
May 10, 2005



Infrastructure and Environment

Defense Threat Reduction Agency's
Data Call Submissions and Internal
Control Processes for Base Realignment
and Closure 2005
(D-2005-072)

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Acronyms

BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
COBRA	Cost of Base Realignment Actions
DGT	Data Gathering Tool
DoD OIG	Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
DTRA	Defense Threat Reduction Agency
DWO	Defense-Wide Organization
ICP	Internal Control Plan
JCSG	Joint Cross Service Group
JPAT 7	Joint Process Action Team Criterion Number 7
N/A	Not Applicable
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense



INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202-4704

May 10, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY

SUBJECT: Report on Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and Closure 2005 (Report No. D-2005-072)

We are providing this report for information and use. No written response to this report was required, and none was received. Therefore, we are publishing this report in final form. We performed this audit in response to an Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics request.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Questions should be directed to Mr. Dennis L. Conway at (703) 604-9172 (DSN 664-9172) or Mr. Hugh G. Cherry at (703) 604-9614 (DSN 664-9614). See Appendix B for the report distribution. The team members are listed inside the back cover.

By direction of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing:

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Robert F. Prinzbach II".

Robert F. Prinzbach II
Acting Assistant Inspector General
for Readiness and Logistics Support

Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

Report No. D-2005-072

(Project No. D2004-D000LG-0074)

May 10, 2005

Defense Threat Reduction Agency's Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and Closure 2005

Executive Summary

Who Should Read This Report and Why? Office of the Secretary of Defense personnel responsible for deciding the realignment or closure of military installations, based on the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) data calls, and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) management personnel should read this report. The report discusses the adequacy, completeness, and integrity of the data provided by DTRA to assist the Secretary of Defense in BRAC 2005 recommendations.

Background. BRAC 2005 is the formal process outlined in Public Law 101-510, "Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990," as amended, under which the Secretary of Defense may realign or close military installations inside the United States and its territories. As part of BRAC 2005, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued "Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005) Policy Memorandum One—Policy, Responsibilities, and Procedures," April 16, 2003, which stated that the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General would review the accuracy of BRAC data and the certification process.

The BRAC 2005 process was mandated for the United States and its territories and was divided into the following data calls: capacity analysis, supplemental capacity, military value, Cost of Base Realignment Actions, Joint Process Action Team Criterion Number 7, and scenario specific. The supplemental capacity, military value, Cost of Base Realignment Actions, and Joint Process Action Team Criterion Number 7 data calls are collectively known as the second data call. We issued two site memorandums for the capacity analysis data call and one site memorandum for the second data call to summarize the results of the sites reviewed. This report summarizes issues related to the BRAC 2005 process used by DTRA.

The mission of DTRA is to provide quality tools and services to safeguard the United States and its interests from the threat of weapons of mass destruction. DTRA has its headquarters at Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Other significant elements are located at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico, and the Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site in Mercury, Nevada.

Results. We evaluated the validity, integrity, and supporting documentation of all BRAC 2005 data that DTRA submitted in response to the capacity analysis data call, second data call, and scenario specific data call as of April 5, 2005. We also evaluated compliance with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and DTRA internal control plans at two DTRA locations.

DTRA provided BRAC 2005 data that were generally supported, complete, and accurate, after corrections were made. In addition, DTRA properly incorporated and supplemented the Office of the Secretary of Defense internal control plan into the DTRA internal control plan. Although we identified control weaknesses with marking, controlling and securing BRAC 2005 responses and supporting documentation, DTRA corrected those control weaknesses as they were identified. Therefore, the identified weaknesses will not materially impact the reliability and integrity of BRAC data submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense BRAC Office.

Subsequent to our reviews, the Joint Process Action Team Criterion Number 7 group requested that activities update some of their responses based upon new guidance. We did not review the supporting documentation for the changed responses.

Management Comments. We provided a draft of this report on April 29, 2005. No written response to this report was required, and none was received. Therefore, we are publishing this report in final form.

