Evaluation Report

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

EVALUATION OF US SOUTHERN COMMAND HEADQUARTERS

Report No. 96-015 **October 23, 1995**

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

ACRONYMS

AO	Action Officer
CINC	Commander in Chief
DoD	Department of Defense
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
J1	JCS, Manpower and Personnel Directorate
LAN	Local Area Network
SCJ1	SOUTHCOM Manpower, Personnel and Adminstration Directorate
SCJ2	SOUTHCOM Intelligence Directorate
SCJ3	SOUTHCOM Operations Directorate
SCJ4	SOUTHCOM Logistics Directorate
SCJ5	SOUTHCOM Strategy, Policy and Plans Directorate
SCJ6	SOUTHCOM Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems Directorate
SCJ8	SOUTHCOM Programs and Resource Directorate
SJS	Secretary Joint Staff
USARSO	US Army South

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October 23, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER IN CHIEF, US SOUTHERN COMMAND

SUBJECT: Evaluation of US Southern Command Headquarters

Enclosed is our evaluation responding to your letter of 31 October 1994 requesting an evaluation of the internal operations of your headquarters.

The objectives of our evaluation were to assess processes and procedures which affect the efficiency, productivity, and morale of the U.S. Southern Command; to identify strengths for reenforcement; and to provide recommendations to improve the overall efficiency, productivity, and morale of U.S. Southern Command.

Based on the results of our evaluation, we made observations in the following areas of concern: centralization of authority, quality of life, editorial review process, missions and functions statements, manpower, and automation.

We suggest that you consider these observations to improve the overall efficiency, productivity, and morale of the U.S. Southern Command.

We hope this evaluation will be of value to you and would appreciate your feedback, although no formal response is required. Should additional information be needed or assistance in other areas desired, please contact Colonel Timothy T. Turner at (703) 604-9555 or DSN: 664-9555.

Robert J. Lieberman
Assistant Inspector General
for Auditing

Enclosure

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Deputy Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, asked us to evaluate the internal operations of the headquarters and to recommend ways to conduct business more efficiently and effectively.

The evaluation objectives were to assess processes and procedures which affect the efficiency, productivity, and morale of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM); to identify strengths for reinforcement; and to provide recommendations to improve the overall efficiency, productivity, and morale of SOUTHCOM.

The vehicle for data collection was a questionnaire sent to 160 randomly selected individuals and 17 interviews of the senior leadership. With a 35 percent return rate on the questionnaire, there is difficulty making firm conclusions, but we can suggest and identify areas for further assessment. These are the areas of concern we found: centralization of authority, quality of life, editorial review process, manpower, and automation.

We concluded that SOUTHCOM needs to:

- Be aware that almost half of the survey respondents and several Directors expressed concern about too much centralization of authority and micromanagement.
- Focus the internal headquarters feedback system on quality of life to gain a more accurate status assessment and follow-up as appropriate.
- Consider making all those tasked with drafting and reviewing correspondence familiarize themselves with SOUTHCOM Regulation 25-2 and attend the action officer correspondence course (including senior decision makers). Additionally, SOUTHCOM Regulation 25-2 needs periodic review to incorporate evolving procedural changes.
- Conduct an internal manpower and workload review so the personnel borrowed from U.S. Army South as well as any other personnel requirements generated by the move to Miami can be used efficiently.
- Review training closely to maintain computer instruction that develops and sustains essential competencies throughout the work force.

Strengths of SOUTHCOM that were evident in this evaluation:

- The staff handles multiple, concurrent, complex taskings well and produces outstanding results. The Cuban Refugee situation was one example of an additional mission that SOUTHCOM accomplished with no detriment to other ongoing missions in the organization.

- All Directors in the interviews mentioned that the Directors worked well together.

- The majority of personnel believe that SOUTHCOM is a valuable professional experience. Exposure to a unified command and national level policy making was considered important to individual's developmental programs.

In conclusion, SOUTHCOM is a hard-working, professional organization that is proud of all the work that they do. Everyone in the command cooperated with the Program Evaluation team and was very open with their comments.

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PART I - INTRODUCTION

PURPOSE

The purpose of the evaluation was to provide the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, with an evaluation of the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Headquarters' processes and procedures. Additionally, we were to determine workable alternatives to conduct business more efficiently and effectively.

OBJECTIVES

The evaluation had the following objectives:

- Assess processes and procedures which affect the efficiency, productivity, and morale of SOUTHCOM.
- Identify strengths for reinforcement.
- Provide recommendations to improve the overall efficiency, productivity, and morale of SOUTHCOM.

SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS

Our evaluation focused on the processes and procedures of SOUTHCOM. We did not attempt a comparative analysis of manpower or organizational structure across the Unified Commands because of their differing missions. The data we could have obtained would not necessarily have been applicable or beneficial to the SOUTHCOM Commander-in-Chief. Further, we felt we could best meet his needs in a timely manner by narrowing the scope of this evaluation to focus solely on SOUTHCOM.

METHODOLOGY

Our methodology was a multi-dimensional approach consisting of document reviews, data collection, questionnaires and on-site interviews. We targeted the questionnaires to randomly selected individuals. The concern, then, was that we would miss the perspective of the senior leadership, so we conducted interviews with those leaders. After conducting the interviews and collecting the questionnaires, we developed a data base. The data base consisted of the answers to the questionnaire to include both the open-ended and structured questions. We queried the data base by looking for key words (hits) in the open ended questions and we determined averages for the structured questions. With the number of "hits" in the data base and mathematical averages, we identified areas of concern that developed into the concerns presented in this report. We chose this approach because it provided us with the most accurate and timely information that would be useful to the Commander in Chief (CINC).

Documents reviewed

We reviewed documents in preparation for and in support of the evaluation. These documents were selected because they fell into three groups:

- Documents that regulate manpower in the Joint Staff and SOUTHCOM.
- Documents of previous inspections of SOUTHCOM and SOUTHCOM manpower reviews.
- Documents that deal with organizational assessment and total quality management.

The complete list of documents is at Appendix A.

Data Collection Ranged From Washington to Panama

We visited the SOUTHCOM Washington Field Office in Crystal City and the SOUTHCOM Liaison office in the Pentagon. At the Washington Field Office, we received the SOUTHCOM command briefing. At the Liaison Office, we were able to collect the organizational chart and some of the SOUTHCOM documents. A complete list of organizations and offices contacted during this evaluation is at Appendix B.

A visit to the Manpower and Personnel Directorate, the Joint Staff, provided us with an overall appreciation of the Unified Commands and a broad command perspective prior to visiting SOUTHCOM.

