May 06, 2005

Infrastructure and Environment

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and Closure 2005 (D-2005-058)

Department of Defense
Office of Inspector General

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To request copies of this report, contact Mr. Rudolf Noordhuizen at (703) 604-8959 (DSN 664-8959) or Mr. Bruce A. Burton at (703) 604-9071 (DSN 664-9071).

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Department of Defense Inspector General
400 Army Navy Drive (Room 801)
Arlington, VA 22202-4704

Acronyms

BRAC	Base Realignment and Closure
COBRA	Cost of Base Realignment Actions
DARPA	Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
H&SA	Headquarters and Support Activities
ICP	Internal Control Plan
JCSG	Joint Cross-Service Group
JPAT 7	Joint Process Action Team Criterion Number 7
DoD OIG	Department of Defense Office of Inspector General
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense

INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
400 ARMY NAVY DRIVE
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22202–4704

May 06, 2005

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY

SUBJECT: Report on Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and Closure 2005 (Report No D-2005-058)

We are providing this report for information and use. No written response to the draft report was required, and none was received. Therefore, we are publishing this report in final form. We performed this audit in response to a request from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the staff. Questions should be directed to Mr. Bruce A. Burton at (703) 604-9071 (DSN 664-9071) or Mr. Rudolf Noordhuizen at (703) 604-8959 (DSN 664-8959). See Appendix B for report distribution. The team members are listed inside the back cover.

By direction of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing:

Mary L. Ugone
Assistant Inspector General for
Acquisition and Technology Management

Department of Defense Office of Inspector General

Report No. D-2005-058 **May 06, 2005**
(Project No. D2004-D000AB-0085.000)

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes for Base Realignment and Closure 2005

Executive Summary

Who Should Read This Report and Why? DoD personnel responsible for deciding the realignment or closure of military installations based on the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) data calls and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency management personnel should read this report. The report discusses the adequacy, completeness, and integrity of the data that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency provided to assist the Secretary of Defense in BRAC 2005 recommendations.

Background. BRAC 2005 is the formal process outlined in Public Law 101-510, "Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990," as amended, under which the Secretary of Defense may realign or close military installations inside the United States and its territories. As part of BRAC 2005, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics issued, "Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005) Policy Memorandum One-Policy, Responsibilities, and Procedures," April 16, 2003, provided for DoD Office of Inspector General review of the accuracy of BRAC data and the certification process.

The BRAC 2005 process was mandated for the United States and its territories and was divided into the following data calls--capacity analysis, supplemental capacity, military value, Cost of Base Realignment Actions, Joint Process Action Team Criterion Number 7, and scenario specific. The supplemental capacity, military value, Cost of Base Realignment Actions, and Joint Process Action Team Criterion Number 7 data calls are collectively known as the second data call. This report summarizes issues related to the data calls as of March 3, 2005, for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency BRAC 2005 process.

The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency was originally established in 1958 to prevent technological surprises like the launch of Sputnik, which signaled that the Soviets had beaten the U.S. into space. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is not tied to a specific operational mission, but it supplies technological options for the DoD, mines fundamental discoveries, accelerates their development, and lowers their risks until they can be adopted by the Services.

Results. We evaluated the validity, integrity, and supporting documentation of all BRAC 2005 data that the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency submitted in response to the capacity analysis data call, the second data call and the scenario specific data call as

of March 3, 2005. We also evaluated compliance with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency internal control plans. The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency provided BRAC 2005 data that were generally supported, complete, and accurate, after corrections were made. In the second data call, responses to Technical JCSG military value questions 3017 through 3020 and Technical JCSG supplemental capacity questions 4277 through 4279 are still unsupported; no other source documentation can or will be provided based on the complexity of obtaining this documentation. In addition, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency used data collection processes that generally complied with the applicable internal control plans. Changes could have been made to the Joint Process Action Team Criterion Number 7 data after our visit that we did not verify. We identified a management control weakness with an unsigned nondisclosure agreement that DARPA corrected during the audit. The lack of supporting documentation and the unsigned nondisclosure agreement are considered immaterial and should not affect the reliability and integrity of the overall DARPA data for the BRAC 2005 analysis.