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Background

Base Realignment and Closure 2005. Public Law 101-510, “Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990,” as amended, establishes the procedures under which the Secretary of Defense may realign or close military installations inside the United States and its territories. The law authorizes the establishment of an independent Commission to review the Secretary of Defense recommendations for realigning and closing military installations. The Secretary of Defense established and chartered the Infrastructure Executive Council and the Infrastructure Steering Group as the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 deliberative bodies responsible for leadership, direction, and guidance. The Secretary of Defense must submit BRAC recommendations to the independent Commission by May 16, 2005.

Joint Cross Service Groups. A primary objective of BRAC 2005, in addition to realigning base structure, is to examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) established seven Joint Cross Service Groups (JCSGs)—Education and Training, Headquarters and Support Activities, Industrial, Intelligence, Medical, Supply and Storage, and Technical. The JCSGs address issues that affect common business-oriented support functions, examine functions in the context of facilities, and develop realignment and closure recommendations based on force structure plans of the Armed Forces and on selection criteria. To analyze the issues, each JCSG developed data call questions to obtain information about the functions that they reviewed.

BRAC Data Calls. The BRAC 2005 data collection process, mandated for the United States and its territories, was divided into the following data calls—capacity analysis, supplemental capacity, military value, Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA), Joint Process Action Team Criterion Number 7 (JPAT 7), and scenario specific. The supplemental capacity, military value, COBRA, and JPAT 7 data calls were collectively known as the second data call. The Services, Defense agencies, and Defense-Wide Organizations (DWOs) used either automated data collection tools or a manual process to collect data call responses. Each data call has a specific purpose as follows.

- The capacity analysis data call gathered data on infrastructure, current workload, surge requirements, and maximum capacity.
- The supplemental capacity data call clarified inconsistent data gathered with the initial capacity analysis data call.
- The military value data call gathered data on mission requirements, land and facilities, mobilization and contingency, and cost and manpower.
- The COBRA data call gathered data to develop costs, savings, and payback (formerly known as return on investments) of proposed realignment and closure actions.

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- The JPAT 7 data call gathered data to assess the community's ability to support additional forces, missions, and personnel associated with individual scenarios.¹
 - The scenario specific data call gathered data related to specific scenario conditions for realignment or closure.

Internal Control Plans. Before the BRAC data calls were released to the Services and Defense agencies, OSD required the Services and Defense agencies to prepare internal control plans (ICPs) that incorporated and supplemented the OSD ICP. The OSD ICP was issued in the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics' memorandum "Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005) Policy Memorandum One-Policy, Responsibilities, and Procedures," April 16, 2003. To comply with that requirement, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) prepared an undated "Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Internal Control Plan (ICP) for 2005 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Process." For the capacity analysis data call, DTRA used a manual process to collect data, and for the second data call, DTRA used the Data Gathering Tool (DGT), a modified Microsoft Access tool developed for those not using an automated data collection tool.

Department of Defense Office of Inspector General Responsibility. The "Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005) Policy Memorandum One-Policy, Responsibilities, and Procedures," April 16, 2003, requires the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General (DoD OIG) to provide ICP development and implementation advice, review the accuracy of BRAC data, and evaluate the data certification processes. In addition, the memorandum requires DoD OIG personnel to assist the JCSGs and DoD Components as needed. This report summarizes issues related to the DTRA BRAC 2005 process.

DTRA. The current mission of DTRA is to provide quality tools and services to safeguard the United States and its interests from the threat from weapons of mass destruction. DTRA is organized into directorates that perform these essential functions to accomplish its mission:

- the Combat Support Directorate supports war-fighters with vulnerability assessments, consequence management, and other capabilities to counter and defeat weapons of mass destruction;
- the Technology Development Directorate develops, tests, and fields technologies as part of U.S. counterproliferation efforts;
- the Chemical and Biological Defense Directorate manages and integrates all DoD chemical and biological science and technology efforts and performs program financial management functions;

¹ A description of one or more potential closure or realignment actions identified for formal analysis by either a JCSG or a Military Department.