Questionnaire Sent to Randomly Selected People

Based on the literature review and the preliminary information gathered on SOUTHCOM, we developed a tailored questionnaire that would identify organizational structure, formal and informal information processing procedures, such as standard operating procedures, and individual perceptions and needs. The questionnaire was composed of open-ended and structured questions that were designed and categorized to capture certain personal and organizational information which would help us provide the CINC with useful and meaningful information. These characteristics were demographic variables, environmental factors, processes and procedures, communication, and authority and responsibility. Appendix C contains a copy of the questionnaire. We randomly selected 160 individuals at the SOUTHCOM Headquarters to complete the questionnaire. This sample size was approximately a quarter of the SOUTHCOM population, which is an acceptable sample size. Additionally, we were looking for a response of 70 percent or 112 individuals.

Panama Interviews Targeted Senior Leaders

Because our sample was randomly selected to survey a cross section of the organization, we were concerned that we would not get the perspective of the senior decision makers which we thought was important to compare to the survey results. The questionnaire provided the overall picture and the interviews provided us with the senior level perspective as well as informal insights. We suspected senior opinion would differ from the action officers' as in any organization and we wanted to capture

this difference in the data. So we selected the Command Group[1] and the staff Directors (or the Deputy (Vice) Directors) to represent senior decision makers. In addition, we interviewed functional specialists, such as the Engineer, Comptroller, Personnel Specialist, and Historian, to gain more information from a different perspective.

[1]The Command Group is composed of the CINC, Executive Officer to the CINC, Special Assistant to the CINC , Deputy CINC, Chief of Staff, and Secretary Joint Staff.

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PART II - BACKGROUND

SOUTHCOM MISSION

The mission of SOUTHCOM is "...to establish and implement plans, programs, and policies in peacetime, in conflict, and in war which contribute to the defense of the United States and its allies. SOUTHCOM supports U.S. interests in the Southern Theater through the strengthening of the security shield behind which democracy, economic and political development, and social well-being may flourish to enhance regional and national stability."[2]

CURRENT ORGANIZATION

Headquarters SOUTHCOM is organized with seven primary directorates and three functional specialists (Figure 1). At the time of our data collection in March and April 1995, there were 669 people at headquarters, 528 military, and 141 civilians. The civilians are roughly evenly distributed throughout SOUTHCOM. The Headquarters' budget is approximately $30 million.

United States Southern Command



Figure 1

PRESENT AND FUTURE LOCATIONS

Headquarters SOUTHCOM is located in and around Quarry Heights in the Republic of Panama. The Headquarters is spread out in three different locations. Quarry Heights houses the main headquarters which includes the Command Group; the Intelligence Directorate (SCJ2); the Operations Directorate

[2]SOUTHCOM Public Affairs Directorate fact sheet dated 20 June 1994.

(SCJ3); the Strategy, Policy, and Plans (SCJ5); the Inspector General; the Public Affairs Office and the Historian. Ft. Amador houses the Manpower, Personnel, and Administration Directorate (SCJ1); the Logistics Directorate (SCJ4); the Command, Control, Communications, Computer Systems Directorate (SCJ6); and the Programs & Resources Directorate (SCJ8). The SOUTHCOM Engineer is located in Corozal.

Plans require SOUTHCOM to depart from Panama by noon, December 31, 1999. On that date, the Panama Canal will transfer to Panama and permanent U.S. military combat force presence will terminate.[3] Miami has been identified as the new site for SOUTHCOM. However, there is some ongoing debate about how many military personnel might stay in Panama.

[3]Panama Treaty Implementation Plan, Headquarters, US Southern Command, Public Affairs Office.

PART III - RESULTS OF THE EVALUATION

OVERVIEW

Our methodology gave us a wide spectrum of comments from the surveys and the interviews. Of the 160 surveys sent out, 57 were returned. A detailed summary of results from the surveys and interviews is at Appendix D. The 35 percent return rate is not statistically sufficient to identify trends but does suggest and direct attention to areas of concern. Faced with statistical limitation, we relied heavily on interviews with SOUTHCOM's senior leadership to capture experienced insights into the commands operations. We did not use the impact of senior leaders in a statistical roll up. Instead, we emphasized their individual inputs because of the leaders broader range of knowledge and importance in making the CINC's command system work. Significantly, all areas of concern identified by the survey were also subjects of comment by some number of senior leaders. Combining survey data with the seventeen interviews from the Command Group and the Directors, we identified six areas of concern that comprise this report. They are centralization of authority, quality of life, editorial review process, mission and functions manual, manpower, and automation. These areas of concern are only valuable when placed in a more comprehensive frame of reference founded on daily observations of the command and routine feedback.

MISSION AND FUNCTIONS DROPPED FROM THE EVALUATION

Although The Mission and Functions Manual (SOUTHCOM Regulation 10-1, *Organizations and Functions*) is outdated, we learned that the regulation is being updated and observed that meaningful progress is being made. With the current emphasis on the review of roles and mission throughout the Department of Defense, this review of organizations and functions is consistent with present DoD direction. Completion of the update and followup action to enforce changes should resolve the mission and functions concerns which included the SOUTHCOM proposal for functional consolidation and the J2 manpower proposal. The SOUTHCOM proposal of functional consolidation is an effort to eliminate duplication of effort in the J3 and J5 in the Counterdrug and Contingency Operations arena. The J2 manpower proposal was to increase the manpower requirements from 167 to 317 personnel. Based on SOUTHCOM's ongoing initiative, we dropped further consideration of this concern.

AREA OF CONCERN 1: Respondents concern over centralization of authority and micromanagement.

OVERVIEW

Our analysis indicates that 45 percent of the respondents[4] and five of the Directors were concerned about centralized authority. Furthermore, 40 percent felt that they were micromanaged.

CENTRALIZATION OF AUTHORITY CONCERNS

Forty-five percent of the respondents and five of the Directors contend that there is a reluctance on the part of the Command Group to decentralize authority. In Bill Creech's recent book, *The Five Pillars of TQM,* he suggests "use a decentralized, interactive system that integrates all levels...Centralism is a bankrupt approach...Build a decentralized structure on the Teams-Outputs-Product model."[5] Almost half of the respondents are concerned that they do not have the ability to make things happen because the CINC has centralized the authority.