Management Comments. Management Comments. We provided a draft of this report on April 18, 2005. No written response to this report was required, and none was received. Therefore, we are publishing this report in final form.

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Background

Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005. Public Law 101-510, "Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990," as amended, establishes the procedures under which the Secretary of Defense may realign or close military installations inside the U.S. and its territories. The law authorizes the establishment of an independent Commission to review the Secretary of Defense recommendations for realigning and closing military installations. The Secretary of Defense established and chartered the Infrastructure Executive Council and the Infrastructure Steering Group as the BRAC 2005 deliberative bodies responsible for leadership, direction, and guidance. The Secretary of Defense must submit recommendations to the independent Commission by May 16, 2005.

Joint Cross-Service Groups. A primary objective of BRAC 2005, in addition to realigning base structure, is to examine and implement opportunities for greater joint activity. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) established seven Joint Cross-Service Groups (JCSGs)--Education and Training, Headquarters and Support Activities (H&SA), Industrial, Intelligence, Medical, Supply and Storage, and Technical. The JCSGs address issues that affect common business-oriented support functions, examine functions in the context of facilities, and develop closure and realignment recommendations based on force structure plans of the Armed Forces and on selection criteria. To analyze the issues, each JCSG developed data call questions to obtain information about the functions that they reviewed.

BRAC Data Calls. The BRAC 2005 data collection process, mandated for the United States and its territories, was divided into the following data calls--capacity analysis, supplemental capacity, military value, Cost of Base Realignment Actions (COBRA), Joint Process Action Team Criterion Number 7 (JPAT 7), and scenario specific. The supplemental capacity, military value, COBRA, and JPAT 7 data calls are collectively known as the second data call. The Services, Defense agencies, and Defense-wide Organizations used either automated data collection tools or a manual process to collect data call responses. Each data call had a specific purpose as follows.

- The capacity analysis data call gathered data on infrastructure, current workload, surge requirements, and maximum capacity.
- The supplemental capacity data call clarified inconsistent data gathered with the initial capacity questions.
- The military value data call gathered data on mission requirements, land and facilities, mobilization and contingency, and cost and manpower.
- The COBRA data call gathered data to develop costs, savings, and payback (formerly known as return on investments) of proposed realignment and closure actions.

- The JPAT 7 data call gathered data to assess the community's ability to support additional forces, missions, and personnel associated with individual scenarios.[1]

- The scenario specific data call questions gathered data related to specific scenario conditions for realignment or closure.

Internal Control Plans (ICPs). Before the BRAC data calls were released to the Services and Defense agencies, OSD required the Services, Defense agencies, and Defense-Wide Organizations to prepare ICPs that incorporated and supplemented the OSD ICP. The OSD ICP was issued in the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics' memorandum "Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005) Policy Memorandum One-Policy, Responsibilities, and Procedures," April 16, 2003. To comply with that requirement, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) prepared "Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 2005 Internal Control Plan for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)"on December 19, 2003. For the capacity analysis and second data calls, DARPA used Microsoft Word, Excel, and Access.

DoD Office of the Inspector General (DoD OIG) Responsibility. Pursuant to the "Transformation Through Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC 2005) Policy Memorandum One-Policy, Responsibilities, and Procedures," April 16, 2003, DoD OIG provided advice and recommendations on ICP development and implementation, reviewed the accuracy of BRAC data and evaluated the certification process. In addition, DoD OIG personnel assisted the JCSGs and DoD Components as needed. This report summarizes issues related to the DARPA BRAC 2005 process.

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. DARPA was originally established in 1958 to prevent technological surprises like the launch of Sputnik, which signaled that the Soviets had beaten the U.S. into space. The DARPA is not tied to a specific operational mission, but it supplies technological options for the DoD, mines fundamental discoveries, accelerates their development, and lowers their risks until they can be adopted by the Services.

