to in this paragraph. Agree there are now two military agencies to which LEAs may now look for assistance; before 1988 DoD Authorization Act, there was only the Guard. This is the effect and presumed intent of the act. We have coordinated and do coordinate responses to LEA requests with the Hawaii Guard. Generally, state authorities will request assistance of the Guard as they are accustomed to do and as mentioned in the report. Federal agencies, as pointed out, will often come to DoD active force headquarters. Nature of the response depends on the size and mix of forces available and the speed and security with which they can be brought to bear. Because Guard forces are not full time forces, the Guard must plan its activities up to 2 years in advance. Active forces do not require this lead time. Hence, their responses can be and in many instances are quicker. This was one reason why DEA, based on previous experience, requested aid from the active military. Additionally, the spectacular success of Operation Wipeout resulted from extensive pre-operation aerial photo reconnaissance and detailed imagery interpretation of multi spectral imagery. The Hawaii Guard possesses none of the recon and intel assets to do this. As a result of the imagery effort, areas for years thought to be relatively free of plants yielded the bulk of the eradication harvest. The proof is in the results. During the 12 years preceding our 1990 eradication efforts, Hawaii became be the second highest producer and exporter of domestic MJ. In 1990, DEA reported the state had become a net importer of the drug. 23

Re: Page 30-31, Recommendation:

Recommendation 1: Disagree. USARPAC is the lead agency for LEA support by forces under USCINCPAC. USARPAC has not and may not be appointed a lead role over the Guard, which is not in the USCINCPAC chain of command. 23

Recommendation 2: This has been the case since before the audit and will continue to be so. 24

Recommendation 3: As stated above, coordination with the Guard has been ongoing. It has not and likely will not result in funding adjustments. In 1990, the Guard provided what they could to Operation Wipeout and USCINCPAC active forces then provided the balance requested. This continues to be the case in 1991. No single command, Guard or active duty, can provide all requested assets. 24

PART II - FINDING D, COUNTERNARCOTICS REQUIREMENTS

The DoDIG recommended action accompanying this finding was taken by this HQ over a year ago. We do wish to correct several misstatements of fact contained in the audit report and to emphatically disagree with the incorrect conclusion that the audit team's work resulted in savings alluded to in the portion of the report 27

******UNCLASSIFIED******

dealing with this finding. As late as 31 October 1990, USCINCPAC staff elements continued to assist the audit team in a not yet completely successful attempt to derive and use figures that accurately represent what had been done by members of the USCINCPAC staff to reconcile the USCINCPAC CN program.

Re: Page 34, 2nd para: FY89 request was $22.3M, not $21.3M. The FY1990-94 request was $106M, not $195M 27

Re: Page 35, first para: The first sentence is incorrect. On 23 August 1989 the DoDIG Regional Office (RO) Pacific received a Hotline complaint. This was not the date that it initiated the investigation. The investigation of this complaint began on 15 September. The DoDIG Hotline investigation focused on six CN projects identified by the USCINCPAC staff as having questionable merit. The $34M figure quoted in the audit report is for FY90 only. In the second para on pg 35, the DoDIG auditors compare this to FYDP totals of $152M. The unannotated switching from annual to FYDP figures is repeated elsewhere in the audit report. 27

Re: Page 35 second para: This paragraph is incorrect. The USPACOM Operations directorate CN unit, J318 (later redesignated as J33) had been in existence since October 1989. The Intelligence Directorate CN element had been in existence since 11 September 1989. Prior to creation of dedicated CN Division within J2 and J3, both directorates did have full time CN staff officers assigned. There was no causal relationship between any of the occurrences alluded to and work done by the DoDIG Hotline investigation or by the subsequent DoDIG audit of the USPACOM CN Program. By the start of the Hotline investigation, USCINCPAC staff was already well underway reviewing the CN resource program. This review was a USCINCPAC initiative, not begun because of the pending Hotline investigation of which we were then unware. 28