Additionally, there was a concern that every action is treated with the same priority. As such, all requirements must receive the same degree of scrutiny and guidance from the CINC. The respondents argue for some delegation of authority down to the Directors. For example, the Directors could be given the authority to release internal information papers with a courtesy copy to the Command Group. Such a delegation of authority would be a message to the organization that some of the authority is being relinquished by the CINC.

MICRO-MANAGEMENT ALLEGED

Forty percent of the survey respondents and two of the Directors indicated they were micromanaged by the Command Group because the Command Group must review and approve all actions. Further, critical direction and guidance is not provided to the action officers which forces them to "guess what they [Command Group] want." The action officers feel that everything must be scrutinized because the Command Group does not trust the action officers' experience and knowledge.

ANALYSIS

Complaints about centralization of authority and micromanagement are not unusual in organizations of this size with a four star commander. Significant to assessing these criticisms is the fact that so few individuals made the effort to press the issue through the questionnaire. Also significant is that three Directors expressed concern about too much centralization and micromanagement. Statistically insufficient data or overwhelming input from interviews with Directors to validate these concerns leaves the command in the position of subjectively assessing the implications.

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[4]Respondents are those surveyed.

[5]Extracted from *The Five Pillars of TQM* by Bill Creech, pg. 528. Bill Creech was the very successful general that revitalized the Tactical Air Command and went on to be highly respected in the corporate world in the TQM arena.

Observation 1

SOUTHCOM needs to be aware that almost half of the respondents and several Directors expressed concern about too much centralization of authority and micromanagement.

AREA OF CONCERN 2: There is a perception by some that Quality of Life is poor.

OVERVIEW

One of the significant concerns shared by a majority of the respondents and the Directors was the lack of quality in their personal lives. Comments on why this was a perception indicated that SOUTHCOM is usually in a crisis mode of operations and the long range plan keeps changing, which makes it difficult to plan family time. Both of these comments might well be true and may be unavoidable; however, the following discussion might be of further help to inform the CINC of perceptions of his subordinates.

SOME PERCEPTION OF POOR TREATMENT OF FAMILY AND PERSONAL LIFE

The Directors and the staff agree that private lives must be secondary to the genuine mission needs of the organization. But, they also assert that their family lives are very important and some consistency in schedules to enable spending some quality time with their families would add greatly to their effectiveness on the job. SOUTHCOM has had no command picnics or family functions in recent years. In general, some perceived that there is unnecessary turbulence in schedules which makes planning quality family time difficult and sometimes next to impossible. Additionally, the respondents wanted to talk face-to-face with the CINC to endorsed these immediate concerns to him in a more relaxed atmosphere. Several respondents endorsed the idea of a "Brown Bag" lunch with the CINC and his subordinates to discuss issues that affect SOUTHCOM. This or some other forum would provide the CINC with an opportunity to hear the problems and concerns of the command.

Too Many Late Night Phone Calls

Another concern of several of the respondents was that there are too many late night telephone calls. Respondents, as well as four of the Directors, alleged that if the organization would prioritize requirements, numerous midnight and early morning phones calls and meetings could be curtailed. We were told that senior officials are prone to call a meeting to address an issue immediately, regardless of the time of day , setting off a chain reaction of activity. A majority of the Directors interviewed agreed that some of the requests for late night meetings and telephone calls have been unnecessary and some of the problems could have been solved in the morning just as well as late at night.

ANALYSIS

The perception by some in SOUTHCOM that the Quality of Life is poor cannot be fully explained based on our limited survey and interviews. There is no "flashing red light" pointing to an issue. Nevertheless, the volume and quality of feedback collected suggest more of a "flashing yellow light" indicating this needs to be a subject for further assessment and possible fine-tuning within the command.

None of the material surfaced lies outside the bounds of the expected findings in a unified command. Cumulatively, the comments reinforce the importance of ongoing command attention and initiative to keep effective communication flowing throughout the headquarters. Attaining a positive quality of life perception in the command is a dynamic that SOUTHCOM is well prepared to manage.

Observation 2

SOUTHCOM needs to focus the internal headquarters feedback system on quality of life to gain a more accurate status assessment and follow-up as appropriate.

AREA OF CONCERN 3: The editorial review process is perceived by some as inefficient.

OVERVIEW

Our survey revealed that 60 percent of the respondents think there is a problem with documentation reaching the CINC in a timely manner. Respondents identified various reasons for the delay that include nonsubstantive reviews, heavy emphasis on accompanying documentation requirements, and Directors' perceptions that differ from action officers!

CONCERN THAT EXCESSIVE LAYERS OF REVIEW CAUSE TIME DELAYS

On the average, our analysis of the responses indicates that a document for the CINC's signature takes approximately 9.33 days to reach him. Figure 2 highlights the review layers. Our interviews and surveys indicate that there are, at a minimum, seven layers of review, and that documents are reviewed an average of over five times as they travel through the review process. Further, a minor change noted at any level of review results in sending the document directly back to the AO and the process starts all over again.

THE SOUTHCOM EDITORIAL REVIEW PROCESS



Figure 2

ALLEGED NONSUBSTANTIVE REVIEWS WASTE TIME

Seventy-one percent of the respondents indicated that the majority of the reviews were of a nonsubstantive nature, such as "form over content". Although SOUTHCOM has a correspondence manual (USSOUTHCOM Regulation 25-2, *Preparation and Management of Correspondence in USSOUTHCOM*) and an action officers' class to prepare AOs to write memoranda, the respondents complained of constant changes that were not incorporated into Regulation 25-2. Some examples of their concerns: "We waste a lot of time on format vs content;" "Usually corrections are just changing words or order;" and "Inane, idiosyncratic clerical requirements, e.g., binder clips and proper placement of staples." They believe that the review process can be expedited if more importance is placed on content and less on format, and if minor corrections are handled by the SOUTHCOM secretarial staff, particularly since the floppy disks accompany the documentation.

ACCOMPANYING DOCUMENTATION MIGHT DELAY PROCESS

Further, according to USSOUTHCOM Regulation 25-2, memoranda for the CINC's signature must be accompanied by a staff action summary sheet (SASS) and an informal memorandum for the CINC plus whatever other notes or documents the AOs believe may clarify and expedite signature. The SASS is the cover sheet for the document that summarizes pertinent points for the CINC. Respondents expressed frustration at the overemphasis on the meticulous packaging of documents which they feel contributes to the processing delays. Some AOs believe that too much documentation accompanies the memos. There is a complaint that too many documents give the SOUTHCOM staff too many opportunities to send back the package with irrelevant

questions that pertain more to the accompanying documentation than to the document for signature or authority to release the document. According to the AOs, if the reviewer had read through the entire package their questions may have been answered by the SASS, the informal memo, the notes, or the memo for signature. But more importantly, all questions, suggestions, or corrections would be identified and the necessary changes made to the documents at one time instead of the document going back and forth several times. As it is, the smallest discrepancy results in major revisions to everything but the document sent up for signature or review by the CINC. Any revisions to the memorandum for signature is addressed much later, and must follow the same review checkpoints, further delaying concurrence and signature.