[1] A scenario is a description of one or more potential closure or realignment actions identified for formal analyses by either a JCSG or a Military Department.

Objectives

The overall objective of the audit was to evaluate the validity, integrity, and supporting documentation of data that DARPA collected and submitted for the BRAC 2005 process. In addition, we evaluated whether DARPA complied with the OSD and DARPA ICPs. This report is one in a series on data call submissions and internal control processes for BRAC 2005. See Appendix A for a discussion of the scope and methodology and prior coverage related to the audit objectives.

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency's Base Realignment and Closure 2005 Data Call Submissions and Internal Control Processes

DARPA reported BRAC 2005 data that were generally supported, complete, and accurate after corrections were made. All responses in the capacity analysis data call were corrected and are now supported. In the second data call, responses Technical JCSG military value questions 3017 through 3020 and Technical JCSG supplemental capacity questions 4277 through 4279 are still unsupported; no other source documentation can or will be provided based on the complexity of obtaining this documentation. DARPA provided reasonable responses to the scenario specific data call questions and adequate supporting documentation. The site data collection processes for the capacity data call, second data call, and scenario specific data call generally complied with applicable ICPs. The DARPA ICP properly incorporated and supplemented the OSD ICP. We identified a management control weakness with an unsigned nondisclosure agreement that DARPA corrected during the audit. The lack of supporting documentation and the unsigned nondisclosure agreement are considered immaterial and should not affect the reliability and integrity of the overall DARPA data for the BRAC 2005 analysis.

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency BRAC 2005 Data Call Submissions

The BRAC 2005 data that DARPA reported were generally supported, complete, and accurate after corrections were made. We evaluated the validity, integrity, and supporting documentation. Specifically, we compared responses to supporting documentation and reviewed "Not Applicable" (N/A) question responses to determine whether the responses were reasonable.

Capacity Analysis Data Call. DARPA provided accurate, reasonable question responses and adequate support for the capacity analysis data call, after corrections were made. For the capacity analysis data call, DARPA received 753 questions. We evaluated the 32 responses and supporting documentation for DARPA. In addition, we reviewed the reasonableness for 721 "Not Applicable" responses, and determined those responses to be reasonable. We also identified responses with inadequate support and inaccurate information and, as a result, DARPA revised its responses and provided the necessary supporting documentation. We verified and concurred with the changes. See Appendix A for a list of questions reviewed. We did not verify that the changes were made to the OSD Database.

Second Data Call. DARPA provided accurate, reasonable responses and adequate supporting documentation for the second data call after corrections were made. DARPA received 175 questions--11 H&SA JCSG military value questions, 20 JPAT 7 questions, 8 COBRA questions, 12 H&SA JCSG supplemental capacity questions, 28 Technical JCSG military value questions, 10 Technical supplemental capacity questions, 55 Education and Training JCSG supplemental capacity questions, 26 Medical JCSG military value questions, and 5 Medical JCSG supplemental capacity questions.

We evaluated the responses and supporting documentation. We also reviewed the reasonableness for "Not Applicable" responses and determined those responses to be reasonable. We identified responses with inadequate support and inaccurate information and, as a result, DARPA revised its responses and provided the necessary supporting documentation. We verified and concurred with the changes. See Appendix A for a list of questions reviewed. We did not verify that the changes were made to the OSD Database. However, responses to Technical JCSG military value questions 3017 through 3020 and Technical JCSG supplemental capacity questions 4277 through 4279 are still unsupported; no other source documentation can or will be provided based on the complexity of obtaining this documentation.

Fort Myer provided DARPA responses for JPAT 7 question numbers 1400, 1405, 1406, 1407, 1409, and 1417. We did not audit the accuracy or the supporting documentation for Fort Myer's responses. BRAC instructions stated that sites could obtain and use responses from military bases near the sites. Changes could have been made to the JPAT 7 data after our site visits that were not verified. Also, we did not determine whether the support was reasonable or accurate for H&SA JCSG question numbers 1907[2] and 1908[3] because we were unable to validate the steps taken to generate the responses.