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- the On-Site Inspection Directorate carries out treaty inspections to ensure that weapons of mass destruction are being stored, protected, and dismantled as agreed upon in treaties; and
 - the Cooperative Threat Reduction Directorate implements DoD responsibilities under the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program.²

The DTRA Headquarters, located at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, provides administrative support for each of the operational directorates discussed above. Significant elements of the DTRA Technology Development Directorate and the Combat Support Directorate are located at Kirtland Air Force Base, in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The Technology Development Directorate also performs research and development at the Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site, in Mercury, Nevada.

Objectives

The overall objective of the audit was to evaluate the validity, integrity, and supporting documentation of data that DTRA collected and submitted for the BRAC 2005 process. In addition, we evaluated whether DTRA complied with the OSD and DTRA ICPs. This report is one in a series of reports on data call submissions and internal control processes for BRAC 2005. See Appendix A for a discussion of the scope and methodology and prior coverage related to the audit objectives.

² The mission of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials, technologies, and expertise from former Soviet Union states.

Defense Threat Reduction Agency BRAC 2005 Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes

DTRA BRAC 2005 data were generally supported, complete, and accurate, after corrections were made as a result of our site visits. However, the responses to capacity analysis data call questions 363, 364, 690, and 696 were only partially supported because DTRA did not maintain records supporting the responses. DTRA properly incorporated and supplemented the OSD ICP management controls into the DTRA ICP. Also, DTRA site data collection procedures generally complied with applicable ICPs. Although we identified some non-compliance issues, the weaknesses identified should not impact the reliability and integrity of the data submitted to the OSD BRAC Office.

DTRA BRAC 2005 Data Call Submissions

DTRA reported BRAC 2005 data that were generally supported, complete, and accurate, after making corrections. At DTRA, we evaluated the validity and integrity of the documentation used to support responses to data call questions. Specifically, we compared responses to supporting documentation and reviewed Not Applicable (N/A) responses to determine whether the responses were reasonable. We did not verify whether the responses that we evaluated matched those recorded in the OSD BRAC database for DTRA.

Capacity Analysis Data Call. As a result of our reviews, DTRA provided reasonable responses and adequate supporting documentation for the capacity analysis data call. The OSD BRAC Office sent DTRA 753 capacity analysis data call questions. We reviewed all questions and agreed with the DTRA classification of 669 questions as being N/A to DTRA. Of the 84 questions applicable to DTRA, the DTRA trusted agent³ assigned responsibility for 8 questions to the Defense Nuclear Weapons School,⁴ in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The remaining 76 questions were sent to selected field locations or were assigned to DTRA Headquarters personnel. We evaluated the responses and documentation supporting the responses for these 84 questions assigned to DTRA. (See Table 1 in Appendix A for a list of sites visited and questions reviewed.)

As a result of our review, we initially determined that 44 of the 84 capacity analysis data call responses were adequate, and 40 responses were inaccurate or lacked the proper support. We conducted audit work on the capacity analysis data

³ The DTRA ICP designated a trusted agent to further assign responsibility within DTRA for responding to specific BRAC questions and to review and approve the accuracy of the responses prior to submission of certified responses to the OSD BRAC Office.

⁴ The Defense Nuclear Weapons School, a component of the DTRA Combat Support Directorate, provides nuclear weapons core competencies and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high explosive response training to personnel from DoD, other Federal and State agencies, and National Laboratories.

call between February 17, 2004 and May 10, 2004, and issued two site memorandums. We issued one site memorandum covering the capacity analysis questions answered by the Defense Nuclear Weapons School on March 25, 2004, and another site memorandum on the DTRA consolidated capacity analysis data call on May 13, 2004. We continued, through April 5, 2005, to review DTRA work on revising responses and adding supporting documentation. We were able to verify that DTRA had adequately revised responses and located supporting documentation for 36 of the 40 capacity analysis questions. We could not verify the accuracy or completeness of responses to question numbers 363, 364, and 696 because DTRA did not keep documentation to support portions of those questions. Also, the response to question number 690 was unsupported because DTRA did not maintain educational records on contractor employees. We consider these four unsupported responses to be immaterial in relation to the total number of capacity analysis data call responses that DTRA did adequately support.