REVIEW PROCESS IMPLIES A PERCEIVED LACK OF TRUST

In addition to the AOs' concern over the layers of review, a majority of those surveyed believe that such strict adherence to the requisite memorandum package presents a lack of trust on the part of upper management. Standard operating procedure is for every piece of paper to be reviewed and approved before the paperwork is forwarded to the next level. According to a majority of the respondents, this requirement exists because their chain of command does not trust them to know their job. Further evidence of this is the need to review revised paperwork. The respondents feel that revised paperwork should not have to start at the first step of the review process again but should be returned to the office that requested the change and proceed automatically to the next review level.

DIRECTORS' PERCEPTIONS DIFFER FROM ACTION OFFICERS'

Most of the Directors interviewed did not share the same concerns over review delays as those AOs we surveyed. The Directors said that documents reached the CINC in an average of 4.5 days, while those surveyed said that documents reached the CINC in an average of 9.33 days. This significant difference in opinion between those surveyed and those interviewed can be explained by where they start counting. The Directors see the process as taking only 4.5 days from their office forward and the AOs see 9.33 days from their office forward. Additionally, the Directors have experienced many more headquarters assignments than the AOs and might not conclude this to be a problem. For example, the Director understands that it takes a document some time to move through the different levels when an AO thinks that it should flow quickly up the chain. Nevertheless, the Directors need to recognize that the AOs perceive the review process as burdensome and should try and explain the situation to the AOs.

ANALYSIS

Frustrations with the staff action review process in SOUTHCOM are not unusual or easily resolved. The continuous learning process accompanying the cycling of officers through the command ensures that the review process will always be a target of opportunity by inexperienced AOs. Based on the products that the CINC requires, senior leaders have to discriminate between background static and operationally inefficiencies. Respondents input suggests there are some aspects of the review process that

might be made more efficient. For example, some of the suggestions we found noteworthy include:

- For papers leaving SOUTHCOM, send the package through the editorial review process along with the computer disk. Require the administrative staff to make minor changes, in lieu of sending the package back to the AO. Codify the requirement into Regulation 25-2 to send the computer disk along with the package so the administrative staff can make minor changes. With this process it is important to provide the AO a copy of the final document so that he may benefit from the changes made along the way.

- Eliminate, whenever possible, the need for the document to reenter the editorial review process at the bottom.

Observation 3a

All those tasked with drafting and reviewing correspondence should familiarize themselves with SOUTHCOM Regulation 25-2 and attend the AO correspondence course including senior decision makers.

Observation 3b

SOUTHCOM Regulation 25-2 needs to be periodically reviewed by representatives from each of the Directorates or as to codify de facto changes currently disseminated by word of mouth.

TWO OTHER AREAS OF CONCERN

During the course of the evaluation, we identified two other areas of concern that may affect SOUTHCOM's ability to function efficiently and effectively. These concerns are important enough to impact the organization, but because they were brought to our attention during our interviews, we did not have time to conduct additional analysis to validate these issues. SOUTHCOM's anticipated move to Miami provides a opportunity for SOUTHCOM to consider the additional areas of concern.

AREA OF CONCERN 4: Current manpower requirements are not sufficiently documented.

CURRENTLY AUGMENTING PERSONNEL RESOURCES FROM USARSO

Currently, SOUTHCOM is augmenting their manpower shortfalls by borrowing personnel from the U.S. Army South (USARSO), located at Fort Clayton, Panama. There were 236 people on loan to SOUTHCOM from USARSO when we conducted our research in April 1995. We were informed that

SOUTHCOM has always "augmented" their personnel in quantity and skill mix from the USARSO, which is their Army component. Because of this past practice of borrowing manpower whenever needed, SOUTHCOM has always succeeded in accomplishing numerous tasks in a timely manner. This could change with SOUTHCOM's planned relocation in 1997.

RELOCATION SUGGESTS MANPOWER AND WORKLOAD VALIDATION

In Miami, SOUTHCOM will not easily be able to augment their personnel shortfalls by borrowing from their Army component, the U.S. Forces Command in Atlanta, Georgia. In the worst case, SOUTHCOM will probably not see any reduction in their workload and they will not be able to borrow military manpower as they have from USARSO. As a result, SOUTHCOM's ability to accomplish all their taskings in a timely manner may be diminished. The move to Miami should force SOUTHCOM to validate their borrowed manpower from USARSO as well as any other personnel requirements needed to support the organization at the new location. Without a validated workload and resource baseline, SOUTHCOM may find itself in an untenable situation where work continues to increase, while resources decline drastically at first, (cut in augmentation) and then continue to decline due to the downsizing of the defense establishment. Moreover, the risk of burning out the staff and adding to the previously discussed quality of life problems in SOUTHCOM are vastly increased in the absence of good data for determining how to size and allocate the staff.

ANALYSIS

Past reliance on undocumented manpower has created a situation demanding prompt action. Documentation of the positions along with updating the Mission and Functions Manual are needed to provide the organization with a comprehensive review of how many people are needed to accomplish the mission. Timing of the move and the inherent complexities and long lead times of resourcing action make manpower requirements validation a high priority for SOUTHCOM.

We discovered no indicators of lessened taskings for SOUTHCOM during the course of the evaluation nor was there evidence of the staff pursuing work of marginal value. These factors ruled out our consideration of options based on SOUTHCOM doing less. Nonetheless. we recognize that doing less is an alternative that can be developed by the CINC and his superiors.

Observation 4

SOUTHCOM needs to conduct an internal manpower and workload review so the personnel borrowed from U.S. Army South as well as any other personnel requirements generated by the move to Miami can be used in appropriate resourcing actions.

AREA OF CONCERN 5: The utilization of automation capabilities is not maximized.

OUTDATED COMPUTER EQUIPMENT

SOUTHCOM has not purchased or updated all required hardware and software equipment because of their anticipated move to Miami. SOUTHCOM has been reluctant to purchase new computer equipment that would add to the inventory that is scheduled to move to Miami. When the organization is settled at their new location, the plan is to upgrade the present computer system to include fiber optic connectivity for their Local Area Network. The move will provide better access to the Internet, as well as other significant advantages, which they currently do not have in Panama.