Re: Page 36, first full para: During the Fall of 1989, the FY89 CN program was well into execution. In early November 1989, its revised structure was reported in response to data calls from Washington CN authorities, not as a result of audit work, which was not then complete. The revised USPACOM FY 90 CN program request (USCINCPAC 0902202 DEC 90) was $13.8M, not $28M. The FY91-95 CN program was not then reported as those figures were specifically not requested by (higher) HQ. The $47M figure in this DoDIG audit report paragraph was taken from a USCINCPAC internal working paper, later revised. 28

Re: Page 38 para "Conclusion": The second sentence is incorrect. The scrub of the program was self initiated and preceded the initiation of the DoDIG Hotline investigation. This included our serious questioning of the validity of the Secure Video Teleconferencing (SVTC) project. We did and do agree with the IG position that the SVTC project has no merit. We cancelled this project with no expenditure of funds. With agreement on this point, there remains no substance to this issue. Our sole purpose in commenting on this finding is to correct the misstatement of fact commencing in first para, first sentence, pg 35 "On August 23, 1989 the Inspector General..."; contained in first sentence, second para, pg 35 "after the Hotline case was initiated..."; further contained second sentence, first full para, pg 38, "after the initiation of a DoD hotline review... we subsequently identified..." The IG audit did not identify as questionable any project not previously under review by USCINCPAC CN staff. In fact, those reported by DoDIG in the hotline investigation and again in the audit report were precisely the ones highlighted by USCINCPAC CN staff as unsuitable. 29

APPENDIX A: 31

1. The CN resource program has been changed several times in each fiscal year with budget execution taking place while Congress, et. al, changed program figures. Execution, budget estimate submissions and POM submission have often been simultaneous. As Appendix A lacks the customary statement regarding the "as of" date for the program figures, or a source of the data, it is difficult to make precise corrections.

2. Projects 3309 and 3419 were merged effective FY91. The figures displayed for FY's 91-95 are not additive.

3. Project 3301 was never part of the JTF FIVE program. Further, it was rejected in our 1989 program review.

4. Corrections to incorrect figures from draft report are on attached sheet. We cannot locate the source of FY95 figures shown in Appendix A. They are not the ones submitted by this HQ.

APPENDIX C: 35

1. The OPUS terminal for FICPAC was rejected in our '89 review.

2. No SVTC has been procured with CN funds or for CN in this theater.

3. There is no JMIE terminal at FOSIF WESTPAC.

4. The CMST-N terminal at PACFLT is not related to the CN effort or funding program. It is a generally used intel collection management device. None will be procured for JTF FIVE. The CMST-N program has been cancelled. No CMST-N terminal is planned or programmed for FICPAC.

5. In Appendix B the FIST is correctly identified (as it was in POM) as the circuit for the FIST III terminal. In Appendix C, FIST AND FIST III are both described as terminals with incorrectly identified circuits. The appendix identifies terminals at places where they do not exist. If they are regarded as circuits, they are also terminated at places where their terminals do not exist. The FIST's at CINCPACFLT and numbered fleets are related to regular fleet operations. They were not funded under CN programs.

6. CSP's are Communications Support Processors. PACFLT and NAVCAMS WESTPAC have both had CSP's for quite some time. We have paid no CN funds for the communication devices displayed.

7. MSI is an imagery interpretation device. FICPAC has a theater CN imagery interpretation mission.

APPENDIX D: 37

1. OPUS: Appendix C credits USPACOM CN program with OPUS at three locations. There are OPUS at two locations. One of them was drawn from pre-existing PACFLT inventory. The second is under procurement. The cost of an OPUS unit, depending on options needed, is circa $450K.

2. SVTC: As previously stated, this project was cancelled per our review. The system was not purchased or maintained for our CN program.

3. CMST-N: All figures are incorrect. Correct project (# 1379) figures are: FY90 - OGM-$140K; outyear at $4K OGM,N ea.

4. FIST, FIST III: Correct figures are FY90 $119K for terminal, $40K for ckt. $50K total for FY91 and each outyear. We may be able, as comm systems are connected at JTF FIVE, to eliminate outyear costs.

5. CSP: See comments on Appendix C.

Appendix E: Title. Disagree. As stated in the foregoing, no single service can provide all requested support to LEAs. Coordination between USARPAC and the Guard aims at covering all requests and doing so with the asset best suited to the task. This is not duplicative but complementary. 39

Appendix F:

A1: Figures are incorrect. See revision to Appendix A.