Scenario Specific Data Call. DARPA provided reasonable responses to the scenario specific data call questions and adequate supporting documentation. We evaluated seven Technical JCSG scenarios and one Medical JCSG scenario for DARPA, which provided reasonable explanations of the methodologies used to respond to the scenarios, and the responses were adequately supported with documentation. All DARPA responses to the scenario specific data call were certified as accurate and complete to the best of the certifier's knowledge and belief.

[2] The question asks for the number of meetings between an organization's senior officials, including flag and general officers, and senior officials from another organization located in the Washington, D.C., area.

[3] The question asks for the number of meetings between an organizations senior officials, including flag and general officers, and Members of Congress or their staffs.

Internal Control Processes

The data collection processes that DARPA used for the capacity data call, second data call, and scenario specific data call generally complied with applicable ICPs. DARPA properly incorporated and supplemented the OSD ICP into the DARPA ICP.

We evaluated whether DARPA complied with the ICPs for the capacity analysis data call, the second data call, and the scenario specific data call. The evaluation included reviewing whether the DARPA ICP incorporated the OSD ICP and whether DARPA completed nondisclosure agreements, and marked and safeguarded BRAC data.

Completeness of ICPs. The DARPA BRAC 2005 ICP describes responsibilities and procedures for BRAC 2005 to ensure accurate and complete data from a properly documented and auditable process. The ICPs established DARPA BRAC 2005 responsibilities and control mechanisms to safeguard DARPA BRAC information. Specifically, the DARPA ICP included direction on completing nondisclosure agreements and collecting, marking, safeguarding, and maintaining BRAC data.

Compliance with ICPs. DARPA was generally compliant with the ICP procedures. The data collection processes for the capacity analysis, second, and scenario specific data calls complied with applicable ICPs. Specifically, we reviewed BRAC documents to determine whether data were appropriately marked with header or footer information, secured in locked containers, and that personnel had signed nondisclosure agreements. We identified a control weakness with nondisclosure agreements in that the deputy director did not sign a nondisclosure agreement. The DARPA management corrected the control weakness during the audit; therefore, we consider the identified weakness to be immaterial, and it will not affect the integrity of the BRAC data submitted to the OSD BRAC office. DARPA generally complied with applicable ICPs.

Conclusion

DARPA reported BRAC data that were generally supported, complete, and accurate, after corrections were made, and the data collection processes generally complied with the ICPs. We discussed the results of the data call submissions and ICP review with DARPA management. DARPA management concurred with the findings and corrected or more fully supported the questionable responses. In the capacity analysis data call, we identified responses with inadequate supporting documentation and inaccurate information and, as a result, DARPA revised responses and provided the necessary supporting documentation. In the second data call, we identified responses with inadequate supporting documentation and inaccurate information and, as a result, DARPA revised responses and provided the necessary supporting documentation. We verified and concurred with the

changes. Responses to second data call questions 3017 through 3020 and 4277 through 4279 are still unsupported, and no other source documentation can or will be provided. However, DARPA provided reasonable explanations of the methodologies used to respond to the scenarios, and their methodologies were adequately supported with documentation. We determined that the identified control weakness for nondisclosure agreements was corrected and therefore immaterial. Despite the unsupported responses and immaterial control weakness, DARPA generally complied with BRAC 2005 requirements and we consider the DARPA data to be generally reasonable and supported and it should not affect the reliability and integrity of the DARPA data in the BRAC 2005 analysis.

Appendix A. Scope and Methodology

We evaluated the validity, integrity, and supporting documentation of DARPA BRAC 2005 data. The evaluation included comparing question responses to supporting documentation and reviewing Not Applicable (N/A) responses to determine whether responses were reasonable. Questions had either an answer or an N/A response; an N/A response was for questions that did not apply to a site. We determined that the DARPA ICP incorporated the requirements of the OSD ICP.