INADEQUATE COMPUTER TRAINING

In conjunction with out-of-date computer equipment and software, 45% of the people surveyed mentioned that there was inadequate automation training, specifically in the use of the Local Area Network.

LEADERSHIP AVERSION TO USING COMPUTERS

Another concern mentioned by two Directors is the leadership aversion to using their computers. These same individuals suggested that the leadership be trained so that they can maximize the use of their computers to facilitate and expedite paperwork from their AOs. There are many benefits to be gained with the senior leadership active on the computer. For example, the leadership can disseminate information from above, as well as receive suggestions from below, more quickly through better use of computers.

ANALYSIS

Respondents did not show SOUTHCOM to be suffering from automation deficiencies unpredictable for a headquarters positioned to make a long distance move. We routinely encounter frustrations caused by Defense automation falling behind rapidly changing technology. Parts of the automation issue will have to be resolved through actions beyond SOUTHCOM. Two factors are working in the CINC's favor for long term improvement. First is the passage of time and the emergence of officers ever more capable of getting the best out of automation. Many computer literate officers are now entering the Directors ranks. The second factor is the new automation that will be installed in Miami. Simplified operation of this much improved equipment will do much to exploit the potential of automation.

SOUTHCOM's planning, programming, budgeting and executing effective training will glue the process together so that the command makes the best use of what is available over time. Sustained leadership priority to this training should continue.

Observation 5

While automation upgrade contracts usually contain good up front training for selected personnel, SOUTHCOM should review

training closely to maintain computer instruction that develops and sustains essential competencies throughout the work force.

PART V - CONCLUSIONS

SOUTHCOM is a hard working, professional organization that is proud of the work that they do. Everyone in SOUTHCOM was cooperative with the Program Evaluation team that visited them and was very open with their comments.

There are many strengths in SOUTHCOM. The most outstanding were: the ability to keep many "balls in the air" while producing outstanding results; the Directors all said that they worked well together; and the majority of people believe that SOUTHCOM is a valuable professional experience.

Two of the areas of concern are really the most important. First, there is the possibility that SOUTHCOM does need additional personnel in the command to reduce the workload on certain individuals. But, an actual manpower analysis should be conducted to validate the positions that are needed because of change in mission/functions and the move out of Panama. Second, alleged low morale of the organization was the number one priority of the limited responses to our survey. In particular, respondents wanted emphasis on building the family team that will help cultivate better family relationships and reduce stress within the command.

APPENDIX A
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APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW SITES AND OFFICES

- Army Management Staff College, Ft. Belvoir, Virginia
- Department of the Army, Management Directorate, Management Practices Branch, Total Army Quality, Pentagon, Arlington, Virginia
- Joint Chiefs of Staff, Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J1), Arlington, Virginia
- Office of the Secretary of Defense, Defense Performance Review, Arlington, Virginia
- US SOUTHCOM Washington Field Office, Arlington, Virginia
- US SOUTHCOM Headquarters Elements in Panama:
  - -- Deputy Commander in Chief/Chief of Staff
  - -- Deputy Chief of Staff
  - -- Inspector General
  - -- Executive Officer
  - -- Manpower, Personnel & Administration Directorate
  - -- Intelligence Directorate
  - -- Operations Directorate
  - -- Logistics Directorate
  - -- Strategy, Policy & Planning Directorate
  - -- Command, Control, Communications, & Computer Systems Directorate
  - -- Programs & Resources Directorate
  - -- Engineer Director
  - -- Public Affairs Directorate
  - -- Command Historian

APPENDIX C
PROCESS & PROCEDURAL SURVEY

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

1. NAME:_____

2. RANK OR SERIES AND GRADE:_____

3. POSITION:_____

4. LENGTH OF SERVICE:_____

5. OFFICE, DIRECTORATE, DIVISION, OR BRANCH:
_____

ENVIRONMENT

1. WHAT ARE YOUR DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES?
_____
_____
_____

2. HOW LONG HAVE YOU WORKED FOR SOUTHCOM?
_____YEARS _____MONTHS

3. DOES THE COMMAND HAVE A FLEXIBLE WORK SCHEDULE?_____YES_____NO IF NO, WHY NOT?
_____

4. IF YES, DO YOU PARTICIPATE?
_____YES_____NO IF NO, WHY NOT?_____
_____

AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

1. THINK ABOUT YOUR DAILY WORK AND LIST THE TOP THREE OBSTACLES, THAT IF ELIMINATED, WOULD GIVE YOU MORE AUTHORITY TO DO YOUR JOB?:
_____
_____
_____

1

2. FROM THE TIME YOU FINISH A MEMO AND SEND IT FORWARD FOR REVIEW AND SIGNATURE, HOW MANY DAYS WOULD YOU SAY IT TAKES FOR THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF MEMOS TO GET SIGNED?

MEMO FOR THE CINC'S SIGNATURE_____
MEMO INTERNAL TO THE COMMAND_____
MEMO INTERNAL TO YOUR OFFICE
(DIVISION, BRANCH, DIRECTORATE)_____

3. ON THE AVERAGE, HOW MANY REVIEWS DOES IT TAKE BEFORE SIGNATURE?

MEMO FOR THE CINC'S SIGNATURE_____
MEMO INTERNAL TO THE COMMAND_____
MEMO INTERNAL TO YOUR OFFICE
(DIVISION, BRANCH, DIRECTORATE)_____

4. DOES THE DECISION MAKER HELP YOU BY GIVING YOU ANY ADVICE ABOUT THE FORMAT AND CONTENT OF THE PAPER, MEMO, ETC.?
_____YES_____NO IF NO, WHY?_____
_____
_____

5. ANY SUGGESTION ON HOW TO EXPAND AUTHORITY AND DECREASE THE SPAN OF CONTROL?
_____
_____
_____

COMMUNICATION

1. HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE FLOW OF COMMUNICATION UP THE CHAIN OF COMMAND? (ANSWER BY CIRCLING THE NUMBER)

1_____2_____3_____4_____5
BAD POOR NEUTRAL GOOD EXCELLENT

2. HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE FLOW OF COMMUNICATION DOWN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND? (ANSWER BY CIRCLING NUMBER)

1_____2_____3_____4_____5
BAD POOR NEUTRAL GOOD EXCELLENT

2

3. HOW FREQUENTLY DO YOU HAVE (OR HOLD) STAFF MEETINGS?

_____WEEKLY_____BIWEEKLY_____MONTHLY
_____QUARTERLY_____SEMI-ANNUAL
OTHER:_____

4. DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU MEET SUFFICIENTLY?
_____YES_____NO

5. IF NOT, HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU HOLD MEETINGS?
_____

6. HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION GIVEN IN A STAFF MEETING?

1_____2_____3_____4_____5
INSUFFICIENT ADEQUATE REDUNDANT

7. HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION?

1_____2_____3_____4_____5
BAD POOR NEUTRAL GOOD EXCELLENT

8. DOES THE CINC COMMUNICATE HIS CONCERNS AND IDEAS TO THE COMMAND, USING A NEWSLETTER OR SOME OTHER MECHANISM?_____YES_____NO

9. IN LIGHT OF THE PREVIOUS QUESTION, HOW OFTEN DOES THE CINC OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE "SPEAK" TO THE WHOLE COMMAND?