A2: Disagree for reasons set forth on page 5.

A3: Ditto.

B1: Disagree. Costs of cued operations have potential to exceed those of random patrol. Experience shows cued operations come to fruition at much greater distances from home ports than the location of our old random patrol stations i.e., South of Baja versus off Southern California.

B2: No comment.

B3: Disagree. Current intelligence from JTF FIVE justifies cued operations.

C1, C2, C3: Agree. All were accomplished from the outset of our CN program.

D: Agree in principle. However, it is difficult to attribute $4M of present and future savings to monies never committed, obligated or expended under a project cancelled over a year ago.

******UNCLASSIFIED******

*****OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, DOD,
ADDENDUM TO THE USPACOM REPONSE******

The Appendix A referred to in USPACOM's March 30, 1991, comments on the draft report was omitted from management's initial response. On April 8, 1991, USPACOM provided updated funding figures, and our Appendix A in the final report (page 31) has been modified accordingly.

THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-3000

J-3A 00330-91
1 April 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, READINESS AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT DIRECTORATE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Subject: Draft Audit Report on Support to Drug Interdiction Efforts in the U. S. Pacific Command (Project 9RC-0052.02) (U)

1. (U) I have read with great interest the subject draft report evaluating the detection and monitoring support that U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) provides the law enforcement community. Several recommendations have the potential to improve the performance of USPACOM's counter-drug mission.

2. (U) The Joint Staff disagrees with the recommended disestablishment of JTF-5. The structure and functions of the JTFs are vital to support DOD's role in counter-drug operations. USPACOM has a unique problem in providing this support due to the large geographic area of responsibility (AOR). JTF-5 fulfills a critical role as the sub-unified command within USPACOM solely dedicated to CN operations. It performs the following functions:

- Conducts operations to detect and monitor aircraft and surface vessels suspected of smuggling drugs into U.S.
- Integrates the anti-drug Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) network for federal, state, and local LEAs.
- Coordinates activities of other Federal agencies engaged in detection and monitoring.
- Serves as an intelligence fusion center and provides drug-related intelligence to appropriate law enforcement agencies (LEAs).
- Facilitates coordination among DOD and civil agencies in order to maximize effective use of resources.

3. (U) The recommendation on page 23 which states that PACOM operations should be reprogrammed to be commensurate with strategy issued by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, should be deleted from the report. USCINCPAC has developed operational plans to support the National Drug Control Strategy within his AOR. While it is valid to evaluate USPACOM counter-drug operations within that context, it is not appropriate to suggest that the operations of any unified command should be reprogrammed to correspond in size and extent with the strategy of an outside agency.

Classified By: Multiple Sources
Declassified ON: OADR

THE JOINT STAFF
WASHINGTON, DC

Reply ZIP Code:
20318-3000

J-3A 00330-91
1 April 1991

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, READINESS AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT DIRECTORATE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

Subject: Draft Audit Report on Support to Drug Interdiction Efforts in the U. S. Pacific Command (Project 9RC-0052.02) (U)

1. (U) I have read with great interest the subject draft report evaluating the detection and monitoring support that U.S. Pacific Command (USPACOM) provides the law enforcement community. Several recommendations have the potential to improve the performance of USPACOM's counter-drug mission.

2. (U) The Joint Staff disagrees with the recommended disestablishment of JTF-5. The structure and functions of the JTFs are vital to support DOD's role in counter-drug operations. USPACOM has a unique problem in providing this support due to the large geographic area of responsibility (AOR). JTF-5 fulfills a critical role as the sub-unified command within USPACOM solely dedicated to CN operations. It performs the following functions:

- Conducts operations to detect and monitor aircraft and surface vessels suspected of smuggling drugs into U.S.
- Integrates the anti-drug Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) network for federal, state, and local LEAs.
- Coordinates activities of other Federal agencies engaged in detection and monitoring.
- Serves as an intelligence fusion center and provides drug-related intelligence to appropriate law enforcement agencies (LEAs).
- Facilitates coordination among DOD and civil agencies in order to maximize effective use of resources.