We evaluated site data collection procedures to determine whether the procedures were in compliance with DARPA ICP procedures for collecting, storing, accessing, and controlling BRAC information and whether BRAC information was certified for accuracy and completeness. In addition, we interviewed the personnel responsible for preparing and certifying the responses to the data calls. We did not verify that the DARPA responses were in the OSD Database for the capacity and second data calls.

Capacity Analysis Data Call. DARPA received 753 capacity analysis data call questions, reviewed the data call questions, and determined which data call questions were applicable. We evaluated the data call questions at DARPA, and issued one site memorandum to summarize the results. We reviewed the DARPA selection process for the reasonableness of the "Not Applicable" questions and found the process to be reasonable. Specifically, we reviewed the following responses and supporting documentation.

Table 1. Capacity Analysis Data Call Questions Reviewed

Defense Agency Site	Question Number	
	Answered	Not Applicable
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Headquarters, Arlington, Virginia	11, 23, 24, 27, 29, 210, 214, 219, 327, 446, 455-457, 462, 466, 582, 690, 691, and 734-747	1-10, 12-22, 25, 26, 28, 30-209, 211-213, 215-218, 220-326, 328-445, 447-454, 458-461, 463-465, 467-581, 583-689, 692-733, and 748-753

Second Data Call. DARPA received 175 questions from the JCSGs. Specifically, DARPA received 11 H&SA JCSG military value questions (1905, 1907 through 1911, 1913 through 1917) and 12 H&SA JCSG supplemental capacity questions (4072 through 4074, 4079, 4080, 4081, 4096, 4099 through 4103), 55 Education and Training JCSG supplemental capacity questions (4000, 4002, through 4053, 4061, 4062), 28 Technical JCSG military value questions (3000 through 3027), 10 Technical JCSG supplemental capacity questions (4277 through 4286), 26 Medical JCSG military value questions (2600, 2617, 2629,

2634 through 2656), 5 Medical JCSG supplemental capacity questions (4242 through 4246), 8 COBRA questions (1500 through 1507), and 20 JPAT 7 questions (1400 through 1417[4], 1420, 1421).

We reviewed the DARPA selection process for the reasonableness of the "Not Applicable" questions and found the process to be reasonable. DARPA complied with the requirement for all stand-alone facilities and host installations to answer JPAT 7 and COBRA data call questions, which includes leased facilities. DARPA is a leased facility. Fort Myer provided DARPA responses for JPAT 7 question numbers 1400, 1405, 1406, 1407, 1409, and 1417. We did not audit the accuracy or the supporting documentation for Fort Myer's responses. BRAC instructions stated that sites could obtain and use responses from military bases near the sites. Also, we did not determine whether the support was reasonable or accurate for H&SA JCSG question numbers 1907[5] and 1908[6] because we were unable to validate the steps taken to generate the responses. Technical JCSG military value questions 3017 through 3020 and Technical JCSG supplemental capacity questions 4277 through 4279 are still unsupported; no other source documentation can or will be provided based on the complexity of obtaining this documentation. Changes could have been made to the JPAT 7 data after our visit that we did not verify.

In addition to reviewing the second data call responses; we followed up on outstanding issues from the capacity analysis data call involving question numbers 690, 745, and 747.

We issued a site memorandum to summarize the results of the site visit. Specifically, we reviewed the following responses and supporting documentation at DARPA.