_____WEEKLY_____BIWEEKLY_____MONTHLY
_____QUARTERLY_____SEMI-ANNUAL
OTHER:_____

10. DO MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ASK FOR FEEDBACK FROM THEIR SUBORDINATES IN THE FOLLOWING:

MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS_____YES_____NO
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS SUCH AS OFFICE EQUIPMENT, LIGHTS, ETC._____YES_____NO
PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS SUCH AS OFFICE PROCEDURES, ETC._____YES_____NO

3

11. HAS THERE EVER BEEN ANY ATTEMPT TO MEASURE HOW WELL YOUR OFFICE OR THE COMMAND IS OPERATING (OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE)?
_____YES_____NO
CUSTOMER SATISFACTION?_____YES_____NO
WERE YOU GIVEN FEEDBACK?_____YES_____NO

PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES

1. DO YOU HAVE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES OR GUIDELINE?_____YES_____NO

2. IS IT EFFECTIVE?_____YES_____NO

3. WHAT TYPE OF INFORMATION IS COLLECTED OR USED TO IMPROVE OR REVISE PROCEDURES, PROCESSES, AND OPERATIONS E.G., A SUGGESTION PROGRAM, SURVEYS, QUESTIONNAIRES, MALCOLM BALDRIDGE CRITERIA, TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT PRINCIPALS,TOTAL ARMY QUALITY FACTORS, INTERNAL MANAGEMENT CONTROL REVIEWS, ETC.?
_____
_____

4. HOW IS CUSTOMER FEEDBACK USED TO REVISE OR DEVELOP OPERATING PROCEDURES AND POLICIES, AMEND SHORT AND LONG TERM PRIORITIES, AND ASSIST DECISION MAKING?_____
_____
_____
_____

5. CAN YOU IDENTIFY ANY FUNCTIONS OR OBSTACLES (ORGANIC OR NONORGANIC) THAT MAKE YOUR JOB MORE DIFFICULT? MORE TIME CONSUMING?_____
_____
_____
_____

6. THINK OF YOUR PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY. THEN DESCRIBE AND DIAGRAM WHAT YOU DO AND WHO MUST REVIEW YOUR WORK._____
_____
_____
_____

4

DIAGRAM THE REVIEW/APPROVAL PROCESS, INCLUDE PEOPLE WHO REVIEW YOUR WORK.

7. IF YOU HAVE WRITTEN ANY MEMORANDA THAT REQUIRES A SIGNATURE TO IMPLEMENT AN ACTION OR RESPONSE, PLEASE DESCRIBE AND DIAGRAM WHAT YOU DO AND WHO MUST REVIEW AND SIGN YOUR WORK.

_____

_____

_____

FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE ABOVE, DIAGRAM THE REVIEW PROCESS:

8. DO YOU THINK THE ORGANIZATION HAS KEPT UP WITH TECHNOLOGY SUCH AS COMPUTERS, INFORMATION HIGHWAY, ELECTRONIC MAIL ETC.?
_____YES_____NO

9. EXPLAIN:_____

_____

10. WHAT WOULD YOU CHANGE TO IMPROVE YOUR OFFICE?_____

_____

_____

_____

11. THE COMMAND IN GENERAL?_____

_____

_____

_____

5

APPENDIX D
RESULTS OF EVALUATION

PROCESS & PROCEDURAL SURVEY

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND

DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES

1. NAME: *No analysis required*

2. RANK OR SERIES AND GRADE:

Civilians 18, Navy 5, Army 32, Air Force 17, Marine 5. Of the military 45 were officers and 14 were enlisted.

3. POSITION: *Randomly selected by generator using the last digit of the social security number.*

4. LENGTH OF SERVICE: *Average was 15 years*

5. OFFICE, DIRECTORATE, DIVISION, OR BRANCH: *All different.*

ENVIRONMENT

1. WHAT ARE YOUR DUTIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES? *Based on the specific name.*

2. HOW LONG HAVE YOU WORKED FOR SOUTHCOM?
_____YEARS _____MONTHS

The average was 29 months which is skewed by long term civilian assignments: for example, the comptroller has been in Southern Command for 15 years. The median was 20 months.

3. DOES THE COMMAND HAVE A FLEXIBLE WORK SCHEDULE? *27%* YES *72%* NO

IF NO, WHY NOT? *"We do what we have to do to accomplish the mission."*

4. IF YES, DO YOU PARTICIPATE?
52% YES *48%* NO

IF NO, WHY NOT?

AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

1. THINK ABOUT YOUR DAILY WORK AND LIST THE TOP THREE OBSTACLES, THAT IF ELIMINATED, WOULD GIVE YOU MORE AUTHORITY TO DO YOUR JOB?:

The four most reoccuring responses were:
Editorial Review Process (34 times) 19%
Centralized Authority (21 times) 12%
Micromanagement (19 times) 11%
Workload or Manpower (18 times) 10%

Actual responses: "Emphasis on form over substance" "Micromanagement by senior officials" "Cumbersome admin process" "Too many big guys worrying about little things" "Bureaucratic admin process" "Lack of leadership" "lack of access to information" "Antiquated, hyper technical staffing procedures" "Direct access to CINC" "Everything is a priority, everything is an emergency" "Format over substance" "Not enough qualified people to do the job" "Taskings that have nothing to do with your job" "Centralize the decision making process" "Lack of clear guidance" "Eliminate Staff Action Summary Sheet(SASS), no one reads it" "Take control of meetings. Agenda too long. Schedules change constantly." "CINC does not recognize burn-out factor" "VIP visitors to SOUTHCOM" "Lack of proper planning—all tasks are crisis because of excessive review and coordination" "Whatever we give is not good enough" "Inane, idiosyncratic clerical requirements, e.g., binder clips and proper placement of staples(upper left hand corner 1/8" down and 1/8" from left edge)" "Lack of prioritization—too many fire missions" "Making it harder is better than making it easier" "We do not get the best from the Navy" "Morale problem—definitely not a soldier environment"

2. FROM THE TIME YOU FINISH A MEMO AND SEND IT FORWARD FOR REVIEW AND SIGNATURE, HOW MANY DAYS WOULD YOU SAY IT TAKES FOR THE FOLLOWING TYPES OF MEMOS TO GET SIGNED?