Second Data Call. DTRA provided responses for the second data call that were generally accurate, reasonable, and adequately supported, after corrections were made. For the second data call, DTRA provided responses to 118 questions (2 COBRA questions, 20 JPAT 7 questions, and 96 JCSG-targeted questions). We reviewed 27 questions that DTRA classified as N/A, and agreed with DTRA that the N/A responses were appropriate. The DTRA trusted agent assigned responsibility for responding to all or parts of 91 of the 118 second data call questions to DTRA Headquarters; the DTRA Test Division of the Technology Development Directorate, in Albuquerque, New Mexico; and to the DTRA operations at the Department of Energy's Nevada Test Site.

Initially, we found that 35 of 91 responses to the second data call questions had inadequate support or inaccurate responses. However, during our follow-up site visits, we found that DTRA had revised its responses or provided additional supporting documentation, which corrected 34 of 35 responses. We could not verify the response to Headquarters and Support Activities JCSG military value question number 1907⁵ because we were unable to validate the steps taken to generate the response.

Subsequent to our visits, the JPAT 7 group requested activities, to include DTRA activities, to update some of their responses based upon new guidance. We did not review the supporting documentation for the changed responses to JPAT 7 questions.

Scenario Specific Data Call. DTRA's responses to scenario specific data call questions were complete, reasonable, and generally supported. The OSD BRAC Office sent a total of nine scenarios (eight Technical scenarios and one Medical scenario) to DTRA. Specifically, those scenarios were Technical JCSG scenarios TECH-0002, TECH-0010, TECH-0018, TECH-0032, TECH-0038 through TECH-41, and Medical JCSG scenario MED-0028. The DTRA BRAC trusted agent assigned DTRA Headquarters and the DTRA Test Division of the Technology Development Directorate, in Albuquerque, New Mexico, with the

⁵ The question asked for the number of meetings between an organization's senior officials, including flag officers, and senior officials from another organization located in the Washington D.C. area.

responsibility for responding to all or parts of those scenarios. As of April 5, 2005, we evaluated the responses and support for all nine scenarios sent to DTRA and found reasonable and supportable explanations for the methods used to respond to the scenarios.

Internal Control Processes

The data collection procedures used by DTRA activities generally complied with applicable ICPs, and DTRA properly incorporated and supplemented the OSD ICP management controls into the DTRA ICP.

We reviewed the data collection processes used for compliance with applicable ICPs. We reviewed DTRA processes used for controlling data access, collection, maintenance, and transmission for the capacity analysis data call, second data call, and the scenario specific data call at DTRA Headquarters and the DTRA operations in Albuquerque. Specifically, the reviews included whether officials working with BRAC data had completed nondisclosure agreements and properly marked all BRAC data. We also reviewed whether DTRA staff working with BRAC data secured all BRAC documents in locked containers, maintained logs showing each time information from the official BRAC file was accessed outside of the trusted agent's office, and recorded all changes made to previously certified BRAC submissions.

Completeness of DTRA ICP. The DTRA BRAC 2005 ICP provided a set of management controls designed to provide accountability for each sub-element of information used in the BRAC 2005 process. The DTRA ICP properly incorporated and supplemented the management control mechanisms to provide accountability and to safeguard BRAC 2005 information as identified in the OSD ICP. Although DTRA used the DGT for collecting and reporting BRAC data for the second data call questions and the scenarios, DTRA did not revise the ICP to reflect the changed procedures required to operate using the DGT.

The DTRA ICP identified procedures for justifying changes made to data and information after it had been certified and sent to the OSD BRAC Office. Additionally, the DTRA ICP included directions on completing nondisclosure agreements and collecting, marking, safeguarding, and maintaining BRAC data. The DTRA ICP also designated the Chief, Project Integration as the BRAC trusted agent and the Director, Business Directorate as the certifier of all DTRA BRAC submissions. The separate and distinct responsibilities of the trusted agent, certifying authority, and responders are discussed in the DTRA ICP.