3. (U) The recommendation on page 23 which states that PACOM operations should be reprogrammed to be commensurate with strategy issued by the Director, Central Intelligence Agency, should be deleted from the report. USCINCPAC has developed operational plans to support the National Drug Control Strategy within his AOR. While it is valid to evaluate USPACOM counter-drug operations within that context, it is not appropriate to suggest that the operations of any unified command should be reprogrammed to correspond in size and extent with the strategy of an outside agency.

Classified By: Multiple Sources
Declassified ON: OADR

4. (U) As part of its mission, JTF-5 coordinates DOD support to both state and federal LEAs, including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Customs Service (USCS), and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). When JTF-5 was established, it was located in Alameda in order to collocate it with the USCG Pacific Area Headquarters, the principal maritime LEA in USPACOM's AOR. The USCG also provided the building and other facilities for JTF-5's rapid establishment. The Joint Staff is unaware of any failure on USPACOM's or JTF-5's part to provide adequate support to the LEAs. A single command with a dedicated CN mission would seem to remain the most efficient method of coordinating LEA support.

6. (U) I agree that the Commander, U.S. Army, Pacific (USARPAC) should coordinate his CN plan with the Hawaii National Guard in order to eliminate duplication of efforts. Each organization has strengths and requirements which should be taken into account when planning operations.

7. (U) I view with concern your findings that USPACOM may not be following DOD funding guidelines. I trust that the issue will be clarified by USCINCPAC when he responds to your draft report.

8. (U) I appreciate the obvious time and effort that went into the making of your draft report. Many of the recommendations will assist USPACOM in better fulfilling their counter-drug mission. If my CN staff can further assist you in refining your report, please don't hesitate to let me know.

J. R. FITZGERALD
Rear Admiral, USN
Deputy Director for Operations
(Current Operations)

SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL MONETARY AND OTHER BENEFITS RESULTING FROM AUDIT (U)

(U) Recommendation Reference	Description of Benefit	Amount and/or Type of Benefit
A.1.	Program Results. Disestablishment of Joint Task Force 5.	Funds put to better use of $15,773,000[1/] (Operation and Maintenance - $14,873,000; Other Procurement Navy- $900,000).
A.2.	Program Results. Establishment of liaison offices within the law enforcement community.	Nonmonetary. Allows DoD to provide the support that is required.
A.3.	Program Results. Direct support of the EL Paso Intelligence Center and the proposed National Drug Intelligence Center agencies that require it.	Nonmonetary. Facilitates the immediate use of time-sensitive information by law enforcement
B.1.	Program Results. Reductions of operations. $115,335,000, for the FY 1991 through FY 1995 time frame.	Funds put to better use of
B.2.	Program Results. Reassess and coordinate theater U.S. Pacific narcotics threat with the Director, Central Intelligence. funds cannot be readily determined.	Nonmonetary. Allows for the efficient use of the DoD counternarcotics budget. This reapplication of
B.3.	Program Results. Resumption of operations when justified by adequate intelligence cueing. missions.	Nonmonetary. Precludes the diversion of assets from other

1/ Offsetting costs to relocate to the El Paso Intelligence Center are addressed in our comprehensive draft report, "DoD's Support to Drug Interdiction Efforts," April 22, 1991.

******UNCLASSIFIED******

SUMMARY OF POTENTIAL MONETARY AND OTHER BENEFITS RESULTING FROM AUDIT (U) (Continued)

(U) Recommendation Reference	Description of Benefit	Amount and/or Type of Benefit
C.1.	Program Results Acknowledgment of the lead role status of the Hawaii National Guard. agencies and provides one point of contact.	Nonmonetary. Eliminates confusion among the law enforcement
C.2.	Economy and Efficiency. Coordination of Hawaii National Guard and U.S. Army Western Command counternarcotics plans to minimize duplication of effort.	Undeterminable. Serves to maximize support to law enforcement agencies and to prevent unneeded obligations of funds.
C.3.	Economy and Efficiency. Review and adjust funding for counternarcotics support.	Undeterminable. Provides additional support.
D	Program Results. Cancellation of the planned procurement of the Secure Video Teleconferencing connectivity.	Funds put to better use of $4,000,000 - Operation and Maintenance.