These were analyzed based on the averages with first all responses then, just the surveys and finally just the interviewees. (all/surveys/interviews)

MEMO FOR THE CINC'S SIGNATURE *9.33/10.33/4.5*
MEMO INTERNAL TO THE COMMAND *5.21/5.42/3.00*
MEMO INTERNAL TO YOUR OFFICE
(DIVISION, BRANCH, DIRECTORATE) *1.74/1.81/1.17*

3. ON THE AVERAGE, HOW MANY REVIEWS DOES IT TAKE BEFORE SIGNATURE?

These were analyzed based on the averages with first all responses then, just the surveys and finally just the interviewees. (all/surveys/interviews)

MEMO FOR THE CINC'S SIGNATURE *5.43/5.54/3.67*
MEMO INTERNAL TO THE COMMAND *3.53/3.47/5.00*
MEMO INTERNAL TO YOUR OFFICE
(DIVISION, BRANCH, DIRECTORATE) *1.84/1.75/4.0*

4. DOES THE DECISION MAKER HELP YOU BY GIVING YOU ANY ADVICE ABOUT THE FORMAT AND CONTENT OF THE PAPER, MEMO, ETC.?
58% YES *42%* NO

IF NO, WHY? *Some of the comments "We don't know if it's right until it's rejected." "Usually we try to guess what they want even if we have questions, People afraid to ask. We shoot the messenger often." "no one seems to understand what the CINC wants." "Too many decision makers think they know what the CINC wants."*

5. ANY SUGGESTION ON HOW TO EXPAND AUTHORITY AND DECREASE THE SPAN OF CONTROL?

Several common ideas in this answer:
Eliminate micro-management(14 times).
Reduce format requirements and focus on content rather than format(9 times)
Trust your subordinates(5 times)

COMMUNICATION

1. HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE FLOW OF COMMUNICATION UP THE CHAIN OF COMMAND? (ANSWER BY CIRCLING THE NUMBER)

1_____2_____3_____4_____5
BAD POOR NEUTRAL GOOD EXCELLENT

The average with first all responses was 2.92 then, the average of just the surveys was 2.85 and finally the average of just those interviewed was 3.64. The senior leadership thought that the communication up the chain was better than those surveyed.

2. HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE FLOW OF COMMUNICATION DOWN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND? (ANSWER BY CIRCLING NUMBER)

1_____2_____3_____4_____5
BAD POOR NEUTRAL GOOD EXCELLENT

The average with first all responses was 2.60 then, the average of just the surveys was 2.42 and finally the average of just those interviewed was 3.70. The senior leadership thought that the communication down the chain was better than those surveyed.

3. HOW FREQUENTLY DO YOU HAVE (OR HOLD) STAFF MEETINGS?

The percentages in the blanks are the percentages of the responses

54% WEEKLY *6%* BIWEEKLY *4%* MONTHLY
0% QUARTERLY *0%* SEMI-ANNUALLY *36%* OTHER

4. DO YOU FEEL THAT YOU MEET SUFFICIENTLY?
85% YES *15%* NO *The opinion here is that they meet sufficiently.*

5. IF NOT, HOW OFTEN WOULD YOU HOLD MEETINGS?
Of the 15% that answered NO, the most common answer was weekly meeting were preferred but ranged from as needed to twice a day.

6. HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE AMOUNT OF INFORMATION GIVEN IN A STAFF MEETING?

1____2____3____4____5
INSUFFICIENT ADEQUATE REDUNDANT

The average with first all responses was 2.85 then, the average of just the surveys was 2.76 and finally the average of just those interviewed was 3.27. The senior leadership thought that the communication down the chain was better than those surveyed.

all/surveys/interviews
2.85/2.76/3.27

7. HOW WOULD YOU RATE THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION?

1____2____3____4____5
BAD POOR NEUTRAL GOOD EXCELLENT

The average with first all responses was 3.22 then, the average of just the surveys was 3.21 and finally the average of just those interviewed was 3.27. All thought that the quality of information was neither poor nor good.

8. DOES THE CINC COMMUNICATE HIS CONCERNS AND IDEAS TO THE COMMAND, USING A NEWSLETTER OR SOME OTHER MECHANISM? *19%* YES *81%* NO

The command does not think that the CINC communicates his concerns and ideas to the command.

9. IN LIGHT OF THE PREVIOUS QUESTION, HOW OFTEN DOES THE CINC OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE "SPEAK" TO THE WHOLE COMMAND?

1% WEEKLY *0%* BIWEEKLY *4%* MONTHLY
25% QUARTERLY *15%* SEMI-ANNUAL
OTHER: *55%*

10. DO MANAGERS AND SUPERVISORS ASK FOR FEEDBACK FROM THEIR SUBORDINATES IN THE FOLLOWING:

MANAGEMENT EFFECTIVENESS *42%* YES *58%* NO

The majority of the command has the perception that managers do not ask for feedback in management effectiveness.

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPROVEMENTS SUCH AS OFFICE EQUIPMENT, LIGHTS, ETC. *56%* YES *44%* NO

The majority of the command has the perception that managers do ask for feedback about environmental improvements.

PROCESS IMPROVEMENTS SUCH AS OFFICE PROCEDURES, ETC. *60%* YES *40%* NO

The majority of the command has the perception that managers do ask for feedback about process improvements.

11. HAS THERE EVER BEEN ANY ATTEMPT TO MEASURE HOW WELL YOUR OFFICE OR THE COMMAND IS OPERATING (OPERATIONAL PERFORMANCE)?
24% YES *76%* NO

The majority of the command has the perception that managers have not made any attempt to measure how well your office is performing.

CUSTOMER SATISFACTION? *24%* YES *76%* NO

The majority of the command has the perception that managers have not made any attempt to measure customer satisfaction.

WERE YOU GIVEN FEEDBACK? *23%* YES *77%* NO

The majority of the command has the perception that managers do not get feedback.

PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES

1. DO YOU HAVE STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES OR GUIDELINE? *65%* YES *35%* NO

The perception of the command is that there are standing operating procedures.

2. IS IT EFFECTIVE? *66%* YES *34%* NO

And the command thinks that the SOPs are effective.

3. WHAT TYPE OF INFORMATION IS COLLECTED OR USED TO IMPROVE OR REVISE PROCEDURES, PROCESSES, AND OPERATIONS E.G., A SUGGESTION PROGRAM, SURVEYS, QUESTIONNAIRES, MALCOLM BALDRIDGE CRITERIA, TOTAL QUALITY MANAGEMENT PRINCIPALS,TOTAL ARMY QUALITY FACTORS, INTERNAL MANAGEMENT CONTROL REVIEWS, ETC.?

57% of the responses where NO or NONE. The other answers varied from "Updating regs" "No Suggestion program" "AO classes" "Reviews of Internal Control Programs."

4. HOW IS CUSTOMER FEEDBACK USED TO REVISE OR DEVELOP OPERATING PROCEDURES AND POLICIES,

AMEND SHORT AND LONG TERM PRIORITIES, AND ASSIST DECISION MAKING?

43% responded with NONE. Actual answers: "Tough Question," "We continually receive feedback," "AO comments have been used to change or modify procedures" "After DV visits or significant functions, we review events with POCs to identify strong and weak areas.

5. CAN YOU IDENTIFY ANY FUNCTIONS OR OBSTACLES (ORGANIC OR NONORGANIC) THAT MAKE YOUR JOB MORE DIFFICULT? MORE TIME CONSUMING?

There was no consistant answer to this question, but some of the comments follow: "We should learn to work smarter not harder," "Paperwork vs. Automation," "Constant revision of documents" "Inadequate, unclear, untimely, poor Command guidance from the Command group" "No long range vision for the command, the procedures in the SJS and CofS office make our job more difficult, short fused suspenses" "Insufficient focus on content" "Arcane staffing procedures. Mindless devotion to format" "Morale is not very good. More time with their families is a priority."

6. THINK OF YOUR PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY. THEN DESCRIBE AND DIAGRAM WHAT YOU DO AND WHO MUST REVIEW YOUR WORK.

The responses to this depended on their job descriptions and varied greatly.

DIAGRAM THE REVIEW/APPROVAL PROCESS, INCLUDE PEOPLE WHO REVIEW YOUR WORK.

The majority of the responses were very similiar to the diagram presented in the report.

7. IF YOU HAVE WRITTEN ANY MEMORANDA THAT REQUIRES A SIGNATURE TO IMPLEMENT AN ACTION OR RESPONSE, PLEASE DESCRIBE AND DIAGRAM WHAT YOU DO AND WHO MUST REVIEW AND SIGN YOUR WORK.

The majority of the responses were "same as above", meaning that the diagram was the same as question 6.

FOLLOWING THE EXAMPLE ABOVE, DIAGRAM THE REVIEW PROCESS:

8. DO YOU THINK THE ORGANIZATION HAS KEPT UP WITH TECHNOLOGY SUCH AS COMPUTERS, INFORMATION HIGHWAY, ELECTRONIC MAIL ETC.?
55% YES *45%* NO

The majority of the command has the perception that the organization has kept up with the information highway.

9. EXPLAIN:

There were many comments that the LAN was going in and that the system had gotten better. But connectivity with the United States would be a big improvement. When new systems come on-line, there needs to be an accompanying training package. The continued push to standardize software must be sustained.

10. WHAT WOULD YOU CHANGE TO IMPROVE YOUR OFFICE?

The four most reoccuring responses:
More Manpower (14 times) 20%
Computers (7 times) 10%
Physical Workplace (6 times) 9%
Nothing (5 times) 7%

Actual responses: "Let AOs and analysts do their job. Don't micromanage" "More people" "Revamp the phone system" "A more predictable work schedule with a reasonable assurance that 12 hour days were no longer the norm" "Quit scheduling Saturday, Sunday or 1730 meetings" "Better lines of communications and dissemination of information" "Better and efficient training program" "Decentralize the decision making" "Quit forcing micromanagement at all levels" "Increase the staff" "Reorganize the office" "Streamline paperwork" "Climate, its not a simple place to work. Lots of pressure, demands on people and time." "Listen to CINC and set priority" "Streamline invitational travel order process" "More memory in computers, updated software versions, database program, immediate computer maintenance response time, added commercial phone lines"

11. THE COMMAND IN GENERAL?

The four most reoccuring responses:
Poor Management (16 times) 23%
Poor Quality of Life/Morale (11times) 15%
More Manpower/Less Workload (10 times) 14%
No Comment (8 times) 11%

Actual responses: "Get e-mail connected with everyone and accept as a method of commo" "Hold directors to administrative standards for correspondence—they'll never do it right if they don't have to re-do their work" "We lack vision, concrete objectives and command support" "12 hour days 6 & 7 days is killing the people" "Quit working people to the extreme!" "Lighten up the work load. Realize that people have lives outside the military" "Decentralize the decision making" "Conduct a review of mission, determine who does or should do what and see if they are correctly manned. Cross-level tasks and missions—stop doing ones that no longer make sense" "There is no formal training and OJT is by fire. Eliminate AOs from protocol duty" "Power down—empower subordinates in decision making process—function as a unified command—delegate to components and hold commanders accountable for actions" "Have command think quality of life" "Physically spread out. Only 2 stars and above

allowed to make decisions" "Adopt a long range view, articulate where we are going and what everyone can do to help. Eliminate short fused—great ideas, develop feedback systems" "Trust your people's experience" "Too few people doing too many things..A few people saying thank you. No respect for people" "Send messages and actions up electronically and disseminate through those means rather than paper copies" "Nonvalue stuff eliminated, roles and missions reviewed" "Listen and question. Let the people talk freely so the CINC really knows what is going on. People are overworked and frustrated. Look at morale. Have an Organizational Day" "Travel alot distracts from work" "Be myself. Meter my energy. And set focus" "CINC should tell Deputy CofS that he is the CofS" "Add quarterly formations, PT etc." "Clarify on taskers/duplication of effort needs to be worked out".

APPENDIX E
EVALUATION TEAM MEMBERS

Evaluation Director
LTC Louis Gelling, Jr.

Evaluation Analyst
Ms. Sally S. Goya

Evaluation Coordinators
Nakita Pounds
Jim Manley