Compliance with DTRA ICP. DTRA sites were generally compliant with the ICP procedures; however, for the capacity analysis and second data calls, we identified issues of noncompliance with the applicable ICPs. During the validation process, we noted the following:

- all data was not marked with the appropriate header or footer as required by the DTRA ICP;

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- BRAC documents located in the trusted agent's private office were not always properly secured; and
 - logs were not maintained when BRAC documents, data, and information were removed from the trusted agent's office.

The DTRA trusted agent corrected noted deficiencies and implemented stronger controls over the processes used to collect and safeguard BRAC data. Therefore, we consider the data, responses, and sources to be generally reasonable for use in the BRAC 2005 process.

Conclusion

DTRA reported BRAC data that were generally supported, complete, and accurate, after corrections were made. Initially, we identified a substantial number of incorrect or unsupported responses to the capacity analysis and second data call questions. We discussed the results of our review with DTRA, and DTRA concurred with our findings. We also alerted the OSD BRAC Office of the results of our reviews in three separate site memorandums between March 25, 2004 and November 29, 2004. DTRA corrected the incorrect responses and provided adequate supporting documentation or generally reasonable responses, where no documentation was available. However, DTRA did not maintain records to fully support the responses provided to capacity analysis data call questions 363, 364, 690, and 696.

We found that procedures used to provide supportable responses to capacity analysis data call, second data call, and the scenario specific data call questions generally complied with applicable ICPs. Furthermore, DTRA properly incorporated and supplemented the OSD ICP management controls into the DTRA ICP. Although we identified some weaknesses with the collection processes used, we determined that those internal control weaknesses should not materially impact the reliability or integrity of the DTRA BRAC 2005 data. Despite the problems identified, we consider the data, responses, and sources to be generally reasonable for use in the BRAC 2005 process.

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology

We evaluated the validity, integrity, and supporting documentation of DTRA BRAC 2005 data. The evaluation included comparing responses to supporting documentation and reviewing N/A responses to determine whether the responses were reasonable. Questions had either an answer or an N/A response; an N/A response was for questions determined not to apply to a site.

We ensured that the DTRA ICP properly incorporated and supplemented the requirements of the OSD ICP. We evaluated DTRA site data collection procedures to determine whether they were in compliance with DTRA ICP procedures for the proper handling and storage of BRAC 2005 data. In addition, we interviewed the personnel responsible for preparing and certifying the responses to the data calls. We did not verify whether the DTRA responses were in the OSD BRAC Database.

The DTRA trusted agent served as the central collection point for all responses and supporting documentation from DTRA sites. Consequently, we performed the majority of our work at DTRA Headquarters. However, we also accompanied the DTRA BRAC trusted agent on visits to operational sites to validate the data collection procedures used and the integrity of data used to support the responses. DTRA gathered and reported data manually on the capacity analysis data calls, but used the DGT to respond to questions for the second data call.

Capacity Analysis Data Call. The OSD BRAC Office sent 753 capacity analysis data call questions to DTRA. The DTRA BRAC trusted agent reviewed all 753 questions and identified 84 as applicable to DTRA. The DTRA BRAC trusted agent assigned DTRA Headquarters with the responsibility for collecting responses to 76 questions and the Defense Nuclear Weapons School with responsibility for 8 questions. Although we did not validate the selection process used by the DTRA trusted agent, we did review the DTRA responses and documentation provided in support of the 84 capacity analysis data call questions. We also reviewed the 669 questions identified as N/A to determine whether the N/A responses were appropriate. The results of our reviews are discussed in two memorandums covering the DTRA capacity analysis data call responses. Table 1 shows which capacity analysis data call questions each site answered.