Table 2. Second Data Call Questions Reviewed

Defense Agency Site	Question Number	
	Answered	Not Applicable
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency Headquarters, Arlington, Virginia	1400-1417, 1420, 1421, 1501, 1505, 1905, 1907-1911, 1915-1917, 3000-3003, 3005, 3006, 3008, 3009, 3013, 3016-3021, 3024, 3026, 4081, 4096, 4099-4103, 4277, 4278, and 4279	1500, 1502-1504, 1506, 1507, 1913, 1914, 2600, 2617, 2629, 2634-2656, 3004, 3007, 3010-3012, 3014, 3015, 3022, 3023, 3025, 3027, 4000, 4002-4053, 4061, 4062, 4072-4074, 4079, 4080, 4242-4246, and 4280-4286

[4] JPAT 7 replaced JPAT 7 question numbers 1418 and 1419 with JPAT 7 question numbers 1420 and 1421.

[5] The question asks for the number of meetings between an organization's senior officials, including flag and general officers, and senior officials from another organization located in the Washington, D.C., area.

[6] The question asks for the number of meetings between an organizations senior officials, including flag and general officers, and Members of Congress or their staffs.

Scenario Specific Data Call. As of March 3, 2005, the Technical JCSG and Medical JCSG had assigned eight scenario specific data calls to DARPA. The Technical JCSG assigned scenario numbers 10, 32, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 46, and the Medical JCSG assigned scenario number 28. We evaluated the scenario responses from DARPA Headquarters for reasonableness and adequate supporting documentation.

We performed this audit from March 2004 through March 2005 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Use of Computer-Processed Data. We did not test the accuracy of the computer-processed data used to support an answer to a data call question because of time constraints. Potential inaccuracies in the data could affect the results. However, the BRAC data were certified as accurate and complete to the best of the certifier's knowledge and belief. We did not review the data gathering tools used.

Government Accountability Office High-Risk Areas. The Government Accountability Office has identified several high-risk areas in DoD. This report provides coverage of the Federal Real Property and DoD Support Infrastructure Management high-risk areas.

Management Control Program Review

We did not review the DARPA management control program because its provisions did not apply to the one-time data collection process. However, we evaluated the DARPA management controls for preparing, submitting, documenting, and safeguarding information associated with the BRAC 2005 data calls, as directed by the applicable ICPs. Specifically, we reviewed the procedures that DARPA used to develop, submit, and document data call responses. In addition, we reviewed the controls implemented to certify and maintain BRAC documentation in accordance with applicable ICPs. Management controls were adequate as they applied to the audit objective (see the finding discussion for further details). The data collection processes that DARPA used for the capacity data call, the second data call, and the scenario specific data call complied with applicable ICPs. DARPA properly incorporated the OSD ICP into the DARPA ICP, which included direction on completing nondisclosure agreements and collecting, marking, safeguarding, and maintaining BRAC data. We identified a control weakness with the nondisclosure agreements in that the deputy director did not sign a nondisclosure agreement. The DARPA management corrected the control weakness during the audit; therefore, we consider the identified weakness to be immaterial, and it will not affect the reliability and integrity of the BRAC data submitted to the Office of the Secretary of Defense BRAC Office.

Prior Coverage

During the last 5 years, the DoD OIG has issued two site memorandums discussing the DARPA BRAC 2005 data call submissions and internal control processes.

DoD IG

Site Memorandums

DoD OIG Memorandum, "Audit on the Second Data Call Submission for Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Arlington, Virginia for Base Realignment and Closure 2005 (Project No. D2004AB-0085.002)," March 01, 2005

DoD OIG Memorandum, "Audit on the Capacity Analysis Data Call Submission From Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency for Base Realignment and Closure 2005 (Project No. D2004AB-0085.001)," April 15, 2004

Appendix B. Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Director, Base Realignment and Closure (Installations and Environment)

Defense Agency

Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency

Non-Defense Federal Organization

Government Accountability Office

Team Members

The Department of Defense Office of the Deputy Inspector General for Auditing, Acquisition and Technology Management prepared this report. Personnel of the Department of Defense Office of Inspector General who contributed to the report are listed below.

Bruce A. Burton
Rudolf Noordhuzien
Lisa E. Novis
Chrispian M. Brake
Paul R. Glenn
Kiana E. Silver
Jacqueline M. Pugh