ACTIVITIES VISITED OR CONTACTED (U)

(U)
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence), Washington, DC
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs), Washington, DC
National Guard Bureau, Washington, DC
Hawaii National Guard, Honolulu, HI
DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support, Washington, DC
Regional Logistics Support Office, Honolulu, HI
Joint Staff, Washington, DC

Department of the Army

Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, DC
United States Army Pacific, Fort Shafter, HI

Department of the Navy

Chief of Naval Operations, Washington, DC
Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Washington, DC
Pacific Fleet, Pearl Harbor, HI
Naval Ocean Systems Center, San Diego, CA

Department of the Air Force

Headquarters, Department of the Air Force, Washington, DC

Unified Commands

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp H.M. Smith, HI
Intelligence Center, Pacific, Camp H.M. Smith, HI
Joint Task Force 5, Alameda, CA

Defense Agencies

Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, DC
National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, MD

Non-DoD

Central Intelligence, Counternarcotics Center, Washington, DC
Department of Justice
Headquarters, Drug Enforcement Administration, Washington, DC
Field Offices: San Francisco, CA; Los Angeles, CA; San Diego, CA; Honolulu, HI

ACTIVITIES VISITED OR CONTACTED (U) (Continued)

(U)
Non-DoD

Headquarters, Immigration and Naturalization Service,
  Washington, DC
  Western Regional Office, Los Angeles, CA
  United States Border Patrol, Laguna Niguel, CA
Department of Transportation
  Headquarters, U.S. Coast Guard, Washington, DC
   Pacific Area Headquarters, Alameda, CA
    11th Coast Guard District, Long Beach, CA
    Tactical Law Enforcement
    14th Coast Guard District, Honolulu, HI
Department of Treasury
  Headquarters, U.S. Customs Service, Washington, DC
   Western Regional Intelligence Division, Long Beach, CA
   Field Offices: San Francisco, CA; Honolulu, HI;
                  Corronado, CA; Command, Control,
                    Communications and Intelligence Center-West,
                    Riverside, CA

FINAL REPORT DISTRIBUTION (U)

(U)
Office of the Secretary of Defense

Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and Personnel)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Reserve Affairs)
DoD Coordinator for Drug Enforcement Policy and Support
Comptroller of the Department of Defense

Joint Staff

Director, Joint Staff

Department of the Army

Secretary of the Army
Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management)
Army Audit Agency

Department of the Navy

Secretary of the Navy
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management)
Comptroller of the Navy
Naval Audit Service
Inspector General of the Marine Corps

Department of the Air Force

Secretary of the Air Force
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Air Force Audit Agency

Unified Commands

Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
United States Army, Pacific

Defense Agencies

Director, Defense Intelligence
Director, National Security Agency

FINAL REPORT DISTRIBUTION (U) (Continued)

(U)
National Guard Bureau

Director, National Guard Bureau

Non-DoD Activities

Department of Justice
  Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration
    El Paso Intelligence Center
  Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service
  Office of the Inspector General
Department of State
  Assistant Secretary of State, International Narcotics Matters
  Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
  Office of Inspector General
Department of Transportation
  Commandant, United States Coast Guard
  Office of Inspector General
Department of Treasury
  Director, Operation Alliance
  Commissioner, United States Customs Service
  Office of Inspector General
Central Intelligence Agency
  Chief of Staff, Counternarcotics Center
Office of National Drug Control Policy
U.S. General Accounting Office,
  NSIAD Technical Information Center
Office of Management and Budget

Congressional Committees:

Senate Committee on Appropriations
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
Senate Committee on Armed Services
Senate Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Committee on Armed Services
Senate Subcommittee on Preparedness, Committee on Armed Services
Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
House Committee on Appropriations
House Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
House Committee on Armed Services
House Subcommittee on Military Personnel and Compensation, Committee on Armed Services
House Subcommittee on Readiness, Committee on Armed Services

FINAL REPORT DISTRIBUTION (U) (Continued)

(U)
Congressional Committees (Continued)

House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House Subcommittee on Oversight and Evaluation, House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
House Committee on Government Operations
House Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, Committee on Government Operations