Table 1. Capacity Analysis Data Call Responses Reviewed		
DTRA Site	Question Number	
	Answered	Not Applicable
DTRA Headquarters, Fort Belvoir, Virginia	22, 84, 245, 301, 302, 311, 313, 325, 328, 329, 347, 348, 350, 354-356, 358, 362-367, 369, 371-373, 376, 378, 381-388, 393, 446-448, 460-468, 471, 478-482, 582, 686-692, 696, 698, 699, 714, 723, 726, 735, 736, 741, 744, 745, and 748	1-21, 23-83, 85-96, 99-103, 105, 108-111, 113-142, 144-244, 246-300, 303-310, 312, 314-324, 326, 327, 330-346, 349, 351-353, 357, 359-361, 368, 370, 374, 375, 377, 379, 380, 389-392, 394-445, 449-459, 469, 470, 472-477, 483-581,
DTRA Defense Nuclear Weapon School, Albuquerque, New Mexico	97, 98, 104, 106, 107, 112, 143, and 751	583-685, 693-695, 697, 700-713, 715-722, 724, 725, 727-734, 737-740, 742, 743, 746, 747, 749, 750, 752, and 753

Second Data Call. DTRA received 118 questions on the second data call. The DTRA trusted agent classified 27 questions as N/A to DTRA; and we reviewed whether N/A was the appropriate classification for each question. The DTRA trusted agent assigned responsibility for responding to 91 questions to DTRA Headquarters, DTRA operations at Albuquerque, and DTRA operations at the Nevada Test Site. The 91 questions included 2 COBRA (1501 and 1505), 25 Headquarters and Support Activities JCSG military value (1904-1908, 1911-1919, 1921, 1925-1927, 1947, 1949-1951, 1953, 1956, and 1957), 26 Technical JCSG military value (3000-3010, 3013, and 3015-3026, and, 3027), 20 JPAT 7 (1400-1417, 1420, and 1421), 8 Headquarters and Support Activities JCSG supplemental capacity (4079-4081 and 4099-4103), 6 Technical JCSG supplemental capacity (4277, 4279, and 4283-4286), 1 Education and Training JCSG supplemental capacity (4000), and 3 Medical JCSG supplemental capacity (4243, 4244, and 4246) questions.

We reviewed the DTRA responses and supporting documentation for the 91 questions. We did not validate the processes that the DTRA trusted agent used to select which activity would respond to each question. However, we did

validate that DTRA had complied with the requirement to have all stand-alone facilities and host installations and leased facilities answer JPAT 7 and COBRA data call questions. Table 2 shows which second data call questions each DTRA site answered.

Table 2. Second Data Call Responses Reviewed		
DTRA Site	Question Number	
	Answered	Not Applicable
DTRA Headquarters, Fort Belvoir, Virginia	1400-1417, 1420,* 1421,* 1501, 1505, 1904- 1908,** 1911-1919, 1921, 1925-1927, 1947, 1949-1951, 1953, 1956, 1957, 3000-3006, 3010, 3013, 3016-3026, 4079-4081, 4099-4103, 4243, 4244, 4246, 4277, and 4279	1500, 1502-1504, 1506, 1507, 1909, 1910, 1920, 1922-1924, 1948, 1952, 1954, 1955, 3007-3009, 3011, 3012, 3014, 3015, 3027, 4000, 4072-4074, 4096, 4242, 4245, and 4280-4286
DTRA Technology Development Directorate, Albuquerque, New Mexico	1905, 1911, 1913-1919, 1925, 1926, 1947, 1949, 1956, 3001-3009, 3013-3015, 3021, 3027, 4000, 4079-4081, 4277, 4279, and 4283-4286	1904, 1906-1910, 1912, 1920-1924, 1927, 1948, 1950-1955, 1957, 3000, 3010-3012, 3016-3020, 3022-3026, 4072-4074, 4096, 4278, and 4280-4282
DTRA Nevada Test Site, Mercury, Nevada	1400-1417, 1420, 1421, 1501, 1505, 3001-3006, 3013, 3021, 4277, and 4279	1500, 1502-1504, 1506, 1507, 3000, 3007-3012, 3014-3020, 3022-3027, 4278, and 4280-4286
* The JPAT 7 group replaced question numbers 1418 and 1419 with question numbers 1420 and 1421.		
** We reviewed the responses for question number 1907; however, we were unable to make a determination as to whether the responses were reasonable and accurate based on the source documents available.		

In addition to reviewing the second data call responses, we followed up on the following unresolved issues from the capacity analysis data call questions:

84, 328, 329, 347, 354 through 356, 362 through 364, 371, 382, 383, 385, 387, 446 through 448, 465, 480 through 482, 582, 686 through 690, 696, 699, 714, 723, 726, 735, 736, 741, 744, 745, and 748.

Subsequent to our visits, the JPAT 7 group requested responding activities to update some of their responses based upon new guidance. We did not review the supporting documentation for the changed responses to JPAT 7 questions.

Scenario Specific Data Call. As of April 5, 2005, the OSD BRAC Office had assigned nine scenario specific data calls to DTRA. Specifically, the OSD BRAC Office assigned Technical JCSG scenario numbers TECH-0002, TECH-0010, TECH-0018, TECH-0032, TECH-0038 through 41, and Medical JCSG scenario number MED-0028 to DTRA. The DTRA trusted agent further assigned responsibility for responding to part one of Technical JCSG scenario numbers TECH-0002 and TECH-0018 and all of scenario numbers TECH-0010, TECH-0032, TECH-0038 through TECH-0041, and Medical JCSG scenario number MED-0028 to DTRA Headquarters. The DTRA Test Division in Albuquerque, New Mexico assumed responsibility for part four of Technical JCSG scenario numbers TECH-0002 and TECH-0018 (parts two and three did not apply to operations or functions within DTRA). We evaluated whether the responses to the scenario data call provided by DTRA Headquarters and the DTRA Test Division were reasonable and adequately supported.

We performed this audit from February 2004 through April 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not test the accuracy of the computer-processed data used to support an answer to a data call question because of time constraints. Potential inaccuracies in the data could impact the results; however, the DTRA Business Director certified the BRAC data as accurate and complete to the best of his knowledge and belief. Although we did not review DTRA's use of the DGT, not reviewing the use of the DGT did not adversely impact our overall opinion.

Government Accountability Office High-Risk Areas. The Government Accountability Office has identified several high-risk areas in DoD. This report provides coverage of the Federal Real Property and DoD Support Infrastructure Management high-risk areas.

Management Control Program Review

We evaluated the DTRA management controls for preparing, submitting, documenting, and safeguarding information associated with the BRAC 2005 data calls, as directed by the applicable ICPs. Specifically, we reviewed procedures DTRA used to develop, submit, and document its data call responses. In addition, we reviewed the controls implemented to safeguard against the disclosure of DTRA BRAC data before responses were forwarded to the OSD BRAC Office.

As a result, we determined that management controls were adequate as they applied to the audit objective. (See finding for specific details.) We did not review the DTRA management control program because its provisions were not deemed applicable to the one-time data collection process.

Prior Coverage

The DoD Inspector General has issued three site memorandums discussing the DTRA BRAC 2005 data call submissions and internal control processes.

Site Memorandums

DoD IG Memorandum, "Audit on the Second Data Call Submission of the Defense Threat Reduction Agency for Base Realignment and Closure 2005," November 29, 2004

DoD IG Memorandum, "Audit on the Consolidated Capacity Analysis Data Call Submission from Defense Threat Reduction Agency for Base Realignment and Closure 2005," May 13, 2004

DoD IG Memorandum, "Audit on the Capacity Analysis Data Call Submission from Defense Nuclear Weapons School to Defense Threat Reduction Agency for Base Realignment and Closure 2005," March 25, 2004

Appendix B. Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Director, Base Realignment and Closure (Installations and Environment)

Other Defense Organization

Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency

Non-Defense Federal Organization

Government Accountability Office*

* Only Government Accountability Office personnel involved in the BRAC process are to receive the report.

Team Members

The Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing, Readiness and Logistics Support prepared this report. Personnel of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General who contributed to the report are listed below.

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